Pollution permits and financing costs

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio Antoniou ◽  
Manthos D. Delis ◽  
Steven R. G. Ongena ◽  
Chris Tsoumas
2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Zhiyu Feng ◽  
Will Jianyu Lu ◽  
Caroline H. Zhu

AbstractCapital outflows after financial integration can lead to simultaneous increases in the national savings rate and asset prices of an economy with substantial financing costs. Under autarky, firms invest in risky capital while facing a borrowing constraint that creates a need for precautionary savings. Financial integration provides firms with access to foreign risk-free assets and results in two effects: a substitution effect, whereby firms divert some investments to foreign assets and cause capital outflows; and a wealth effect, whereby they grow richer in equilibrium and thus demand more domestic capital. Savings gluts and asset price booms occur when the wealth effect dominates.


Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Karen L. Palmer ◽  
William Shobe ◽  
Dallas Burtraw

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasai Liu

Several real estate enterprises in China (hereinafter referred to as housing enterprises) rely on overseas financing to meet their financing needs, but it is fraught with challenges such as high financing costs. Premised on the internationalization of finance, combined with the background of "staying and not speculating" and establishing a long-term mechanism for real estate market, based on the investigation of the financing motives of real estate enterprises, combined with a large amount of data, the present study examines the current situation and predicament of overseas financing of housing enterprises. It proposes four feasible countermeasures to promote sustainable development of real estate enterprises overseas financing including building a special financing system to reduce the cost, expanding various financing channels, strengthening the supervision of overseas bond financing, and reducing the loss devaluation of RMB internally and externally.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (176) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Garcia-Macia

Why did the Great Recession lead to such a slow recovery? I build a model where heterogeneous firms invest in physical and intangible capital, and can default on their debt. In case of default, intangible assets are harder to seize by creditors. Hence, intangible capital faces higher financing costs. This differential is exacerbated in a financial crisis, when default is more likely and aggregate risk bears a higher premium. The resulting fall in intangible investment amplifies the crisis, and gradual intangible spillovers to other firms contribute to its persistence. Using panel data on Spanish manufacturing firms, I estimate the model matching firm-level moments regarding intangibles and financing. The model captures the extent and components of the Great Recession in Spanish manufacturing, whereas a standard model without endogenous intangible investment would miss more than half of the GDP fall. A policy of transfers conditional on firm age could speed up the recovery, as young firms tend to be more financially constrained, particularly regarding intangible investment. Conditioning transfers on firm size or subsidizing credit (as in current E.U. policy) appears to be less effective.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Michaels ◽  
T Beau Page ◽  
Toni M Whited

Abstract We assemble a new, quarterly panel dataset that links firms’ investment and financing to their employment and wages. In the data, wages and leverage are negatively related, both cross-sectionally and within firms. This pattern contradicts models in which firms insure workers against unemployment risk. We reconcile this fact with a model that integrates factor adjustment frictions and wage bargaining with costly external financing. In the model, the probability of default rises with debt. Because default incurs deadweight costs, the expected surplus over which firms and workers bargain falls, thus depressing wages. We show that raising financing costs reduces employment and wages, in line with recent reduced-form evidence.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 3075-3104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Bird ◽  
Stephen A Karolyi ◽  
Thomas G Ruchti

Abstract To mitigate holdup by an informed incumbent lender, a private borrower may publicly share information in order to increase lender competition. Despite proprietary costs, a subset of private borrowers voluntarily share private information in loan and credit underwriting agreements. These borrowers switch lenders at a 16% higher rate and receive lower loan financing costs. For private firms that go public, we analyze changes in the net benefits of information sharing and study the potential estimation bias from unobservable borrower quality. This setting corroborates our inference that voluntary information sharing reduces lender holdup and alleviates financial constraints for private firms. Received May 25, 2017; editorial decision August 8, 2018 by Editor David Denis.


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