Lobbying as a Source of Rent Seeking: Clarification of the Relationship Between Corporate Lobbying and Firm Tax Benefits

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Carter
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Corporate Lobbying ◽  
Tax Benefits ◽  
The Relationship

The State is Captured Before It Exists

2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-58
Author(s):  
David B. Kanin
Keyword(s):  
Civic Education ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Inverse Relationship ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
Patronage Politics ◽  
State Capture ◽  
Political Entrepreneurs ◽  
Social Management ◽  
The Relationship

Analysts of “State Capture” too often treat the phenomenon as an outside-in process. They identify firms or rent-seeking political entrepreneurs that take over, subvert, or otherwise bend political structures to serve their parochial interests. The key to solving the perceived problem is supposed to lie in better governance, strengthened judicial systems, civic education, and transparency in political and civic activities. This essay will suggest this construct involves a misunderstanding of the relationship between patronage networks and supposedly “legitimate” legal and constitutional institutions enshrined in a teleology of Democracy and Rule-of-Law performances. Patronage politics in the Balkans produces pragmatic social management patterns, not just theft by greedy firms and selfish individuals. This argument builds on Charles Tilly’s observation of the inverse relationship between Democracy and trust to explain why externally imposed programs of civic education and political reform designed to free a state from its perceived capture fail to do much more than recruit a thin sliver of local civic activists, scold “captured” populations, and undermine the credibility of international overseers.

Spillovers from public entrepreneurship: a case study

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caleb Fuller ◽  
Dylan DelliSanti
Keyword(s):  
Political Engagement ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
City Government ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Economic Calculation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Public Entrepreneurship ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose Existing scholarship indicates that more research is needed to explore beneficial spillovers from public entrepreneurship. The purpose of this paper is to fill the gap in that literature by examining a case of public entrepreneurship by a corporation. While political engagement by private firms frequently reduces to rent-seeking, this paper explores an instance in which public entrepreneurship by a private firm lead to beneficial spillovers – specifically, positive externalities resulting from the engagement of Cummins Engine Company with city government in Columbus, Indiana. In the case study, these spillovers consist of improved infrastructure, altered norms, and the reintroduction of economic calculation. Design/methodology/approach This case study uses publications in popular outlets, newspapers, and historical documents to understand the relationship between Cummins Engine Company and its local government. Findings Contrary to the presumption that public engagement by private firms necessarily reduces to rent-seeking, the activities of the Cummins Engine Company lead to beneficial public spillovers by way of improved infrastructure and norms, as well as by restoring a degree of economic calculation to the production of public buildings in Columbus, Indiana. Originality/value The authors illustrate the precise mechanisms that generate the potential spillovers from public entrepreneurship that Klein et al. (2010) explore theoretically.

The Welfare Implications of Rent Control: A Rent-Seeking Contest Approach

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang-Ming Chang ◽  
Shane D. Sanders
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Social Cost ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Control Model ◽  
Random Allocation ◽  
Rent Control ◽  
Welfare Implications ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
High Willingness

Abstract This paper uses a contest approach to characterize a probabilistic, non-price contest between potential consumers of rent-controlled apartments. The model extends upon the rent control model of Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) as well as the rent-seeking contributions of Hurley (1998), Dixit (1987), and Hirshleifer (1989) to consider the roles of chance and endogenously-chosen efforts in the allocation of rent-controlled apartments. Nash equilibrium effort levels for each consumer-type imply that the effort-inducing cost of rent control is greater than the misallocative cost. Further, misallocative costs are lower under the effort contest interpretation than under random allocation, as high willingness to pay consumers allocates more effort. The relationship between effort contest and misallocation influences the policy’s overall social cost.

scholarly journals Problems of Modeling the Relationship of Family Related Groups and the State in Political Rent-Seeking Society

2020 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 01039
Author(s):  
Rais Burganov ◽  
Elena Dolonina ◽  
Zulfia Burganova
Keyword(s):  
Developed Countries ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
State Regulation ◽  
The State ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Human Society ◽  
Proactive Measures ◽  
The Developed Countries ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

The search for political rent is an essential attribute of the coexistence of the interests of family-related groups and the state. A civilized solution to problems in this area has not been fully developed, even in the developed countries of the world. In the media, materials on clan approaches to the distribution of the country's resources are regularly thrown up, which increases tension in human society and uncertainties in future development. In order to take proactive measures, it is necessary to model the state and prospects of the relationship of family-related groups and the state. The paper discusses some approaches to modeling the relationship of family-related groups and the state in political rent-seeking societ. The research methodology uses data from a survey of student youth, which is divided into three groups: students' perceptions of the current political and economic atmosphere of society, assessment of opportunities for access to political rent through family-related ties, assessment of measures for state regulation of the process of obtaining political rent by representatives of family-related groups society. According to the author, in the political life of society, institutions should be created to regulate the behavior of family-related groups in the implementation of political rents.

scholarly journals Do policies and institutions matter for pre-tax income inequality? Cross-country evidence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damián Vergara
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Income Inequality ◽  
Trade Openness ◽  
Government Expenditure ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Income Taxation ◽  
Political Exclusion ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractDo policies and institutions matter for pre-tax income inequality? I build an annual panel of 43 countries for the period 1980–2016 to document cross-country facts. I find robust correlations between pre-tax income shares and economic policy—financial development, trade openness, government expenditure, and income taxation—even after controlling for economic development. I further find that proxies of institutional quality—e.g., state development, corruption, or political exclusion—mediate the relationship between top income shares and economic policy, in particular for trade openness and government expenditure. The role of institutions in allowing or limiting rent-seeking can rationalize the results.

Media and Litigation

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gil S. Epstein ◽  
Renana Lindner Pomerantz
Keyword(s):  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Civil Litigation ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
True Position ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Relationship

In this paper we consider the relationship between the media and the outcome of civil litigation. We present a model dividing lawsuits into two main stages: a signaling stage and a rent-seeking contest. During the first stage the judge is exposed to signals regarding the true position of the defendant, and in addition pays attention to signals reported by the media. The judge forms an initial prejudice towards the plaintiff and the defendant based on the ratio between the true merit of the case and the burden of proof required to establish the plaintiff’s claim (the preponderance of the evidence). Then, we turn to the second stage and provide the plaintiff and the defendant with an opportunity to invest resources in order to influence their winning probabilities. We show how the media can influence the process with biased reports.

scholarly journals Public Spending, Quality of Bureaucracy and Economic Growth: A Theoretical Analysis

2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-221
Author(s):  
Shaheen Naseer
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Public Spending ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Public Expenditures ◽  
Potential Output ◽  
Output Loss ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This paper develops a theoretical framework to investigate the relationship between public spending and economic growth, where public spending provides both productive capital and unproductive services. We take into account the quality of bureaucracy with the possibility of rent-seeking motives. A key feature of the model is that it distinguishes between utility enhancing and productivity enhancing public spending. In the absence of rent-seeking motives, the paper demonstrates that public spending will promote economic growth only if marginal productivity of spending is high enough to offset the potential output loss due to increased taxation. In the presence of rent-seeking, however, the impact of public spending on economic growth depends on the quality of bureaucracy and how the latter impinges upon the rentseeking behaviour. The analysis shows that while improvement in bureaucratic quality would unambiguously raise the share of utility enhancing public spending, its impact on economic growth would depend on how bureaucratic quality influences the relative magnitudes of the two types of public spending as well as on how far bureaucratic extraction will be controlled as a result of improvement in bureaucratic quality. Bureaucratic extraction is likely to be minimised with strong institutions and effective monitoring and accountability mechanisms thereby improving the prospects of economic growth. JEL Classification: C61, D23, D61, D73, H50 Keywords: Rent-seeking, Quality of Bureaucracy, Public Goods, Public Expenditures

scholarly journals The Influence of Political Connection on Tax Avoidance

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-90
Author(s):  
Zaga Kresna Pratama Putra ◽  
Novrys Suhardianto
Keyword(s):  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Supporting Evidence ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
Upper Echelon ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Upper Echelon Theory ◽  
Political Experience ◽  
The Relationship

The upper echelon theory and rent-seeking theory propose conflicting arguments related to the relationship between a firm’s political connection and tax avoidance. This research aims to examine the relationship between a firm’s political connection and tax avoidance. The 1,079 samples used in this research are public companies with positive income in the 2014-2018 period. By using regression analysis, this research finds that political connection has a negative relationship with tax avoidance, implying that political connection increases tax payment. This research contributes to providing supporting evidence for upper echelon theory by finding that management’s political experience or the intention to maintain a positive image of politically connected management improves tax obedience

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