On Opportunities: Philosophical And Empirical Implications

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharon Alvarez ◽  
Jay B. Barney ◽  
Russ McBride ◽  
Robert Wuebker
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Implications

Sequential Difficulty Effects During Strategy Execution

2012 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 295-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Uittenhove ◽  
Patrick Lemaire
Keyword(s):  
Computational Models ◽  
Preceding Trial ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Strategy Execution ◽  
Strategy Performance ◽  
Empirical Implications

In two experiments, we tested the hypothesis that strategy performance on a given trial is influenced by the difficulty of the strategy executed on the immediately preceding trial, an effect that we call strategy sequential difficulty effect. Participants’ task was to provide approximate sums to two-digit addition problems by using cued rounding strategies. Results showed that performance was poorer after a difficult strategy than after an easy strategy. Our results have important theoretical and empirical implications for computational models of strategy choices and for furthering our understanding of strategic variations in arithmetic as well as in human cognition in general.

scholarly journals Making the Grade during Pandemic: Early-stage and Late-stage Provisional Institutions

2021 ◽  
pp. 073112142110286
Author(s):  
Alexander B. Kinney ◽  
Nicholas J. Rowland
Keyword(s):  
Late Stage ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
State University ◽  
Institutional Work ◽  
Traditional Grading ◽  
Grading Policy ◽  
Temporary Solution ◽  
Rural State ◽  
Empirical Implications ◽  
Common Understanding

This is an article that draws on the institutional work literature about provisional institutions. To date, nearly every U.S. sector has been impacted by COVID-19. To sustain their core missions, highly institutionalized organizations such as universities have had to rethink foundational structures and policies. Using a historical ethnographic approach to investigate records from faculty senate deliberations at “Rural State University” (RSU), the authors examine the implementation of a temporary grading policy to supplement traditional, qualitative grades spring 2020 during the outbreak. The authors find that RSU implemented a temporary, supplemental grading policy as a provisional institution to momentarily supersede traditional grading as a means to—as soon as possible—return to it. This finding contrasts with the common understanding that provisional institutions operate primarily as a temporary solution to a social problem that leads to more stable and enduring, ostensibly nonprovisional institutions. The temporary grading policy, the authors argue, constitutes a “late-stage” provisional institution and, with this new lens, subsequently characterize the more commonplace understanding of provisional institutions as “early-stage.” This contribution has theoretical implications for studies of institutions and empirical implications for research on shared governance and disruption in higher education.

Taxing the Tails in a Global Economy: How Electoral, Party and Wage Bargaining Systems Interact to Determine the Taxes Paid by the Poor and Rich

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Jude C. Hays
Keyword(s):  
Global Economy ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Labor Market Institutions ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Consumption Taxes ◽  
Empirical Implications

Abstract A prominent line of research on electoral systems and income redistribution argues that proportional representation (PR) leads to tax-and-transfer policies that benefit the poor at the expense of the rich. This is because PR produces encompassing center-left coalitions that protect the poor and middle classes. Yet countries with PR electoral systems tend to rely heavily on consumption taxes and tax profits lightly, both of which are inconsistent with this expectation. Both policies are regressive and seem to benefit the rich at the expense of the poor. This article argues that PR electoral institutions, when combined with trichotomous multipartism, are not as hostile to the rich as commonly believed, and that it is important to understand how electoral and party systems interact with labor market institutions in order to explain the puzzling pattern of taxation that is observed. The author develops a theoretical model and evaluates its empirical implications for a world in which production has become multinational.

Plausibility of Signals by a Heterogeneous Committee

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 453-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Krehbiel
Keyword(s):  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Signaling Games ◽  
Theoretical Studies ◽  
Empirical Implications

Krishna and Morgan propose “amendments” to two of Gilligan and Krehbiel’s theoretical studies of legislative signaling. The new results for homogeneous committees do not significantly change the empirical expectations of prior works, but the results for heterogeneous committees contradict earlier claims. This note gives primary attention to heterogeneous committees and compares and contrasts the new and old equilibria and their empirical implications. The notion of signaling is somewhat nebulous in all such games but seems distinctly less plausible in the key Krishna-Morgan proposition than in previous legislative signaling games. Furthermore, the empirical literature on choice of rules—specifically, the finding of a positive relationship between committee heterogeneity and restrictive rules—is inconsistent with the Krishna-Morgan analysis but consistent with Gilligan-Krehbiel analyses, even though the former is informationally efficient and the latter are not.

scholarly journals Theoretical And Empirical Implications For Research On South-South And South-North Expansion Strategies

M n gement ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Bandeira-De-Mello ◽  
Pervez N. Ghauri ◽  
Ulrike Mayrhofer ◽  
Pierre-Xavier Meschi
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Implications ◽  
Expansion Strategies

scholarly journals Hicksian Welfare Measures and the Normative Endowment Effect

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 171-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas A Weber
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Endowment Effect ◽  
Indirect Utility ◽  
Compensating Variation ◽  
Equivalent Variation ◽  
Indirect Utility Function ◽  
Welfare Measures ◽  
Empirical Implications ◽  
Hicksian Welfare

We show that the Hicksian welfare measures of compensating variation and equivalent variation coincide if one of them is evaluated at a compensated income. The measures are nondecreasing in income if the varied attribute and income are complementary, and indirect utility is concave in income. Income monotonicity implies the normative endowment effect, where the equivalent variation exceeds the compensating variation. We provide sufficient conditions for the normative endowment effect and discuss empirical implications. In the global absence of a strict (anti-) endowment effect, both Hicksian welfare measures must be independent of income and the indirect utility function additively separable in income. (JEL D11, D63)

scholarly journals Representation and Governance in International Organizations

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 77-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Rapkin ◽  
Jonathan R. Strand ◽  
Michael W. Trevathan
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
Global Governance ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Global Politics ◽  
Representational Practices ◽  
Empirical Implications ◽  
The International Monetary Fund ◽  
Supranational Level

What does representation mean when applied to international organizations? While many scholars working on normative questions related to global governance often make use of the concept of representation, few have addressed specifics of applying the concept to the rules and practices by which IOs operate. This article examines representation as a fundamental, albeit often neglected, norm of governance which, if perceived to be deficient or unfair, can interfere with other components of governance, as well as with performance of an organization’s core tasks by undermining legitimacy. We argue that the concept of representation has been neglected in the ongoing debates about good governance and democratic deficits within IOs. We aim to correct this by drawing on insights from normative political theory considerations of representation. The article then applies theoretical aspects of representation to the governance of the International Monetary Fund. We determine that subjecting IOs to this kind of conceptual scrutiny highlights important deficiencies in representational practices in global politics. Finally, our conclusion argues scholars of global governance need to address the normative and empirical implications of conceptualizing representation at the supranational level.

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