Real-time Monitoring in a Public Goods Game

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simin He ◽  
Xun Zhu
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Molho ◽  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Junhui Wu

Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. Then how is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.


Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
Catherine Molho ◽  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Junhui Wu

Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.


2001 ◽  
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Author(s):  
Robert Kurzban ◽  
Kevin McCabe ◽  
Vernon L. Smith ◽  
Bart J. Wilson

2006 ◽  
Vol 175 (4S) ◽  
pp. 521-521
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Tomoharu Kono ◽  
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2001 ◽  
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pp. Pr3-1175-Pr3-1182 ◽  
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M. Losurdo ◽  
A. Grimaldi ◽  
M. Giangregorio ◽  
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◽  
Asiah Mohd Pilus ◽  
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...  

Diabetes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (Supplement 1) ◽  
pp. 101-LB
Author(s):  
ABHINAV BHUSHAN ◽  
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2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 20
Author(s):  
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ANCY EVERT P.M. JONAH ◽  
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