Rethinking Strength in Numbers: Bilateral Bargaining in Groups

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ravideep Sethi ◽  
WonSeok Yoo
Keyword(s):  
Bilateral Bargaining

Equity in bilateral bargaining.

1971 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence A. Messe
Keyword(s):  
Bilateral Bargaining

Failure of Bayesian Updating in Repeated Bilateral Bargaining

2005 ◽  
pp. 249-260
Author(s):  
Ching Chyi Lee ◽  
Eythan Weg ◽  
Rami Zwick
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Updating ◽  
Bilateral Bargaining

scholarly journals INVESTIGATING BARGAINING POWER OF FARMERS AND PROCESSORS IN IRAN'S DAIRY MARKET

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZEINAB SHOKOOHI ◽  
AMIR HOSSEIN CHIZARI ◽  
MAHDI ASGARI
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Expectation Maximization Algorithm ◽  
Raw Milk ◽  
Annual Data ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Dairy Farmers ◽  
Bilateral Bargaining ◽  
Monte Carlo Expectation Maximization ◽  
Milk Market

AbstractThe farm-gate price of raw milk in Iran is determined annually in negotiations among representatives of dairy processors, milk producers, and government officials. This study estimates the average bargaining power of dairy farmers and processors, through applying the generalized axiomatic Nash approach in a bilateral bargaining model. We employ annual data from 1990 to 2013 to estimate econometric representation of a bilateral bargaining model using a Monte Carlo expectation maximization algorithm. Results imply a higher bargaining power of 0.69 for processors, compared with 0.31 for farmers. This asymmetry of bargaining power causes unequal allocation of gains in the milk market.

Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments

2014 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 353-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tore Ellingsen ◽  
Topi Miettinen
Keyword(s):  
Bilateral Bargaining

Asymmetric bilateral bargaining in the new Russian Federation: A path-dependence explanation

1998 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikhail Filippov ◽  
Olga Shvetsova
Keyword(s):  
Russian Federation ◽  
Path Dependence ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Institutional Choice ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Bilateral Bargaining ◽  
Russian Politics ◽  
Bilateral Treaties ◽  
Strong Path

In this essay we identify economic and political factors that led both the federal centre and the regions in Russia first to open the process of federal bargaining and then to pursue it in the form of signing bilateral treaties, unique for each region. Many Russian politicians and most scholars of Russian politics view asymmetric bilateral bargaining as a dangerous institutional choice contributing to federal instability and potentially threatening the disintegration of Russia. We offer an alternative view. While the treaty-signing practices are actively maintained by Russian political elites, we argue that the genesis of asymmetric bilateral bargaining in Russia had a strong ‘path dependence’ component. In particular, it was precipitated by the developments of the last period in evolution of the Soviet federalism.

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