Accounting Quality and Investment Efficiency in a Bank-Centered Economy: Evidence from the 2001 Bank Shareholding Limitation Act of Japan

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masahiro Enomoto ◽  
Boochun Jung ◽  
S. Ghon Rhee ◽  
Akinobu Shuto
2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyeesoo H. Chung ◽  
Jinyoung P. Wynn ◽  
Han Yi

2006 ◽  
Vol 81 (5) ◽  
pp. 963-982 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary C. Biddle ◽  
Gilles Hilary

This study examines how accounting quality relates to firm-level capital investment efficiency. Our first hypothesis is that higher quality accounting enhances investment efficiency by reducing information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital. Our second hypothesis is that this effect should be stronger in economies where financing is largely provided through arm's-length transactions compared with countries where creditors supply more capital. Our results are consistent with these hypotheses both across and within countries. They are robust to alternative econometric specifications, different measures of accounting quality and investment-cash flow sensitivity, and numerous control variables.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 236-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qingchuan Hou ◽  
Qinglu Jin ◽  
Lanfang Wang ◽  
Guochang Zhang

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 649-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Jaehong ◽  
Cho Eunjung ◽  
Choi Hyunjung

This paper examines whether material weakness in internal accounting control is negatively associated with investment efficiency in Korea. Since internal accounting control weakness drives poor accounting quality and poor accounting quality exacerbates information asymmetry between firms and outside capital suppliers, managerial investment cannot be monitored effectively which result in over- and/or under- investment. Since internal accounting system is closely related to corporate governance, weak internal accounting control is often associated with poor corporate governance, and this control environment makes it hard to monitor managerial opportunistic behavior, causing abnormal investment such as over- and/or under- investment.  We find that firms with internal accounting control weakness tend to make over- and under- investment. We also find the number of weakness in internal accounting control is negatively related to investment efficiency. In addition, three types of qualified review opinion - overall company level weakness, account-specific weakness and disclaimer review opinion due to scope limitation - are differentially affected to investment efficiency; disclaimer review opinion is present the most severe problem in internal accounting control that drives over- and under- investment. Our findings suggest weak internal accounting control provides poor monitoring to manager and cannot restrain managerial inefficient investment decision. 


2011 ◽  
pp. 57-78
Author(s):  
I. Pilipenko

The paper analyzes shortcomings of economic impact studies based mainly on input- output models that are often employed in Russia as well as abroad. Using studies about sport events in the USA and Olympic Games that took place during the last 30 years we reveal advantages of the cost-benefit analysis approach in obtaining unbiased assessments of public investments efficiency; the step-by-step method of cost-benefit analysis is presented in the paper as well. We employ the project of Sochi-2014 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games in Russia to evaluate its efficiency using cost-benefit analysis for five accounts (areas of impact), namely government, households, environment, economic development, and social development, and calculate the net present value of the project taking into account its possible alternatives. In conclusion we suggest several policy directions that would enhance public investment efficiency within the Sochi-2014 Olympics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-232
Author(s):  
Gil S. Bae ◽  
Seung Uk Choi ◽  
Jeong Taek Kim

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