Loss-Offset Restrictions, Progressive Wage Taxation and Performance-Based Incentive Contracts

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rainer Niemann ◽  
Mariana Sailer
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Loss Offset Restrictions ◽  
Loss Offset

Implications of Social Value Orientation and Budget Levels on Group Performance and Performance Variance

2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 293-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. Upton
Keyword(s):  
Group Performance ◽  
Value Orientation ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Personality Types ◽  
Social Value ◽  
Relative Advantage ◽  
Social Value Orientation ◽  
Piece Rate ◽  
Equal Share ◽  
And Performance

ABSTRACT: In this paper I examine the effects of social value orientation (SVO) and group incentive contracts on performance and performance variance. SVO includes three main personality types: prosocials (who value cooperation and equality in outcomes); individualists (who focus upon their own rewards); and, competitors (who seek relative advantage over others, even at their own expense). In an experiment I form groups of participants based on their SVO and assign them to one of three incentive contracts: a piece-rate contract that pays all employees an equal share of any group output, and two budget-linear contracts (with a medium and a high budget target) that pay zero compensation below the budget target, an equal share of a bonus if the budget target is met and a piece-rate for output above the budget target. Group performance is highest for groups of prosocials and lowest for groups with competitors and SVO has a greater effect under a medium rather than a high budget over latter periods of the experiment. Further, SVO appears to play a role in influencing performance variance. These results illustrate the potential of considering individual difference measures such as SVO in conjunction with formal control systems such as budgets to enhance motivation and coordination within organizations.

Charitable Contribution Matching and Effort-Elicitation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Douthit ◽  
Patrick Martin ◽  
Michelle McAllister
Keyword(s):  
Charitable Giving ◽  
Employee Selection ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Equivalent Amount ◽  
Charitable Contribution ◽  
Employee Effort ◽  
Fixed Wage ◽  
Performance Based Pay ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Other Regarding

We examine the effect of a charitable contribution matching (CCM) program on employee effort. In CCM programs, employers commit to match employees' donations to charity. We expect CCM to activate a norm of other-regarding behavior, inducing employees to increase effort to benefit their employer. Experimental results robustly support our expectation. We find that CCM increases effort under both fixed-wage and performance-based incentive contracts. Further, our results suggest CCM is more effective at eliciting effort than alternative uses of firm capital. Specifically, CCM is more effective at eliciting effort than the firm allocating an equivalent amount of capital to either direct firm charitable giving or increased performance-based pay. Our study suggests that CCM has efficient and robust effort-elicitation benefits that increase its value as a compensation tool incremental to any initial employee selection benefits from CCM and any effort benefits from firms' direct charitable giving.

scholarly journals Perspectives on corporate governance and firm valuation in Africa

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 343-351
Author(s):  
Mthuli Ncube
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Regulation Mechanism ◽  
It Impacts ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
And Performance

This paper reviews aspects of corporate governance as it impacts on the valuation and performance of firms. We consider the theoretical framework for corporate governance as an internal regulation mechanism, on the basis of principal agent problems, incentive contracts, and asymmetric information. We also discuss present various corporate governance practices around world. The paper discusses the empirical evidence on how the quality of corporate governance practices impact on the valuation of a form and its general performance. Stylized facts on corporate governance practices in Africa and also presented.

scholarly journals The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory

2000 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 75-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M Kahn
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Market Structure ◽  
Labor Markets ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Considerable Evidence ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Rules Changes ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Player Performance

With superior data on compensation and productivity, as well as the occurrence of abrupt, dramatic market structure and player allocation rules changes, sports labor markets offer an excellent setting in which to test economic hypotheses. This paper reviews evidence from sports in four areas: employer monopsony, discrimination, the Coase Theorem, and incentive contracts, supervision and performance. There is considerable evidence of monopsony as well as for the existence of some forms of discrimination against minority athletes. Incentive contracts have strong effects on player performance and behavior, and there is mixed evidence on the predictions of the Coase Theorem.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document