Some Strategic Decision Problems in Networks

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Holler ◽  
Florian Rupp
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Decision Problems

Assembly line design considering line balancing and part feeding

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amir Nourmohammadi ◽  
Hamidreza Eskandari
Keyword(s):  
Assembly Line ◽  
Assembly Line Balancing ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Decision Problems ◽  
Line Balancing ◽  
Test Problems ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Line Design ◽  
Part Feeding

Purpose This paper aims to optimize the configuration of assembly lines (ALs) considering the two long-term decision problems within the line balancing and part feeding (PF) contexts, when the supermarket concept is applied in PF. Design/methodology/approach To this purpose, a bi-level mathematical model is proposed to deal with the assembly line balancing problem (ALBP) and supermarket location problem (SLP) during the strategic decision-making phase of ALs’ configuration. The proposed model is applied on the known test problems taken from the ALBP literature to verify its performance. Findings The computational results verify that when the proposed structure is applied, the resulting AL configurations are optimized from both ALBP and SLP considerations in terms of the number of stations and line efficiency as well as supermarket transportation and installation costs. Originality/value No study has yet dealt with the long-term decision problem of configuring ALs considering both ALBP and SLP. Also, this study validates the effect of the ALBP on the SLP solutions as two long-term interrelated decision problems.

The Structuring Of The Strategic-Decision-Making Process

2011 ◽  
pp. 213-240
Author(s):  
Tamio Shimizu ◽  
Marley Monteiro de Carvalho ◽  
Fernando Jose Barbin
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Sensitivity Analysis ◽  
Decision Trees ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Decision Problems ◽  
Strategic Decision Making ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Decision Matrix

The basic types of decision models presented in the previous chapter (rational, descriptive, political, and ambiguous models) relies on quantitative values (money, time, or probabilities) that are most suitable for structured and semi-structured decision problems. These basic models can be used as starting models to guide the structuring process of strategic decision problems. First, a systematic procedure for structuring the strategic decision making process is presented, using decision matrix and decision trees. The need for the sensitivity analysis is introduced, and will be illustrated with more detail in the next chapter. Some problems that must be considered in this structuring process are illustrated in form of hidden traps and paradoxes. The first step in the decision-making process is to formulate the problem. It is possible that an inadequate formulation of the problem leads to a result that reduces efficiency and efficacy, since an incorrect formulation can define a wrong problem.

scholarly journals CO-EVOLUTION IN SOCIAL INTERACTIONS

2002 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 71-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
HIROSHI SATO ◽  
AKIRA NAMATAME
Keyword(s):  
Social Interactions ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Collective Learning ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Decision Problems ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Social Efficiency ◽  
Rational Agents

An interesting problem which has been widely investigated is under what circumstances will a society of rational agents realize some particular stable situations, and whether they satisfy the condition of social efficiency? This will crucially depend on how they interact and what information they have when they interact. For instance, when strategic interactions are modeled as coordination games, it is known the evolutionary process selects the risk-dominant equilibrium which is not necessarily efficient. We consider the networks of agents, in which each agent faces several types of the strategic decision problems. We investigate the dynamics of collective decision when each agent adapts the strategy of interaction to its neighbors. We are interested in to show how the society gropes its way towards an equilibrium situation. We show that the society selects the most efficient equilibrium among multiple equilibria when the agents composing it do learn from each other as collective learning, and they co-evolve their strategies over time. We also investigate the mechanism that leads the society to an equilibrium of social efficiency.

Bipolar Abstract Argumentation with Dual Attacks and Supports

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nico Potyka
Keyword(s):  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Decision Problems ◽  
Abstract Argumentation ◽  
Stable Semantics ◽  
Support Relations ◽  
Support Relationships ◽  
Computational Properties ◽  
Inherent Tendency

Bipolar abstract argumentation frameworks allow modeling decision problems by defining pro and contra arguments and their relationships. In some popular bipolar frameworks, there is an inherent tendency to favor either attack or support relationships. However, for some applications, it seems sensible to treat attack and support equally. Roughly speaking, turning an attack edge into a support edge, should just invert its meaning. We look at a recently introduced bipolar argumentation semantics and two novel alternatives and discuss their semantical and computational properties. Interestingly, the two novel semantics correspond to stable semantics if no support relations are present and maintain the computational complexity of stable semantics in general bipolar frameworks.

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