Political Partisanship Influences Behavioral Responses to Governors’ Recommendations for COVID-19 Prevention in the United States

Author(s):  
Guy Grossman ◽  
Soojong Kim ◽  
Jonah Rexer ◽  
Harsha Thirumurthy
1967 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. Segal

As a major socio-political doctrine in the industrializing West, Marxism has had great impact on die research and theory of political sociology and behavioral political science. Particularly, a great deal of research energy has been expended on establishing the nature and degree of the relationship between social class and political partisanship in Western democracies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Tope ◽  
Brittany D. Rawlinson ◽  
Justin T. Pickett ◽  
Amy M. Burdette ◽  
Christopher G. Ellison

The nascent literature on the propensity to endorse conspiratorial views of President Barack Obama suggests that such sentiments may be grounded in racial animus or political partisanship. Yet to date, little attention has been paid to the religious elements that may underlie such claims. We extend the research in this area by using a national survey to assess the relationship between white conservative Protestant affiliation and an inclination to endorse the idea that Obama is a Muslim and/or a noncitizen. The results show that white conservative Protestant affiliation is associated with a greater tendency to support these characterizations of Obama. Importantly, this relationship is substantially mediated by racial resentment. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for the United States’ increasing ethnic and religious pluralism.


2019 ◽  
pp. 81-96
Author(s):  
Andrei P. Tsygankov

The chapter extends the argument about media and value conflict between Russia and the United States to the age of Donald Trump. The new value conflict is assessed as especially acute and exacerbated by the US partisan divide. The Russia issue became central because it reflected both political partisanship and the growing value division between Trump voters and the liberal establishment. In addition to explaining the new wave of American Russophobia, the chapter analyzes Russia’s own role and motives. The media are likely to continue the ideological and largely negative coverage of Russia, especially if Washington and Moscow fail to develop a pragmatic form of cooperation.


Journalism ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa Tully ◽  
Emily K Vraga ◽  
Anne-Bennett Smithson

Drawing on interviews with a diverse group of adults living in the United States, this study examines news media literacy and how perceptions of personal bias and news bias affect news choices and interpretation in general and evaluation of two news stories specifically. Findings suggest that while people recognize that their worldviews shape their news choices in the abstract and believe that news bias occurs for a variety of complex reasons, when faced with analyzing stories, they point to political partisanship connected to specific news outlets as the root of bias in news with most relying on source cues to make their assessments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Olah ◽  
Thomas E. Ford

Abstract A correlational study (n = 180 adults) in the United States tested the hypothesis that self-directed humor styles predict emotional responses to COVID-19, specifically stress and hopelessness, and in turn predict engagement in protective behaviors. Results from a sequential mediation analysis supported our hypotheses. First, to the extent that people have a self-enhancing humor style they perceived less stress and hopelessness associated with COVID-19 and as a result reported engaging in more protective behaviors. Second, people higher in self-defeating humor style showed the opposite pattern; they perceived more stress and hopelessness due to COVID-19 and thus reported engaging in less protective behaviors. Implications for theory and application are discussed.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Li ◽  
Shenghua Luan ◽  
Ralph Hertwig

The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the lives of people worldwide. To understand how people’s emotional and behavioral responses have changed over the course of the pandemic, we conducted a three-wave longitudinal study in the United States and China across four stages of the pandemic: pre-pandemic, onset of viral outbreak, ongoing risk, and contained risk. We found that boredom, anxiety, fear and worry were common emotional reactions to the emerging pandemic. Surprisingly, the public’s emotional experience did not mirror infection and death rates, but soon reverted back to normality, regardless of whether the viral spread was contained or not. Consequently, it was only at the onset of the viral outbreak that people’s preventive behaviours were driven by fear, anxiety and worry. Knowledge about the coronavirus provided a more enduring motivation for preventive behaviours in both countries.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Hunter Priniski

Despite widespread communication of the health risks associated with the COVID-19 virus, many Americans underestimated its risks and were antagonistic regarding preventative measures. Political partisanship has been linked to diverging attitudes towards the virus, but the cognitive processes underlying this divergence remain unclear. Bayesian models fit to data gathered through two preregistered, online surveys administered before (March 13, 2020, N = 850) and during the first-wave (April-May, 2020, N = 1610) of cases in the United States, reveal two preexisting forms of distrust––distrust in Democratic politicians and in medical scientists––that drove initial skepticism about the virus. During the first-wave of cases, additional factors came into play, suggesting that skeptical attitudes became more deeply embedded within a complex network of auxiliary beliefs. These findings highlight how mechanisms that enhance cognitive coherence can drive anti-science attitudes.


1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 941-950 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin P. Wattenberg

This article examines attitudes towards the two major political parties in the United States from 1952 to 1980, using national election study data from open-ended likes/dislikes questions. The major trend which is found is a shift toward neutral evaluations of the parties. A reinterpretation of party decline in the electorate is offered, in which the much-discussed alienation from parties is largely rejected as an explanation. Rather, it is argued that the link between parties and candidates has been substantially weakened over the years and hence that political parties have become increasingly meaningless to the electorate.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Croucher ◽  
Douglas Ashwell ◽  
Niki Murray ◽  
Shawn Michael Condon ◽  
Phoebe Fletcher

The COVID-19 pandemic has seen health preventive behaviors to prevent spread of the virus become highly politicized in the United States. A clear division exists between Democrats favoring health preventive measures and Republicans often defying such measures. Amid increasing fear of the virus, the 2020 United States presidential election became central to how the pandemic should be managed. This longitudinal study examines whether the frequency of handwashing and mask-wearing changed after the United States election. The study further explores whether political partisanship played a part in the change. Results show that handwashing and mask-wearing increased among Democrats after the election. However, Republican’s use of masks and handwashing decreased. These results are explained in terms of loyalty to outgoing President Trump among Republicans and renewed feelings of efficacy among Democrats.


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