The ECCC’s Contribution to Substantive ICL: The Notion of ‘Civilian Population’ in the Context of Crimes Against Humanity

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Ambos
Author(s):  
Beth van Schaack

Crimes against humanity have both a colloquial and a legal existence. In daily parlance, the term is employed to condemn any number of atrocities that violate international human rights. As a legal construct, crimes against humanity encompass a constellation of acts made criminal under international law when they are committed within the context of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population. In the domain of international criminal law, crimes against humanity are an increasingly useful component of any international prosecutor’s toolbox, because they can be charged in connection with acts of violence that do not implicate other international criminal prohibitions, such as the prohibitions against war crimes (which require a nexus to an armed conflict) and genocide (which protects only certain human groups and requires proof of a specific intent to destroy such a group). Although the concept of crimes against humanity has deep roots, crimes against humanity were first adjudicated—albeit with some controversy—in the criminal proceedings following the World War II period. The central challenge to defining crimes against humanity under international criminal law since then has been to come up with a formulation of the offense that reconciles the principle of sovereignty—which envisions an exclusive territorial domain in which states are free from outside scrutiny—with the idea that international law can, and indeed should, regulate certain acts committed entirely within the borders of a single state. Because many enumerated crimes against humanity are also crimes under domestic law (e.g., murder, assault, and rape), it was necessary to define crimes against humanity in a way that did not elevate every domestic crime to the status of an international crime, subject to international jurisdiction. Over the years, legal drafters have experimented with various elements in an effort to arrive at a workable penal definition. The definitional confusion plaguing the crime over its life span generated a considerable amount of legal scholarship. It was not until the UN Security Council promulgated the statutes of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals—the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda—that a modern definition of the crime emerged. These definitions were further refined by the case law of the two tribunals and their progeny, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone. All these doctrinal developments were codified, with some additional modifications, in a consensus definition in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It is now clear that the offense constitutes three essential elements: (1) the existence of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and (2) the intentional commission of an enumerated act (such as an act of murder or torture) (3) by an individual with knowledge that his or her act would contribute to the larger attack. A renewed effort is now afoot to promulgate a multilateral treaty devoted to crimes against humanity based on the ICC definition and these central elements. Through this dynamic process of codification and interpretation, many—but not all—definitional issues left open in the postwar period have finally been resolved. Although their origins were somewhat shaky, crimes against humanity now have a firm place in the canon of international criminal law.


Author(s):  
Christine Byron

Genocide has been called the “crime of crimes” and the gravest violation of human rights it is possible to commit. It was developed as an international crime in reaction to the Nazi Holocaust and intended to provide for the prosecution of those who sought to destroy entire human groups. The word “genocide” was coined by a Polish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944) to provide a legal concept for this unimaginable atrocity. The word is a hybrid of the Greek word genos, meaning race, nation, or tribe, and the Latin suffix cide, meaning killing. Although genocide is often spoken of in the same breath as war crimes and crimes against humanity, it is not the same thing. War crimes refer to violations of the law of armed conflict, while crimes against humanity, of which genocide is often seen as a more serious subset, require a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. Unlike war crimes, the crime of genocide does not have to take place during an armed conflict (although it often does), and unlike crimes against humanity, it may also be perpetrated against soldiers or prisoners of war from the targeted group (if it happens to take place during an armed conflict). Additionally, crimes against humanity do not have to be perpetrated against a specific human group, as is the case with genocide, but simply against a civilian population. While the concept of genocide was developed after World War II, it is unfortunately true that the mass killing of human groups is much older than the legal expression; indeed, the first genocide of the 20th century is widely thought to have been the German genocide of the Herero and Nama in German South West Africa (modern-day Namibia) between 1904 and 1907. The Genocide Convention of 1948 (officially the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide) declared that “genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they, the contracting parties, undertake to prevent and to punish.” Nevertheless, the real development of systematic international trials and punishment for the crime of genocide waited for the end of the 20th century: the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the inclusion of the crime of genocide in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 689-700
Author(s):  
Kai Ambos

Abstract In this short essay, I will argue that the ‘civilian population’ requirement in crimes against humanity (CAH) provisions (e.g. Article 7(1) ICC Statute) must either be radically restricted by way of a teleological (purpose-based) interpretation or — even better — abolished in future CAH provisions. While the traditional International Humanitarian Law approach certainly needs to be adjusted with regard to CAH, such an adjustment does not resolve the considerable limitation of the protective scope of CAH due to the ‘civilian population’ requirement. The contribution of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to the debate is to be welcomed and serves as a useful starting point for the more radical interpretation and necessary reform of CAH.


2021 ◽  
pp. 242-250
Author(s):  
Michael W. Chamberlin

In 2017, the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), supported by 100 other organisations, submitted a communication to the ICC detailing crimes committed against the civilian population from 2009-16 in the State of Coahuila de Zaragoza, Mexico, including murder, illegal imprisonment, enforced disappearance, torture, and sexual violence. This chapter explains the procedural and substantive basis of their complaint as a model for others who may seek the ICC’s involvement in the investigation and prosecution a pattern of enforced disappearances.


Author(s):  
Werle Gerhard ◽  
Jeßberger Florian

This chapter explains crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity are mass crimes committed against a civilian population. Most serious is the killing of entire groups of people, which is also characteristic of genocide. Crimes against humanity target fundamental, recognised human rights, in particular life, health, freedom, and dignity. These violations of individual rights become international crimes when they are committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. The chapter discusses the history and structure of the crime, as well as protected interests. It then presents the contextual element of this crime, which is an attack on a civilian population as defined in the ICC Statute. After this, individual acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population are next discussed. Lastly, this chapter explores the multiplicity of offenses within this category.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Hubert ◽  
Ariela Blätter

In 2005 the UN’s World Summit endorsed the idea that its members have a responsibility to prevent and halt genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Insufficient attention has been paid to clarifying how the definitions and evolving jurisprudence relating to these international crimes can provide clarity in identifying the unlawful acts that the Responsibility to Protect seeks to prevent and to halt. Specifically, an analysis of the elements of the crimes establishes the following parameters: attacks directed against any civilian population, committed in a widespread or systematic manner, in furtherance of a state or organizational policy, irrespective of the existence of discriminatory intent or an armed conflict. This conclusion makes reference to four ‘crimes’ redundant: crime against humanity alone provides an appropriate framework for conceptualizing and implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Although analysts focused on international crimes tend to prioritize accountability, such an approach need not be reactive. The essence of the Responsibility to Protect is best characterized as international crimes prevention.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 118-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chile Eboe-Osuji

AbstractIn international criminal law, to sustain a charge of crimes against humanity, the Prosecution must prove, among other elements, that the perpetrator was involved in an attack directed against a civilian population. In Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, the Special Court for Sierra Leone found that the Prosecution failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the civilian population was the 'primary object' of the attack and acquitted the accused on the counts of murder and other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity. The Appeals Chamber accepted this view. However, it reversed Trial Chamber I on the ground that the Prosecution evidence did establish that the civilian population had been the primary, as opposed to incidental, target of the attack. The author suggests that this is an error resulting from the undue jurisprudential pre-occupation with the meaning of 'primary' in relation to the notion of attack against a civilian population. Instead, the inquiry should focus on whether the civilian population was 'intentionally' targeted in the attack, notwithstanding that it may not have been the primary object of the attack. He submits that this approach would be consistent with the classic theory of mens rea in criminal law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Ana Alija Fernández ◽  
Jaume Saura Estapà

Although an essential element of the definition of crimes against humanity is that a civilian population be targeted, there is no agreement on what ‘civilian population’ means in this context. The notion has been given different meanings depending on whether the crimes are committed in times of conflict or peacetime. In times of conflict, preference is given to a broad approach based on international humanitarian law. More problematic is the attribution of a specific content to the notion in peacetime, where even discrimination has been suggested as a defining criterion. In this article we contend that a single notion of civilian population in crimes against humanity applicable in every circumstance is needed. Hence, we suggest determining the civilian population on the basis of the rules on State responsibility in international human rights law and general international law in order to exclude those endowed with public authority from the civilian population.


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 913-928 ◽  
Author(s):  
TILMAN RODENHÄUSER

AbstractRecent cases before the ICC raise the question of on behalf of which entities crimes against humanity can be committed. Interpreting the ‘organizational policy’ requirement in its context, this article argues that in principle crimes against humanity can be committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a policy of any organization that has the capacity to orchestrate a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. It is shown that this does not broaden the scope of the crime indefinitely but that concrete requirements defining such entities are found in the contextual elements of crimes against humanity.


2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hansdeep Singh

AbstractOn 27 September 2007, the Mrkšić Trial Chamber held that the unlawful killing of soldiers hors de combat ("out of the battle") did not entitle them to recognition as victims of crimes against humanity under Article 5 of the ICTY Statute. This article critically analyses the Court's mischaracterization of precedent, revealing both historical and contemporary support for a broader definition of "civilian population" under Article 5. Moreover, by looking at case law and statutes from Nuremberg, foreign countries, and international courts, a continuous pattern that encompasses soldiers hors de combat within the definition of "civilian population" begins to emerge. Ultimately, to validate the increasing role of international humanitarian and human rights law, international criminal law must provide greater protections for those most vulnerable, in this case, soldiers hors de combat.


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