scholarly journals Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torsten Heinrich ◽  
Yoojin Jang ◽  
Luca Mungo ◽  
Marco Pangallo ◽  
Alex Scott ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Convergence To Equilibrium ◽  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Random Games

scholarly journals Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Amiet ◽  
Andrea Collevecchio ◽  
Marco Scarsini ◽  
Ziwen Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Approximation Error ◽  
Pure Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Asymptotic Results ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Random Games ◽  
Pure Equilibria

In finite games, mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large number of players can each choose one of two possible strategies and the payoffs are independent and identically distributed with the possibility of ties. We provide asymptotic results about the random number of pure Nash equilibria, such as fast growth and a central limit theorem, with bounds for the approximation error. Moreover, by using a new link between percolation models and game theory, we describe in detail the geometry of pure Nash equilibria and show that, when the probability of ties is small, a best-response dynamics reaches a pure Nash equilibrium with a probability that quickly approaches one as the number of players grows. We show that various phase transitions depend only on a single parameter of the model, that is, the probability of having ties.

scholarly journals Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk–dove game

2017 ◽  
Vol 153 ◽  
pp. 61-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Benndorf ◽  
Ismael Martínez-Martínez
Keyword(s):  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response

Modeling Evacuees’ Exit Selection with Best Response Dynamics

2009 ◽  
pp. 309-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harri Ehtamo ◽  
Simo Heliövaara ◽  
Simo Hostikka ◽  
Timo Korhonen
Keyword(s):  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response
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