Credit Market Power: Branch-level Evidence from the Great Financial Crisis

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rustam Jamilov
2012 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 607-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentina Hartarska ◽  
Dennis Nadolnyak

We use survey data to study the degree to which new farming operations in Alabama were financially constrained after the 2008 financial crisis. Next, we control for farmers' self-selection out of the credit market and identify which farmers were able to secure loans during the period of 2009–2010. The results show that new farmers that started any part of their operation after 2005 were financially constrained but no evidence that their financing constraints were affected by the crisis. As expected, we find that lending was collateral-driven, although lenders also considered farmers' profitability and cash flows.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-255
Author(s):  
Andi Fahmi Lubis

This study was aimed to estimate the degree of market power exercised by commercial banks incredit market in Indonesia.Model used to answered this study’s objective was Bresnahan-Lau oligopoly model that using structural equations to estimate the degree of market power.This model was using very different approach than Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm that commonly used in market power studies.Without using actual cost data and accounting profit, Bresnahan-Lau model was able to estimate directly the degree of market power from structural equations. The main result of this study was the degree of market power exercised by commercial banks in credit market relatively low; in other words the degree of competition in credit market in Indonesia was quite high.Keywords: market power, oligopoly, Bresnahan-Lau, structure, performance, conduct, SCP.JEL Classification : L13, G21


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Le Moglie ◽  
Giuseppe Sorrenti

We study the investment of organized crime in the legal economy. By using the shock induced on the Italian credit market by the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis, we document how provinces with a high organized crime presence have been impacted less by the crisis in terms of the establishment of new enterprises than provinces with a lower criminal infiltration. We provide evidence that the lower impact of the crisis is consistent with the presence of investments by organized crime in the legal economy. We corroborate this interpretation by comparing our results with the characterization made by the judicial authority of such investments.


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