Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods

On the Essence and Tipology of International Public Goods

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2005-3-131-141 ◽

2005 ◽

pp. 131-141

Author(s):

V. Mortikov

Keyword(s):

Economic Policy ◽

Social Construction ◽

Public Goods ◽

Public Good ◽

Global Public Goods ◽

Club Goods ◽

Basic Properties ◽

International Public Goods ◽

Regional Public Goods ◽

Joint Products

The basic properties of international public goods are analyzed in the paper. Special attention is paid to the typology of international public goods: pure and impure, excludable and nonexcludable, club goods, regional public goods, joint products. The author argues that social construction of international public good depends on many factors, for example, government economic policy. Aggregation technologies in the supply of global public goods are examined.

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Free Riding in the Monastery: Club Goods, the Cistercian Order and Agricultural Investment in Ancien Regime France

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.2967398 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Theresa S Finley

Keyword(s):

Free Riding ◽

Ancien Regime ◽

Club Goods ◽

Agricultural Investment ◽

Cistercian Order ◽

Ancien Régime

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The Kimberley Process, Club Goods, and Public Enforcement of a Private Regime

Voluntary Programs ◽

10.7551/mitpress/7871.003.0009 ◽

2009 ◽

Keyword(s):

Public Enforcement ◽

Club Goods ◽

Kimberley Process

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Specifics of the Production of Pensionary Good in Russia

Moscow University Economics Bulletin ◽

10.38050/013001052020310 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 2020 (3) ◽

pp. 200-219

Author(s):

Viktoriya Moseiko

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Russian Federation ◽

Pension Fund ◽

Pension System ◽

The State ◽

Secondary Importance ◽

Club Goods ◽

Private Goods ◽

Merit Goods ◽

The Russian Federation

The author considers the concept of «pensionary good» and the specifics of its production at the state and non-state levels. The purpose of the study is to analyze the actions aimed at creating a «pensionary good» under the influence of incentives and coercion. Drawing on the theory of goods, the author comes to conclusion that the elements of pensionary good can be produced in the form of public goods, merit goods, club goods and private goods. The author identifies the specifics of pensionary good structure at the analyzed levels and shows that national pension in the Russian Federation is based on coercion, with stimulation being of secondary importance. Non-state-funded retirement also uses the coercion and incentives. It has been established that coercion and incentives provide contradictory results as mechanisms used in the process of producing a pensionary good. While preparing the article, the author used the data from the Federal Statistic Service, the Pension Fund of Russia and various sociological surveys and scientific works on pensions and insurance. The conclusions of the study may be useful for further research on the development of Russian pension system.

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Are Roads Public Goods, Club Goods, Private Goods, or Common Pools?

Explorations in Public Sector Economics ◽

10.1007/978-3-319-47828-9_11 ◽

2016 ◽

pp. 171-213 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Bruce L. Benson

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Club Goods ◽

Private Goods

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Collective contests for commons and club goods

Journal of Public Economics ◽

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.08.004 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 93 (1-2) ◽

pp. 48-55 ◽

Cited By ~ 35

Author(s):

Shmuel Nitzan ◽

Kaoru Ueda

Keyword(s):

Club Goods

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Public Goods, Club Goods, and Private Interests:

Security Studies ◽

10.1080/09636412.2019.1631381 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 28 (4) ◽

pp. 710-738

Author(s):

Edward R. Lucas

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Club Goods ◽

Private Interests

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Engineering popular support for long-ruling parties: the role of clientelism

Japanese Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s146810991900001x ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 20 (2) ◽

pp. 75-92 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Qingjie Zeng

Keyword(s):

Club Goods ◽

Popular Support ◽

Dominant Party ◽

Electoral Support ◽

Combining Data ◽

Incumbent Party ◽

Ruling Party

AbstractIn electorally contested regimes, the incumbent party often uses clientelist exchanges to stay in power long after its underlying electoral support has evaporated. Existing studies failed to examine how the role of clientelism changes with the increasing tenure of the incumbent party. Combining data from the Afrobarometer project and information about partisan turnover, this article shows that the longer a party has remained in power, the more clientelist exchanges in the form of club goods and patronage will serve to bolster popular support for the ruling party. This is mainly because lengthy party duration facilitates the politicization of bureaucracy and other state resources essential for clientelist exchanges. Understanding the evolving role of clientelism under electoral contestation has profound implications for the study of phenomena such as dominant-party rule and democratic erosion.

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