Stable Improvement Cycles in a Controlled School Choice

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minoru Kitahara ◽  
Yasunori Okumura
2008 ◽  
Vol 98 (3) ◽  
pp. 669-689 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aytek Erdil ◽  
Haluk Ergin

In several school choice districts in the United States, the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is applied after indifferences in priority orders are broken in some exogenous way. Although such a tie-breaking procedure preserves stability, it adversely affects the welfare of the students since it introduces artificial stability constraints. Our main finding is a polynomial-time algorithm for the computation of a student-optimal stable matching when priorities are weak. The idea behind our construction relies on a new notion which we call a stable improvement cycle. We also investigate the strategic properties of the student-optimal stable mechanism. (JEL C78, D82, I21)


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 98-110
Author(s):  
Erin Curtin

This article provides an analysis of Tennessee’s newly signed Education Savings Account policy, a school choice initiative. The policy provides vouchers, in the form of a debit card, to students in grades K-12 who are at or below 200% of the federal poverty line and are zoned to attend a Nashville, Shelby County, or Achievement School District school. Using the Policy Window Framework the author uncovers that the policy was created in a federal and state-level political convergence, which attempted to place equity at the forefront of the issue. However, using Levin's Comprehensive Education Privatization Framework, we can see that neoliberal ideals of choice and efficiency conquer equity in the finalized policy. The author predicts the outcomes of this new policy using this framework in tandem with 3 case studies: Louisiana Scholarship Program, DC Opportunity Scholarship Program, and Tennessee’s Individualized Education Accounts.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynn Bosetti ◽  
Dianne Gereluk
Keyword(s):  

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