scholarly journals Implementation in Iterative Elimination of Obviously Dominated Strategies: An Experiment on King Solomon's Dilemma

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Makoto Hagiwara ◽  
Fumihiro Yonekura
Keyword(s):  
Dominated Strategies

scholarly journals The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies

1993 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 553-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itzhak Gilboa ◽  
Ehud Kalai ◽  
Eitan Zemel
Keyword(s):  
Dominated Strategies

scholarly journals Homophily, heterophily and the diversity of messages among decision-making individuals

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 180027 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pouria Ramazi ◽  
James Riehl ◽  
Ming Cao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Convergence Result ◽  
Term Survival ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
The Face ◽  
Cheap Talk Games ◽  
The One

To better understand the intriguing mechanisms behind cooperation among decision-making individuals, we study the simple yet appealing use of preplay communication or cheap talk in evolutionary games, when players are able to choose strategies based on whether an opponent sends the same message as they do. So when playing games, in addition to pure cooperation and defection, players have two new strategies in this setting: homophilic (respectively, heterophilic) cooperation which is to cooperate (respectively, defect) only with those who send the same message as they do. We reveal the intrinsic qualities of individuals playing the two strategies and show that under the replicator dynamics, homophilic cooperators engage in a battle of messages and will become dominated by whichever message is the most prevalent at the start, while populations of heterophilic cooperators exhibit a more harmonious behaviour, converging to a state of maximal diversity. Then we take Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) as the base of the cheap-talk game and show that the hostility of heterophilics to individuals with similar messages leaves no possibility for pure cooperators to survive in a population of the two, whereas the one-message dominance of homophilics allows for pure cooperators with the same tag as the dominant homophilics to coexist in the population, demonstrating that homophilics are more cooperative than heterophilics. Finally, we generalize an existing convergence result on population shares associated with weakly dominated strategies to a broadly applicable theorem and complete previous research on PD games with preplay communication by proving that the frequencies of all types of cooperators, i.e. pure, homophilic and heterophilic, converge to zero in the face of defectors. This implies homophily and heterophily cannot facilitate the long-term survival of cooperation in this setting, which urges studying cheap-talk games under other reproduction dynamics.

scholarly journals Pairwise Interact-and-Imitate Dynamics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ennio Bilancini ◽  
Leonardo Boncinelli ◽  
Nicola Campigotto
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Asymptotically Stable ◽  
Globally Asymptotically Stable ◽  
Symmetric Game ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Payoff Uncertainty

Abstract This paper introduces and studies a class of evolutionary dynamics --- Pairwise Interact-and-Imitate Dynamics (PIID) --- in which agents are matched in pairs, engage in a symmetric game, and imitate the opponent with a probability that depends on the difference in their payoffs. We provide a condition on the underlying game, named supremacy, and show that the population state in which all agents play the supreme strategy is globally asymptotically stable. We extend the framework to allow for payoff uncertainty, and check the robustness of our results to the introduction of some heterogeneity in the revision protocol followed by agents. Finally, we show that PIID can allow the survival of strictly dominated strategies, leads to the emergence of inefficient conventions in social dilemmas, and makes assortment ineffective in promoting cooperation.

scholarly journals Social preferences are not enough: Accounting for anomalous behavior in a complex mixed-motive game

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (65) ◽  
pp. 261-278
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Moro ◽  
Esteban Freidin ◽  
Fernando Tohmé
Keyword(s):  
Social Preferences ◽  
Anomalous Behavior ◽  
Cognitive Factors ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Display Behavior ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
Traveler’S Dilemma ◽  
Traveler's Dilemma

In some economic games, participants systematically display behavior that departs from the model of payoff maximization, and this is usually attributed to social preferences. In this paper we focus on a new interactive context, a mixed-motive game called "Alternative Traveler's Dilemma" (ATD). In this context, most participants choose strictly dominated strategies. Preliminary studies suggest the reason for such a tendency is that participants have social preferences, usually competitive in nature. The question is whether some cognitive factors should also be included in models that account for the tendency at stake. More specifically, we investigate whether participants neglect payoff maximization, that is, whether they fail to notice that, by pursuing some competitive goal, they are not maximizing their payoffs. We report the results of an experiment that supports this hypothesis. We conclude that in order to explain anomalous behavior in the ATD, and similar games, we need to study the cognitive factors that bound participants' strategies and understanding of the game.

scholarly journals A New Decentralized Approach of Multiagent Cooperative Pursuit Based on the Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies Model

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammed El Habib Souidi ◽  
Songhao Piao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Decision Process ◽  
Pursuit Evasion ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
Markov Decision ◽  
Simulation Results ◽  
The Given ◽  
Dynamic Formation ◽  
Motion Strategy

Game Theory is a promising approach to acquire coalition formations in multiagent systems. This paper is focused on the importance of the distributed computation and the dynamic formation and reformation of pursuit groups in pursuit-evasion problems. In order to address this task, we propose a decentralized coalition formation algorithm based on the Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies (IEDS). This Game Theory process is common to solve problems requiring the withdrawal of dominated strategies iteratively. Furthermore, we have used the Markov Decision Process (MDP) principles to control the motion strategy of the agents in the environment. The simulation results demonstrate the feasibility and the validity of the given approach in comparison with different decentralized methods.

Weakly dominated strategies

Game Theory ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 51-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aviad Heifetz
Keyword(s):  
Dominated Strategies

scholarly journals Nash versus coarse correlation

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 1178-1204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Georgalos ◽  
Indrajit Ray ◽  
Sonali SenGupta
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Pure Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Expected Payoff ◽  
Equilibrium Payoff ◽  
Payoff Dominance ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Nash Point

Abstract We run a laboratory experiment to test the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial in Int J Game Theory 7:201–221, 1978), with a two-person game with unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the solution of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The subjects are asked to commit to a device that randomly picks one of three symmetric outcomes (including the Nash point) with higher ex-ante expected payoff than the Nash equilibrium payoff. We find that the subjects do not accept this lottery (which is a coarse correlated equilibrium); instead, they choose to play the game and coordinate on the Nash equilibrium. However, given an individual choice between a lottery with equal probabilities of the same outcomes and the sure payoff as in the Nash point, the lottery is chosen by the subjects. This result is robust against a few variations. We explain our result as selecting risk-dominance over payoff dominance in equilibrium.

New expected impact functions and algorithms for modeling games under soft sets

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 4463-4472
Author(s):  
Irfan Deli ◽  
Hoang Viet Long ◽  
Le Hoang Son ◽  
Raghvendra Kumar ◽  
Arindam Dey
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Saddle Points ◽  
Soft Set ◽  
Soft Sets ◽  
Matrix Games ◽  
Soft Matrix ◽  
Dominated Strategies

Soft set is the power tool to deal with uncertainty in a parametric manner. In applications of soft set, one of the most important steps is to define mappings on soft sets. In this study, we model theory of game under theory of soft set which is an effective tool for handling uncertainties events and problems that may exist in a game. To this end, we first define some expected impact functions of players in soft games. Then, we propose three new decision making algorithms to solve the 2.2 × p, 2 . n × p and m . 2 × p soft matrix games, which cannot be settled by the relevant soft methods such as saddle points, lover and upper values, dominated strategies and Nash equilibrium. The proposed soft game algorithms are illustrated by examples.

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