Some Facts About Dominant Firms

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
German Gutierrez Gallardo ◽  
Thomas Philippon
Keyword(s):  
Dominant Firms

Technological Change and the Theory of the Firm: The American Locomotive Industry, 1920–1955

1976 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas G. Marx
Keyword(s):  
Technological Change ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Managerial Behavior ◽  
Dominant Firms

This study analyzes the differing managerial behavior of the three dominant firms in the steam locomotive oligopoly as diesel locomotives replaced steam.

scholarly journals The Welfare Effects of Use-or-Lose Provisions in Markets with Dominant Firms

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Gale ◽  
Daniel P O'Brien
Keyword(s):  
Wireless Communications ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Productive Capacity ◽  
Dominant Firm ◽  
Aggregate Output ◽  
Stated Objective ◽  
Total Surplus ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Limit Capacity

A use-or-lose provision requires that firms employ a certain minimum fraction of their productive capacity. Variants have been used by regulators in the airline and wireless communications industries, among others. A typical stated objective is to limit capacity hoarding, thereby increasing aggregate output and welfare. When the dominant firm is more efficient than fringe firms, we find that imposing a use-or-lose provision induces the dominant firm to acquire capacity from the fringe, which causes aggregate output to fall. When the dominant firm is less efficient than the fringe, aggregate output rises. In both cases, total surplus may rise or fall. (JEL D43, K21, L13, L93)

Learning from the Giants: Critical Success Factors for Pharmaceutical EMNEs From India

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 28-53
Author(s):  
Sneha Bhat ◽  
Kirankumar Momaya
Keyword(s):  
Critical Success Factors ◽  
Success Factors ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Firm Capabilities ◽  
Critical Success ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Cost Competitiveness

Indian pharmaceutical EMNEs, with significant cost competitiveness, have the potential to partially address the vexing problems of global healthcare industry, including rising cost of the healthcare. In this context, we explore the Critical Success Factors (CSFs) of the pharmaceutical industry, which can help firms focus their resources sharply to break-out faster. Using case study method, we studied two global dominant firms for identifying industry CSFs. Product innovation capabilities emerged as the most important CSF, having the potential to provide competitive advantage for long-term competitiveness of the firms. Other two factors that emerged as CSFs are marketing capabilities and financial capabilities. The study contributes to the literature by linking the success factors to firm capabilities and also specifically to international business literature of EMNE capability building. The study also has implications to practitioners in strategic decision making.

5. Article 102

2021 ◽  
pp. 180-223
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance

This chapter discusses the main features of Article 102 of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which is concerned with the abusive conduct of dominant firms. It begins by discussing the meaning of ‘undertaking’ and ‘effect on trade between Member States’ in the context of Article 102. It then considers what is meant by a dominant position and looks at the requirement that any dominant position must be held in a substantial part of the internal market. Thereafter it discusses some general considerations relevant to the concept of abuse of dominance, followed by an explanation of what is meant by ‘exploitative’, ‘exclusionary’ and ‘single market’ abuses. It then discusses possible defences to allegations of abuse, and concludes by considering the consequences of infringing Article 102.

Vertical Arrangements

2020 ◽  
pp. 124-151
Author(s):  
Rex Ahdar
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Green Light ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
First Century ◽  
Resale Price Maintenance ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Resale Price ◽  
Twenty First Century ◽  
Price Maintenance

Then law governing vertical arrangements is a comparatively undeveloped area in NZ competition law. With only resale price maintenance (RPM) expressly prohibited by the Act, it has fallen to the general prohibitions on anticompetitive arrangements and monopolization to address traditional antitrust mischiefs such as exclusive dealing and tying. The leading case on exclusive dealing was heavily influenced by Chicagoan thinking to the degree that the courts gave the green light to durable distribution arrangements that countenanced foreclosure on a large scale and were plainly anti-competitive. However, the few cases on tying have been more fruitful insofar as remedies have been granted to rectify blatant leveraging by dominant firms into related markets. A period of active enforcement of RPM by the Commerce Commission marked the first decade, but the swathe of prosecutions dried up as the twenty-first century began.

The Dominant Firms

2014 ◽  
pp. 142-189
Author(s):  
Jacques M. Downs
Keyword(s):  
Dominant Firms
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