scholarly journals Coalition-Proof Stable Networks

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chenghong Luo ◽  
Ana Carmen Mauleon Echeverria ◽  
Vincent Vannetelbosch
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Proof

COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A NORMAL-FORM GAME AND ITS SUBGAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 253-261
Author(s):  
RYUSUKE SHINOHARA
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
Aggregative Games ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Coalition Proof

The relationship between coalition-proof (Nash) equilibria in a normal-form game and those in its subgame is examined. A subgame of a normal-form game is a game in which the strategy sets of all players in the subgame are subsets of those in the normal-form game. In this paper, focusing on a class of aggregative games, we provide a sufficient condition for the aggregative game under which every coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is also coalition-proof in the original normal-form game. The stringency of the sufficient condition means that a coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is rarely a coalition-proof equilibrium in the whole game.

An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium

1997 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolai S. Kukushkin
Keyword(s):  
Existence Result ◽  
Coalition Proof

scholarly journals Coalition-Proof Risk Sharing Under Frictions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold Cole ◽  
Dirk Krueger ◽  
George Mailath ◽  
Yena Park
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Coalition Proof
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