Jurisdictional Competition, Market Power, and the Compensation of Public Employees

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Kogan
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Public Employees ◽  
Jurisdictional Competition

Motivating Public Employees

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Esteve ◽  
Christian Schuster
Keyword(s):  
Public Employees

BUILDING THE PROGRAM OF TRAINING ETHNIC KNOWLEDGE FOR CADRES, CIVIL SERVANTS AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES UP TO 2030

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nguyen Van Dung ◽  
Nguyen Ngoc Minh ◽  
Pham Kim Cuong
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Minority ◽  
Training Program ◽  
Political System ◽  
Civil Servants ◽  
Public Employees ◽  
Target Groups ◽  
Current Period ◽  
Urgent Task ◽  
Practical Research ◽  
Local Levels

Developing a ethnic knowledge training program for cadres, civil servants and public employees according to 04 target groups (Prime Minister, 2018) in the political system from the central to local levels to meet the requirements of ethnic minority affairs up to 2030 is an urgent task. Because the program is “the core” to create a breakthrough in training ethnic knowledge, improving the capacity of the contingent of cadres, civil servants and public employees in formulating ethnic policies and organizing the implementation of Party and State’s policies in the current period. The article analyzes the results of theoretical and practical research on the development of ethnic knowledge training program and provides the results of developing a program that meets the requirements of Vietnam’s ethnic minority affairs from now to 2030.

Vertical Boilerplate

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Gibson
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Real World ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Law School ◽  
Information Cost ◽  
Information Costs ◽  
Policy Proposals ◽  
Radical Solution

Despite what we learn in law school about the “meeting of the minds,” most contracts are merely boilerplate—take-it-or-leave-it propositions. Negotiation is nonexistent; we rely on our collective market power as consumers to regulate contracts’ content. But boilerplate imposes certain information costs because it often arrives late in the transaction and is hard to understand. If those costs get too high, then the market mechanism fails. So how high are boilerplate’s information costs? A few studies have attempted to measure them, but they all use a “horizontal” approach—i.e., they sample a single stratum of boilerplate and assume that it represents the whole transaction. Yet real-world transactions often involve multiple layers of contracts, each with its own information costs. What is needed, then, is a “vertical” analysis, a study that examines fewer contracts of any one kind but tracks all the contracts the consumer encounters, soup to nuts. This Article presents the first vertical study of boilerplate. It casts serious doubt on the market mechanism and shows that existing scholarship fails to appreciate the full scale of the information cost problem. It then offers two regulatory solutions. The first works within contract law’s unconscionability doctrine, tweaking what the parties need to prove and who bears the burden of proving it. The second, more radical solution involves forcing both sellers and consumers to confront and minimize boilerplate’s information costs—an approach I call “forced salience.” In the end, the boilerplate experience is as deep as it is wide. Our empirical work should reflect that fact, and our policy proposals should too.

Exploratory Study for Public Employees’ Professionalism

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 143-172
Author(s):  
Taejun Cho ◽  
Jongsoon Jin ◽  
Jungho Park ◽  
Sangwoo Kim ◽  
Jae Jin Im
Keyword(s):  
Exploratory Study ◽  
Public Employees
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