scholarly journals Rethinking Nudge: An Information-Costs Theory of Default Rules

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oren Bar-Gill ◽  
Omri Ben-Shahar
Keyword(s):  
Information Costs ◽  
Default Rules

Vertical Boilerplate

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Gibson
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Real World ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Law School ◽  
Information Cost ◽  
Information Costs ◽  
Policy Proposals ◽  
Radical Solution

Despite what we learn in law school about the “meeting of the minds,” most contracts are merely boilerplate—take-it-or-leave-it propositions. Negotiation is nonexistent; we rely on our collective market power as consumers to regulate contracts’ content. But boilerplate imposes certain information costs because it often arrives late in the transaction and is hard to understand. If those costs get too high, then the market mechanism fails. So how high are boilerplate’s information costs? A few studies have attempted to measure them, but they all use a “horizontal” approach—i.e., they sample a single stratum of boilerplate and assume that it represents the whole transaction. Yet real-world transactions often involve multiple layers of contracts, each with its own information costs. What is needed, then, is a “vertical” analysis, a study that examines fewer contracts of any one kind but tracks all the contracts the consumer encounters, soup to nuts. This Article presents the first vertical study of boilerplate. It casts serious doubt on the market mechanism and shows that existing scholarship fails to appreciate the full scale of the information cost problem. It then offers two regulatory solutions. The first works within contract law’s unconscionability doctrine, tweaking what the parties need to prove and who bears the burden of proving it. The second, more radical solution involves forcing both sellers and consumers to confront and minimize boilerplate’s information costs—an approach I call “forced salience.” In the end, the boilerplate experience is as deep as it is wide. Our empirical work should reflect that fact, and our policy proposals should too.

Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 60-78
Author(s):  
Julian Velasco
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rights ◽  
Corporate Law ◽  
Fiduciary Duty ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Profit Motive ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Common Misconception ◽  
Strict Enforcement ◽  
Default Rules ◽  
Moral Requirements

This chapter examines fiduciary duty in corporate law. Fiduciary duty is pervasive as well as all encompassing in corporate law. One common misconception about fiduciary duty in corporate law is that it is merely aspirational. Fiduciary duties are not simply moral requirements, they are legal ones. They are not merely suggestions, they represent the demands of the law. Although corporate law has often compromised rather than insisting upon strict enforcement of fiduciary law principles, these compromises are due to practical considerations that are entirely consistent with the goals of fiduciary law. In corporate law, general fiduciary law principles are balanced with practical considerations concerning the profit motive in order to achieve the best overall result for the shareholders. Understanding this tension between ambition and practicality is key to understanding fiduciary duty in corporate law. This chapter first considers the triggers for fiduciary duty in corporate law before discussing the role that the duty of loyalty plays in corporate law. It then explores the duty of care in corporate law, along with other fiduciary duties such as good faith, takeover situations and contests for control, shareholder voting rights, and the duty to monitor and the duty to disclose. The chapter proceeds by analyzing mandatory and default rules regarding the extent to which fiduciary duties can be waived in corporate law and concludes with an overview of remedies for breach of fiduciary duty.

Mandatory and Default Rules in Fiduciary Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 434-448
Author(s):  
Daniel Clarry
Keyword(s):  
Modern Trend ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Core Element ◽  
Constituent Element ◽  
Mandatory Rules ◽  
Default Rules ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter discusses the nature and operation of mandatory and default rules in fiduciary law, arguing that loyalty is a core element of every fiduciary legal institution. Loyalty is the hallmark of fiduciary law, as it requires persons in other-regarding positions of power to perform functions selflessly, rather than selfishly. However, there are many circumstances in which a person undertakes and exercises other-regarding powers, underscoring the fact that a broad range of persons may be the subject of fiduciary law. This chapter first provides an overview of key concepts and context, focusing on the distinction between mandatory rules and default rules as well as sources of such rules in fiduciary law. It then considers fiduciary loyalty, citing examples that illustrate how a baseline of fiduciary accountability is implied by the essential nature of fiduciary legal institutions, along with the mandatory or default quality of the duties of care and good faith. The main thesis of this chapter is that loyalty is a basic constituent element of all fiduciary legal institutions. Whether fiduciary principles are mandatory involves a consideration and determination of whether the relationship or institution is inherently fiduciary as matter of law and legal classification. It also highlights the modern trend toward codification and clear legislative demarcation of mandatory and default rules in fiduciary law.

Neighborhood-Based Information Costs

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (10) ◽  
pp. 3225-3255
Author(s):  
Benjamin Hébert ◽  
Michael Woodford
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Information ◽  
Topological Structure ◽  
Cost Functions ◽  
Binary Choice ◽  
Information Costs ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Rational Inattention ◽  
Linear Quadratic Gaussian ◽  
Perceptual Judgments ◽  
Perceptual Distance

We derive a new cost of information in rational inattention problems, the neighborhood-based cost functions, starting from the observation that many settings involve exogenous states with a topological structure. These cost functions are uniformly posterior separable and capture notions of perceptual distance. This second property ensures that neighborhood-based costs, unlike mutual information, make accurate predictions about behavior in perceptual experiments. We compare the implications of our neighborhood-based cost functions with those of the mutual information in a series of applications: perceptual judgments, the general environment of binary choice, regime-change games, and linear-quadratic-Gaussian settings. (JEL C70, D11, D82, D83, D91)

Enkev Beheer BV (of the Netherlands) v. Republic of Poland

ICSID Reports ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 630-648
Keyword(s):  
Due Process ◽  
The State ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Waiting Period ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Fair And Equitable Treatment ◽  
Just Compensation ◽  
Default Rules ◽  
Equitable Treatment ◽  
Almost All

630Procedure — Addition of a party — Conditional application — UNCITRAL Rules, Article 22 — UNCITRAL Rules, Article 17 — Whether the UNCITRAL Rules or lex loci arbitri allowed for applications to be made conditional on a tribunal’s future decision — Whether the application was consistent with the State’s procedural rights — Whether the amendment to a claim under Article 22 of the UNCITRAL Rules allowed for the addition of a third party as claimantJurisdiction — Investment — Shares — Whether an investor’s shares and rights derived from those shares were protected investments under the BITJurisdiction — Investment — Assets of subsidiary — Whether profits, goodwill or know-how of a local subsidiary constituted investments of the investor protected by the BITJurisdiction — Consent — Cooling-off period — Premature claims — Whether the investor had communicated its own claims rather than those of its local subsidiary — Whether the investor’s failure to comply with a waiting period of six months under the BIT required a tribunal to deny jurisdiction or admissibility — Whether the negotiation of a local subsidiary’s dispute in good faith was relevant to jurisdiction over a foreign investor’s claimsInterpretation — Cooling-off period — VCLT, Article 31 — Object and purpose — Whether the object and purpose of the BIT required a tribunal not to adopt a strict or formalistic interpretation of the waiting period of six monthsRemedies — Declaratory award — Interpretation — Just compensation — Whether the tribunal had jurisdiction under the BIT to make a declaratory award on the interpretation and application of the term “just compensation”Jurisdiction — Dispute — Whether the tribunal had jurisdiction under the BIT to advise the parties of an imminent disputeExpropriation — Direct deprivation — Shares — Rights derived from shares — Whether the State directly deprived the investor of its rights as a shareholder in its local subsidiaryExpropriation — Indirect deprivation — Shares — Rights derived from shares — Whether the shares had lost all or almost all significant commercial value — Whether the measures were adopted in the public interest — Whether due process had been followed — Whether there were any undertakings by the StateExpropriation — Interpretation — “Just compensation” — Whether there was any difference between the terms of the BIT and general international law — Whether the meaning of just compensation could be determined in the abstract631Fair and equitable treatment — Whether the impending expropriation constituted a breach of the standard of fair and equitable treatment — Whether the claim concerned the investor’s rights derived from sharesFull protection and security — Whether the State failed to protect an investment from expropriation by local authorities — Whether the claim concerned the investor’s rights derived from sharesUmbrella clause — Whether there was any assurance directed at the investor that created any legal obligations — Whether the claim concerned the investor’s rights derived from sharesCosts — Arbitration costs — Variation by agreement — UNCITRAL Rules — Whether the terms of the BIT varied the default rules for the allocation of arbitration costs

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