Short Planning Horizons and the Save More Tomorrow Program

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin Cottle Hunt ◽  
T. Scott Findley
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Stefan Homburg

Chapter 8 concludes the text with methodical remarks. It defends key assumptions made in the main text and compares them, to the extent they deviate, with more conventional premises. The chapter starts with a comparison of adaptive versus rational expectations. Thereafter, it contrasts infinite planning horizons, finite planning horizons, and overlapping generations models. The third section, which is devoted to modeling money, discusses money-in-the-utility, the transaction costs approach, and more recent theories that derive money demand from a microeconomic framework. The forth section shows that assuming a highly elastic labor supply is empirically unconvincing, whereas a constant labor supply simplifies the model greatly and appears as a reasonable approximation. The final section contrasts behavioral and choice theoretic approaches to price setting.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike Seiferling

AbstractExecutive control of government is generally not a long-term job. In such cases, relatively short executive tenure should be expected to play an important role in determining the degree to which policymakers internalize the future costs associated with their current fiscal behavior. The effects of policymaker's expected planning horizons on macroeconomic outcomes, however, have been difficult to model outside of a fixed term limit context due to the unobserved likelihood of remaining in office, along with potential endogeneity problems where re-election campaigns can be enhanced with generous, deficit-financed expenditures in election years. From a globally representative sample of 79 countries over a 32-year period (1980–2012), this paper provides empirical evidence suggesting that incumbent governments who know that will not be in office in the following period with a probability of one, are found to generate significantly higher deficits in a linear discounting model, and are found to produce the least responsible fiscal outcomes where the likelihood of re-election is around fifty percent in quadratic discounting models.


1973 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard C. Kunreuther ◽  
Thomas E. Morton

1987 ◽  
Vol 33 (9) ◽  
pp. 1137-1149 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Sridharan ◽  
William L. Berry ◽  
V. Udayabhanu

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