Digital Markets and Online Platforms: New Perspectives on Regulation and Competition Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Kraemer ◽  
Marc Bourreau ◽  
Sally Broughton Micova ◽  
Alexandre de Streel ◽  
Richard Feasey ◽  
...  
Author(s):  
Miriam Caroline Buiten

Abstract Online platforms increasingly offer consumers services ‘for free’, in exchange for collecting consumers’ personal data. This business model is highly successful, leading some online platforms to gain substantial market power. This market power can cause consumer harm—not through higher prices, but in the form of privacy harm. This article considers what role competition law and data protection law can play in mitigating this harm to privacy. The article considers how we can conceptualize exploitative abuse of dominance cases in zero-price markets. The article calls into question if data protection laws should play a role in antitrust abuse assessments, against the background of the Bundeskartellamt antitrust investigation into Facebook’s data collection practices. The article argues that, even in digital markets that unequivocally link market power with data privacy concerns, competition law and data protection law have complementary but distinct roles to play.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 241-284
Author(s):  
Patrycja Szot ◽  
Ana Amza

This article discusses the framework of selective distribution agreements within EU competition law following the Coty Germany case and the EU Commission’s 2017 E-commerce report. It argues that the judgment removed, in essence, the limitation of sales via online platforms from the ‘by object box’. In respect of luxury goods, the ban is considered not to infringe competition law at all. In this context, the article addresses one of the judgment’s key points: what constitutes a ‘luxury good’ and evaluates to what an extent this definition can be practically applied. The authors also embark on the conditions under which the restriction is considered proportionate (when applied to non-luxury goods) and point to the risk of divergent interpretations of platform bans across member states. To illustrate the latter, several examples are given from national case-law. The considerations are completed with a brief look at problematic restrictions on the use of price comparison tools.


2021 ◽  
pp. 359-388
Author(s):  
Liza Lovdahl Gormsen

In Chapter 14, Liza Lovdahl Gormsen considers the contemporaneous debate on how best to address aspects of the interaction between competition law and the digital economy. She stressed that data is the pinnacle of the digital economy. It has fuelled amazing innovations in all sectors of the economy, but the accumulation of data in the hands of a few global companies may lead to lock-in, bottleneck issues, and leverage. The chapter notes that according to the report Unlocking Digital Competition, which was prepared for the UK Treasury, competition policy will need to be updated to address the novel challenges posed by the digital economy. Some of these updates can happen within current powers, but legal changes are important to ensure that this job can be done effectively. The Competition and Markets Authority’s market study on Online Platforms and Digital Advertising recommends establishing a Digital Markets Unit and ex ante regulation as a possible way forward. Building on the outputs from the Furman Review, the government asked the CMA to lead a Digital Markets Taskforce. In December 2020, the latter published its advice, A New Pro-competition Regime for Digital Markets, where it sets out the role of the Digital Markets Unit and an overview of its proposed regulatory framework for digital firms. This chapter looks at some of the challenges for UK competition policy in digital markets, in particular in relation to data, enforcement, and regulation. It also touches upon some of the potential issues that the UK faces in the digital economy following Brexit.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Botta ◽  
Klaus Wiedemann

AbstractThe advent of big data analytics has favoured the emergence of forms of price discrimination based on consumers’ profiles and their online behaviour (i.e. personalised pricing). The paper analyses this practice as a possible exploitative abuse by dominant online platforms. The paper argues that, in view of its “mixed” effect on consumers’ welfare, personalised pricing requires a case-by-case assessment under EU competition law and thus it should not be banned a priori. However, in view of the recent case law of the European Court of Justice on price discrimination, the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and the European Commission would face a high burden of proof to sanction this conduct under Art. 102(c) TFEU. Finally, the paper argues that, due to its case-by-case approach, competition law seems more suitable than omnibus regulation to tackle the negative effects that personalised pricing could have on consumers’ welfare. In particular, an NCA/the European Commission could negotiate with online platforms different kinds of behavioural commitments: transparency requirements, limits on data collection/user profiling, rights to opt out of personalised pricing and the obligation to share customers’ data with competitors could significantly tame the risks of personalised pricing.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-62
Author(s):  
Pedro Petiz Viana

The 4.0 revolution has reached the legal services industry. New online platforms are emerging to connect clients and lawyers, while also providing new and innovative legal services. Nonetheless, several questions arise regarding these new businesses: How do they fare under the Portuguese regulatory framework? Is there a need for legislative reform? And how are Bar Associations dealing with this new reality? In order to answer these questions, we analyze the characteristics of online legal platforms and their compliance with the statutes of the Portuguese Bar Association and National Law. Secondly, we examine the prohibition by the Portuguese Bar Association of online intermediation platforms, taking into consideration the ECJ’s case law related to professional orders and the EU’s competition law. Thirdly, we study the national legal framework of legal services in light of OECD’s Competition Assessment Review of Portugal. Lastly, we present the recent project by the Portuguese Competition Authority and note its similarities with the ECJ’s case law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 448-499
Author(s):  
Inge Graef

Abstract Differentiated treatment is a key focus in current competition investigations of the European Commission and national competition authorities, ranging from more prominent placement of one's own services in a ranking to preferential access to data and the favouring of businesses that pay higher levels of commission. Based on their exclusionary and/or exploitative character, the paper distinguishes three types of differentiated treatment on online platforms in order to provide an analytical framework for assessing the extent to which such practices are abusive under Article 102 TFEU, namely: pure self-preferencing, pure secondary line differentiation and hybrid differentiation. The paper points out that the main area where EU competition law currently does not offer effective protection is in the most far-reaching situation where a business is blocked from a platform without legitimate justification. To address harm in such cases, the paper suggests giving a stronger role to economic dependence both within and outside EU competition law and explores possible measures building upon the Platform-to-Business (P2B) Regulation as well as the notion of fairness of platform-to-business relations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 698-719
Author(s):  
Ivana Rakić

Fake news is getting more attention because of the Internet and the rise of the online platforms and social networks, particularly in the age of COVID-19. Its sudden popularization creates important issues regarding how this phenomenon affects the society and democracy, as well as the consumers, competition and market. The question is what happens when fake news are spread (online) and misused during pandemic - whether to apply the European Union competition law in such cases? The author considers that European Commission should not deal with fake news challenges in the context of potential anticompetitive conducts. It is pointed out that fake news problem is not a competitive problem because the struggle against fake news is about the content not the competition and market power.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kentaro Hirayama ◽  
Koki Arai

Abstract This study attempts to organize the regulatory perspective on the interaction between information law and competition law, especially for platform businesses. An online platform is an entity that mediates multiple groups of users, such as providers and users of products, services, and information, and has an indirect network effect as a two-sided market. The study illustrates the actions taken by online platforms, indicates attendant problems, and suggests responses to these. Four aspects of the competition policy issues related to online platforms are analyzed and discussed: data collection, data enclosure, data acquisition, and algorithmic transparency. The study considers essential online platform issues, such as promoting competition policy and fairness in information law application, to expand the discussion. Although fairness is important, there is a risk that the analysis of the effects of reducing competition is neglected and that interpreting fairness might increase the concern regarding over-execution. Having disaggregated the elements of fairness, the study suggests the need to establish specific standards.


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