scholarly journals Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marieke Pahlke
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Consistency ◽  
Multiple Priors ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
Information Games

Strategic Interaction and Interstate Crises: A Bayesian Quantal Response Estimator for Incomplete Information Games

2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Esarey ◽  
Bumba Mukherjee ◽  
Will H. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Learning Process ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Statistical Treatment ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
Information Characteristics ◽  
Information Games

Private information characteristics like resolve and audience costs are powerful influences over strategic international behavior, especially crisis bargaining. As a consequence, states face asymmetric information when interacting with one another and will presumably try to learn about each others' private characteristics by observing each others' behavior. A satisfying statistical treatment would account for the existence of asymmetric information and model the learning process. This study develops a formal and statistical framework for incomplete information games that we term the Bayesian Quantal Response Equilibrium Model (BQRE model). Our BQRE model offers three advantages over existing work: it directly incorporates asymmetric information into the statistical model's structure, estimates the influence of private information characteristics on behavior, and mimics the temporal learning process that we believe takes place in international politics.

Military Capabilities and Escalation: A Correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 425-427 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Cristina Molinari
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Information Games

Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two-sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict. I show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions, and I offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games.

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