A Fresh Start for US Trade Policy: Unilateral Trade Liberalization through a Tariff Reform Commission

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel T. Griswold ◽  
Donald J. Boudreaux
Author(s):  
María Fabiana Jorge

With the outbreak of the Coronavirus there is a new realization of the vulnerabilities of the U.S. drug supply chain. However, while such concerns may have been amplified by the pandemic, they preceded Covid-19 and were well documented before 2020. Indeed, in past years the U.S. Congress held several hearings addressing potential vulnerabilities in the U.S. drug supply chain, in part due to the increasing dependency on China as a dominant supplier of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and some finished pharmaceutical products. These vulnerabilities go well beyond health policy and constitute a national security concern. The article addresses how U.S. trade policy plays a significant role in shaping the pharmaceutical industry at home and abroad and is in part responsible for some of the current vulnerabilities of the U.S. drug supply chain.


1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 38
Author(s):  
Victor Purba

"Section 301" memberikan wewenang luas kepada Presiden AS untuk mengambil tindakanpembalasan terhadap praktek-praktek perdagangan negara asing yang dianggap merugikan AS. Keampuhan Section 301 ini antara lain berhasil membuka pasar bagi barang-barang Amerika di luar negeri. Umpamanya Jepang, yang akhirnya bersedia menerima penjualan alat-alat telekomunikasi, jeruk dan daging asal AS. Namun, ancaman Section 301 tidak selalu berhasil membuka pasar luar negeri. Sengketa kemudian diselesaikan dalam pertemuan-pertemuan GATT.


2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asif Efrat

AbstractContrary to the general trend of trade liberalization, specific goods—such as small arms, drugs, and antiquities—have come under increasing international control in recent decades through a set of international regulatory agreements. This article offers a theoretical framework of government preferences on the international regulation of these goods. Departing from conventional models of trade policy, the theoretical framework introduces negative externalities, rather than protection, as the motivation for restricting trade; it also takes moral concerns into account. I test this framework empirically through an original survey of government views on international small-arms regulation. Based on interviewing officials from 118 countries, the survey reveals a large variation in government preferences that conforms to the theoretical expectations. I employ this variation to explain why the international regulation of small arms is weak, despite the fact that these are the deadliest weapons of all in terms of actual death toll.


2006 ◽  
pp. 173-188
Author(s):  
Olivier Cadot ◽  
Antoni Estevadeordal ◽  
Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann ◽  
Thierry Verdier

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