Do Corporate Disclosures Constrain Strategic Analyst Behavior?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yen-Cheng Chang ◽  
Alexander Ljungqvist ◽  
Kevin Tseng
Keyword(s):  
Analyst Behavior ◽  
Corporate Disclosures

Corporate Disclosures of the Major Sources of Estimation Uncertainties

2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diane M. Mayorga ◽  
Baljit K. Sidhu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Disclosures

Social learning and analyst behavior

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alok Kumar ◽  
Ville Rantala ◽  
Rosy Xu
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Analyst Behavior

Developing trust through stewardship

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Dumay ◽  
Matteo La Torre ◽  
Federica Farneti
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Stewardship Theory ◽  
Extended Model ◽  
Corporate Disclosure ◽  
Integrated Reporting ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Eu Directive ◽  
Management Behaviour ◽  
Corporate Disclosures

Purpose This paper examines the gap between reporting and managers’ behaviour to challenge the current theoretical underpinnings of intellectual capital (IC) disclosure practice and research. The authors explore how the key features from IC and integrated reporting can be combined to develop an extended model for companies to comply with EU Directive 2014/95/EU and increase trust in corporate disclosures and reports. Design/methodology/approach This essay relies on academic literature and examples from practice to critique the theories that explain corporate disclosure and reporting but do not change management behaviour. Based on this critique, the authors argue for a change in the fundamental theories of stewardship to frame a new concept for corporate disclosure incorporating using a multi-capitals framework. Findings We argue that, while the inconsistency between organisations’ reporting and behaviour persists, increasing, renewing or extending the information disclosed is not enough to instil trust in corporations. Stewardship over a company’s resources is necessary for increasing trust. The unanticipated consequences of dishonest behaviour by managers and shareholders compels a new application of stewardship theory that works as an overarching guide for managerial behaviour and disclosure. Emanating from this new model is a realisation that managers must abandon agency theory in practice, and specifically the bonus contract. Research limitations/implications We call for future empirical research to explore the role of stewardship theory within the dynamics of corporate disclosure using the approach. The research implications of those studies should incorporate the potential impacts on management behaviours within a stewardship framework and how those actions, and their outcomes, are disclosed for rebuilding public trust in business. Practical implications The implications for integrated reporting and reports complying with the new EU Directive are profound. Both instruments rely on agency theory to coax managers into reducing information asymmetry by disclosing more. However, agency theory only re-affirms the power managers have over corporate information. It does not change their behaviour, nor to act in the interest of all stakeholders as the stewards of an organisation’s resources. Social implications We advocate that, in business education, greater emphasis is needed on how stewardship has a more positive impact on management behaviour than agency, legitimacy and stakeholder theories. Originality/value We reflect on the current and compelling issues permeating the international landscape of corporate reporting and disclosure and explain why current theories which explain corporate disclosures do not change behaviour or engender trust in business and offer an alternative disclosure model based on stewardship theory.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Transparency in Japan

2021 ◽  
pp. 2150003
Author(s):  
Hiroyuki Aman ◽  
Wendy Beekes ◽  
Philip Brown
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Good News ◽  
Share Prices ◽  
Japanese Companies ◽  
Corporate Disclosures

Corporate governance (CG) reformists typically presume better-governed companies are more transparent to investors. We focus on CG and transparency in Japan, where CG has been an ongoing issue. Using local ratings of Japanese companies’ CG and data on corporate disclosures and their associated stock returns, we do find better-governed Japanese companies have made more frequent and timelier disclosures, and their share prices have reflected value-relevant information earlier. While these results hold for good news, they do not hold for bad. Consequently, governance guidance in Japan may not have resulted in both timelier and more balanced release of newsworthy information.

scholarly journals Relationship between Cost of Equity Capital and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Petrova ◽  
Georgios Georgakopoulos ◽  
Ioannis Sotiropoulos ◽  
Konstantinos Z. Vasileiou
Keyword(s):  
Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Corporate Disclosures

Evaluation Markers and Mitigators in Analyst Reports in Light of Market Response to Stock Recommendations

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 310-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karol Marek Klimczak ◽  
Marta Dynel
Keyword(s):  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Writing Skills ◽  
Professional Writing ◽  
Specific Group ◽  
Stock Recommendations ◽  
Share Prices ◽  
Analyst Behavior ◽  
Warsaw Stock Exchange

Professionals and individuals who invest in equity markets rely on financial analysts’ recommendations and reports to decide on what to invest in and when to trade. This study examines the role of two groups of communication strategies, evaluation markers and mitigators, in establishing analysts’ credibility. The sample consists of 80 reports written in Polish for companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in Poland. In this emerging market setting, where credibility is challenged by uncertainty, analysts deploy various strategies depending on the recommendation they make: “buy,” “hold,” or “sell” shares. The findings point toward a specific group of mitigators, namely subjectivization, as a means of communicating expert opinion. Regression results reveal that investors’ reaction to the publication of a recommendation to “hold” or “sell” shares, measured based on the changes in share prices, is stronger when subjectivization is used in a report. The findings carry implications for research into analyst behavior and for the development of professional writing skills.

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