Cournot and Bertrand Competition in a Mixed Oligopoly With a Corrupt Public Firm

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vishal Pant
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Oligopoly ◽  
Bertrand Competition ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
Cournot And Bertrand Competition

International Tariffs in a Mixed Oligopoly with Research Spillovers

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-293
Author(s):  
Shoji Haruna ◽  
Rajeev K. Goel
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Technical Change ◽  
Large Range ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Mixed Oligopoly ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
Mixed Oligopolies

AbstractThis paper merges three strands of the literature – industrial organization, international trade, and economics of technical change – to examine the effect of tariffs on international mixed oligopolies which conduct research and development (R&D) that is prone to spillovers. Mixed oligopolies are prevalent in the defense sector, among other sectors. Using a two-stage sequential game with R&D in the first stage and production in the second stage, results show that higher tariffs reduce outputs of both the domestic public firm and foreign private firms, and private R&D. Effects on domestic R&D and welfare, and profits of foreign private firms depend upon spillovers. Within a large range of research spillovers, higher tariffs can in fact lower welfare. Some of these findings are different from traditional oligopolies and from models that ignore research spillovers. Policy implications are discussed.

scholarly journals Cournot and Bertrand Competition in the Software Industry

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Domenico Buccella
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Software Industry ◽  
Bertrand Competition ◽  
The Social ◽  
Cournot And Bertrand Competition

In a software industry based on a platform firm and two firms producing differentiated applications complementary to the platform, we investigate the effects on profits and welfare of the choice of different contracts (price versus quantity) by the application firms. In contrast to the traditional result, (1) equilibrium profits are higher under Cournot or Bertrand competition depending upon the degree of complementarity between platform and application producers as well as the degree of substitutability between applications; (2) the social welfare may be higher under Cournot when the application products are highly substitutable.

INSTANTANEOUS INFORMATION ALWAYS STABILIZES?

2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (02) ◽  
pp. 239-253
Author(s):  
YANG ZHANG ◽  
WEIHONG HUANG
Keyword(s):  
Local Stability ◽  
Continuous Model ◽  
Stability Loss ◽  
Cost Structure ◽  
Bertrand Competition ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Additional Stability ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Cournot And Bertrand Competition

The impact of information improvement on local stability is examined for continuous dynamics. It is conventionally believed that removal of uncertainty always brings additional stability to an existing equilibrium. This paper shows that the relation between information and equilibrium stability may not be monotonic. Removal of information lag may sometimes destabilize the otherwise stable continuous model. Economic applications to Cournot and Bertrand competition are examined where the role of improved information on stability is shown to be cost-structure specific. Elimination of lags may cause stability loss. The conclusion drawn on two-dimensional continuous dynamics is briefly generalized to multidimensional system.

scholarly journals The Evaluation of Maximum Tariffs in an Emerging Economy: The Nigerian Case

2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 207
Author(s):  
N. P. Audu ◽  
T. O. Apere
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Economy ◽  
Mixed Oligopoly ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Oligopolistic Competition ◽  
Oligopoly Model ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
Asymmetric Costs ◽  
Nigerian Government ◽  
Foreign Competitors

Using the Cournot and Stackelberg theories of oligopolistic competition, the paper re-evaluate the importance of tariff ranking issue under a mixed oligopoly model with foreign competitors and asymmetric costs. We demonstrated that under Cournot theory, when the size of domestic private and foreign private firms becomes more unequally distributed, maximum–welfare tariff will exceed maximum–revenue tariff. The study also revealed that under Stackelberg theory, when the domestic government protects its domestic sector, it will levy higher maximum–welfare tariffs versus maximum–revenue tariffs. These two positions notwithstanding, when the Nigerian government decides to open its doors more for foreign competitors, it will need to levy higher maximum-revenue tariffs versus maximum–welfare tariffs. The findings of this paper remain valid whether the domestic public firm acts as a leader or a follower in the market.

scholarly journals Mixed oligopoly, public firm behavior, and free private entry

2012 ◽  
Vol 117 (3) ◽  
pp. 767-769 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Bennett ◽  
Manfredi La Manna
Keyword(s):  
Firm Behavior ◽  
Mixed Oligopoly ◽  
Public Firm

scholarly journals Product Differentiation in a Vertical Structure

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tien-Der Han ◽  
M. Emranul Haque ◽  
Arijit Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Product Differentiation ◽  
Vertical Structure ◽  
Returns To Scale ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Bertrand Competition ◽  
Price Determination ◽  
Free Entry ◽  
Horizontal Product Differentiation ◽  
Goods Market ◽  
Cournot And Bertrand Competition

AbstractWe consider final goods producers’ preference for horizontal product differentiation in the presence of strategic input price determination. Final goods producers may not prefer maximal differentiation but may prefer moderate differentiation under both Cournot and Bertrand competition in the final goods market if product differentiation does not increase the market size significantly and there is either free entry in the input market or the input supplier has increasing returns to scale technology. Thus, we provide a new rationale for moderate product differentiation. Our reasons are different from the existing reasons of mixed pricing strategy, endogenous leadership, no-buy option for the consumers and the relative performance incentive schemes.

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