Insider Trading and the Public Enforcement of Private Prohibitions: Some Complications in Enforcing Simple Rules for a Complex World

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert T. Miller
Author(s):  
Marcus de Freitas Gouvea

Resumo O Brasil inicia uma fase de aplicação da lei que rege o mercado de capitais, pela iniciativa privada, não em rompimento, mas em acréscimo a aplicação do direito por órgãos públicos. Aplicação da lei por iniciativa dos particulares vem a reboque do contexto histórico, relacionado tanto a ações privadas, individuais e coletivas, de outros ramos do direito, como consumidor, concorrência, quanto a notícias de escândalos e de combate a corrupção, envolvendo infrações ao mercado. Este texto procura apresentar as linhas gerais dos ilícitos mais importantes contra o mercado de capitais bem como das ações privadas de aplicação do direito que o regula. Dentre as infrações, o texto discute a manipulação do mercado, o uso indevido de informações privilegiadas e outros delitos informacionais. Quanto as ações, o artigo aponta os requisitos básicos da ação individual, da ação civil pública e da ação de responsabilidade do administrador, como meios de reparação de danos decorrentes de infrações ao mercado de capitais. Abstract Brazil begins to experience a private enforcement era of the law of the capital market, in addition to the public enforcement. The private enforcement of the securities law has been influenced by the development of the individual or class actions based on the law that regulates other areas, v.g. consumers law and antitrust law, and by news about the fight against corruption in Brazil. This paper presents the framework of the most important types of capital market misconducts and of the kinds of actions that can be used to enforce the law. The text discuss the practice of market manipulation, insider trading and other practices related to disclosure of information. Among the types of actions, the text discuss the basic requirements of the individual action, the collective action and the derivative action as ways to enforce the securities law in Brazil.  


2021 ◽  
pp. 258-310
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter explains the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 by European Commission and the national competition authorities under Regulation 1/2003. It begins by describing the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, including its power to accept commitments, its leniency programme, the cartel settlement procedure, and its power to impose financial penalties. It then discusses the operation of Regulation 1/2003 in practice, with particular reference to the European Competition Network (‘the ECN’) that brings together the Commission and the national competition authorities of the Member States (‘the NCAs’) and the ECN+ Directive that strengthens the powers of the NCAs. The chapter concludes by providing a brief account of judicial review of the Commission’s decisions.


Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne

This chapter discusses the public enforcement regime for the application of Articles 101 and 102 under Regulation 1/2003. It explains the system that applied previously under Regulation 17, and the reasons for, and salient features of, the ‘modernisation’ introduced by Regulation 1/2003. The chapter then examines: the complaints procedure; the powers of the Commission, including the investigation and inter partes stages of its procedure; the decisions which the Commission may take, including decisions imposing fines and commitments decisions; judicial review by the EU Courts; the European Competition Network (ECN) and enforcement by national competition authorities, including the changes to be introduced by the ECN+ Directive; and the possibility of sanctions against individuals.. The chapter also considers the application of fundamental rights provisions in EU competition proceedings.


Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne

This chapter sketches the history and functions of the EU and its institutions in order to set the EU competition rules in context. It then describes the competition provisions themselves and outlines the way in which the rules are applied and enforced, including the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 under Regulation 1/2003, the control of mergers with a European dimension under Regulation 139/2004, public enforcement by the national competition authorities of the Member States, and the role of private enforcement. It discusses the position and powers of the European Commission, particularly the role of the Competition Directorate General (DG Comp); the powers of the EU Courts; the significance of fundamental rights and the general principles of EU law in competition cases; the application of competition rules to particular sectors of the economy; and the application of the EU rules to the EEA.


2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 511-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabrina S. Chi ◽  
Morton Pincus ◽  
Siew Hong Teoh

ABSTRACT We find evidence that investors misprice information contained in book-tax differences (BTDs), measured as the ratio of taxable income to book income, TI/BI. Low TI/BI predicts worse earnings growth and abnormal stock returns than high TI/BI. We find that short sellers and insiders arbitrage BTD mispricing, but the arbitrage is imperfect because of constraints on short selling and insider trading. Under SFAS No. 109 the predictability is stronger for TEMP/BI, the temporary component of TI/BI, which reflects greater managerial discretion. The results are incremental to a large set of known accruals-based anomaly predictors. We suggest that a sunshine policy of disclosing a reconciliation of book and taxable incomes can reduce mispricing of BTDs and improve capital market resource allocation. Data Availability: Data are obtained from the public sources as indicated in the text.


2000 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Mitchell Polinsky ◽  
Steven Shavell

This article surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law—the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first present the basic elements of the theory, focusing on the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions, and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, concerning accidental harms, costs of imposing fines, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, the principal-agent relationship, settlements, self-reporting, repeat offenders, imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of fines, and incapacitation.


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