The Judicial Conflict between the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) and the Court of the European Union (ECJ) about the European Central Bank’s (ECB) PSPP-Programme: In the Name of Democracy Against the Primacy of EU Law?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Prof. Dr. Calliess
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

scholarly journals Against Bidimensional Supremacy in EU Constitutionalism

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1006-1022
Author(s):  
Vlad Perju
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Subjective Bias ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

AbstractScholarly consensus sees EU supremacy as “necessarily bidimensional”: the supranational dimension necessarily stands alongside the national dimension, which rejects the absolute and unconditional supremacy of EU law. I argue that this view of bidimensional supremacy is conceptually flawed and descriptively inaccurate. On the conceptual side, I identify the fallacy of symmetry (the idea that national and supranational perspectives on supremacy are similar in nature and equally reductionist), the fallacy of selection (the view that bidimensionalism alone can overcome what it perceives as an inevitable subjective bias in the choice between national and supranational supremacy claims), and the fallacy of construction (an originally shared popular sovereignty theory, which turns out to be riddled with biases that disrupt the equilibrium within the internally divided sovereign). On the interpretative side, I suggest that the empirical evidence in support of bidimensional supremacy is weaker than it is generally assumed. I then offer an interpretation of the PSPP judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which holds a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union to be ultra vires, unlawful and thus non-binding. PSPP presents a problem of German origins and cast, rather than one stemming from the inner structure of EU constitutionalism. At most, PSPP represents a contingent, rather than necessary, and thus unexceptional instance of bidimensional supremacy.

Core of State Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union's Identity in the Lissabon – Urteil

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-418
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Lanza
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.

The Lisbon Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court – New Guidance on the Limits of European Integration?

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 367-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin Steinbach
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Core Competencies ◽  
National Level ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
State Functions

The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has found that there are no constitutional objections against the Lisbon Treaty. At the same time, the FCC imposed limitations to future integration by identifying a number of state functions that are non-amenable to integration and which have to be retained at the national level. This article examines the scope and content of these core competencies. It also discusses to what extent the criteria used by the FCC for the determination of core competencies might reflect a European-wide standard for the determination of limits to the transfer of competencies to the European Union. The article concludes that the judgment clarifies the limitations of the transfer of competencies, even though the criteria used by the FCC cannot claim to produce the set of inalienable sovereign powers that were recognized as such throughout the Union.

scholarly journals Euro-sceptical or Euro-phile? A critical analysis of the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the process of European integration and decision-making

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bernadette Sangmeister
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

<p>On 14 January 2014, for the first time in its history, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) decided to refer a decision to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This referral, which concerned the issue of the legality of the European Central Bank’s bond-buying practices, must be seen as “historic” with regard to European integration and the relationship between European Union law and German constitutional law, forming part of important decisions of the FCC in this field since its first euro-critical judgment, Solange I, 40 years ago. Considering the high influence the German Federal Constitutional Court has had on the process of European integration, this paper aims at identifying and critiquing the lines of argumentation developed by the FCC in recent years in the field of European integration and decision-making before and after the Lisbon judgment in 2009, paying particular attention to the currently suspended OMT Decision proceedings in order to answer the question if a shift in the jurisprudence of the FCC from a euro-sceptical to a euro-phile approach has taken place.</p>

scholarly journals «La integración europea a través del derecho». La contribución del Tribunal Constitucional Federal (alemán)

2017 ◽  
pp. 103
Author(s):  
Andreas Vosskuhle
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
European Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Law ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Muchos actores están involucrados en la implementación de la idea de comunidad jurídica, entre ellos, los parlamentos nacionales, administraciones y tribunales internos que son responsables de la puesta en práctica del Derecho de la Unión Europea. En este estudio se aborda la labor del Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemán en el desarrollo de la integración europea considerando diez impulsos centrales. Además, para finalizar, se aportarán algunas reflexiones realistas sobre las limitaciones del derecho en la solución de vicisitudes en el marco de la Unión Europea.Many stakeholders are involved in implementing the idea of legal community, including national parliaments, administrations and courts, which for their part are responsible for the implementation of European law. This study addresses the work of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the development of European integration by considering ten central impulses. In addition, to conclude, some realistic reflections on the limitations of the law in the solution of vicissitudes in the framework of the European Union will be provided.

Wohin steuern die Ultra-vires- und die Identitätskontrolle? Eine Zwischenbilanz anhand der Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts im PSPP-Verfahren

IG ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-219
Author(s):  
Christian Walter
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Public ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

The article takes stock of the consequences which the decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) concerning the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Union (EU) have had on the relation between EU law and the German constitution. The interplay between the PSPP judgment of 5 May 2020 and a follow-up decision on its enforcement reveals a certain degree of back-paddling by the FCC. Irrespective of the infringement procedure, which the European Commission recently initiated against Germany, there are good chances for a respite for both the FCC and the Court of Justice of the EU. It is up to the FCC to use this period to clarify where it is headed with its jurisprudence on controlling the application of EU law in Germany.

scholarly journals Inconsistencies – The German Federal Constitutional Court on the European Arrest Warrant

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Tomuschat
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Arrest Warrant ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Democratic Principle ◽  
European Arrest Warrant ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Features European Arrest Warrant – Article 16(2) German Basic Law, which allows exceptionally for the extradition of German nationals, not read in the light of the European Union integration clause in Article 23(1) Basic Law – Complaint of violation of the democratic principle put in perspective – Preservation of the statehood of Germany – Lack of proportionality in and procedural defects of the implementing Act

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document