Measuring Marginal q

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vito Gala
Keyword(s):  
Marginal Q

Tobin's Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation

Econometrica ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fumio Hayashi
Keyword(s):  
Marginal Q

REIT Capital Budgeting and Equity Marginal q

2009 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brent W. Ambrose ◽  
Dong Wook Lee
Keyword(s):  
Capital Budgeting ◽  
Marginal Q

Marginal q revisited

2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per-Olof Bjuggren
Keyword(s):  
Marginal Q

Marginal q , Tobin's q , Cash Flow, and Investment

2004 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 512-531
Author(s):  
Klaus Gugler ◽  
Dennis C. Mueller ◽  
B. Burcin Yurtoglu
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Marginal Q

scholarly journals Institutional ownership and returns on investment

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-430
Author(s):  
Per-Olof Bjuggren ◽  
Johan E. Eklund ◽  
Daniel Wiberg
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Investment Performance ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
Returns On Investment ◽  
Institutional Owners ◽  
Marginal Q

This paper examines how institutional investors influence investment decisions and returns on investment. To measure investment performance, we use marginal q, which measures the ratio of the return on investment to the cost of capital. Institutional owners are found to have a positive but marginally diminishing effect on performance. Our paper uses longitudinal data on Swedish firms from 1999 to 2005; during this period, the ownership structure of Swedish firms underwent dramatic changes as institutional investors increased their ownership shares, while ownership by Swedish households decreased. However, controlling owners - who were often founding families - maintained their control of firms by resorting to extensive use of dual-class shares. This was an important determinant of firm performance that eradicated the positive influence of institutional ownership

The Impact of Vote Differentiation on Investment Performance in Listed Family Firms

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per-Olof Bjuggren ◽  
Johanna Palmberg
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Performance Measure ◽  
Investment Performance ◽  
Family Control ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Marginal Q ◽  
The Empirical Analysis

This article investigates the effects of separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation on listed family firms’ investment performance. The authors study the question of whether family-controlled firms have better investment performance than nonfamily firms and whether this investment performance is negatively affected by a separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation. Marginal q is used as a performance measure. The empirical analysis shows that family control has a positive impact on investment performance when ownership and control are aligned, whereas separation of ownership and control in terms of vote-differentiated shares reduce investment performance.

scholarly journals Fixed Costs: The Demise of Marginal q

10.3386/w5508 ◽  
1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Caballero ◽  
John Leahy
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Costs ◽  
Marginal Q

Average q, marginal q, and the relation between ownership and performance

2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Gugler ◽  
Burcin B Yurtoglu
Keyword(s):  
And Performance ◽  
Marginal Q
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