Why Do or Should Foreign Investors Resort to the Courts of the Host Country Prior to Investment Treaty Arbitration? A Study of Two Transitional and Two Well-Established Judiciaries

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Szilárd Gáspár Szilágyi
Keyword(s):  
Host Country ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

Making International Legal Persons in Investment Treaty Arbitration: State-owned Enterprises along the Person/Thing Distinction

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 1183-1228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikko Rajavuori
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal Person ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Investment Law ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
International Legal Personality ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

Investment treaty arbitration (ITA) has emerged as a space where the international legal personality of states and foreign investors is continuously created, maintained, and redefined. Focusing on treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this Article juxtaposes investment law's doctrinal foundations with Roberto Esposito's political philosophy to explore the dynamics, porosity, and ramifications of international legal personality in ITA. Skeptical of gradual conceptualizations of legal personality, this Article frames investment law in terms of Esposito's person/thing distinction and argues for SOEs to form a liminal category that exposes malleability of legal doctrines when ITA tribunals make or break international legal persons. Ultimately, the ITA cases seem to open a distinct dispositif of a SOE that both delineates the exact normative demarcation of the state as international legal person and creates pockets of indistinguishability and politics at its borders—often to the detriment of the Global South. This insight provides a new perspective on the creation of international legal persons in ITA and international law more generally but, at the same time, also adds a new dimension to Esposito's overarching framework resting on the asymmetric relationship between persons and things.

System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 1083-1110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan W. Schill
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
State Level ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
The North ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

Since the late 1990s investment treaty arbitration has developed into one of the most vibrant fields of international dispute settlement with now almost 400 known cases. It involves claims by foreign investors against host States for breach of obligations assumed under one of the more than 2700 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), under the numerous investment chapters in bilateral or regional free trade agreements, including the North American Free Trade Agreement, or under sectoral treaties such as the Energy Charter Treaty. All of these instruments offer comprehensive protection to foreign investors by setting down principles of substantive investment protection, including national and most-favored-nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, protection against expropriation without compensation, and free capital transfer. They also allow investors to enforce these standards in arbitral proceedings directly against the host State, most commonly under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention). Investment treaty arbitration thereby not only empowers foreign investors under international law, but also introduces investment treaty tribunals as novel actors into the arena of international investment law. Although arbitration has been a classic form of dispute settlement on the State-to-State level, including for the settlement of investment-related disputes, modern investment treaty tribunals have wider jurisdiction and are more removed from State control than any of their predecessors.

scholarly journals Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations between India and U.S: Problems and Prospects

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajesh Kumar
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaty ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Treaty Negotiations ◽  
Technology Control ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Control Regime ◽  
Australian Company ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

<p><em>Relationship between U.S. and India is at the best phase, especially after former unequivocal support in NSG (Nuclear Supply Group) and helping inclusion in MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime). The relationship between two oldest and biggest democracies has matured under the headship of Mr. Barak Obama as President and Mr. Nardendra Modi as prime minister. In the recent visit of Indian prime minister, the warm gesture shown by U.S. congress members have further cemented the strength of tie up between two nations. However, despite great chemistry between two nation and its leaders from last many years, both have failed to enter into Bilateral Investment Treaty. India is having Bilateral Investment treaty with more than 80 countries including U.K. and Russia, of which 72 treaties are operational. <a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/SPub/Desktop/July%202016%20IRA%20Issues/IRAJEMS/IRAJEMS1.docx#_ftn1">[1]</a>  U.S. is having Bilateral Investment treaties with more than 46  countries including Russia and Bangladesh.<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/SPub/Desktop/July%202016%20IRA%20Issues/IRAJEMS/IRAJEMS1.docx#_ftn2">[2]</a> Since 2008, the two countries have been engaged in sporadic discussions to conclude the Investment treaty. Negotiations on its wording, based on each country’s revised model treaty texts, will begin soon. Both the leaders Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S President Barack Obama affirmed their mutual commitment to facilitating increased bilateral investment flows and fostering an open and predictable climate for investment many a times , But consensus has not been reached till today on certain term and conditions.   In the absence of BIT , the rights of investors of both the countries are at the stake. Further, MFN or nationality treatment clause cannot be invoked or granted in the event of any regulatory or other action. Obligations imposed by BIT to protect interest of foreign investors are absent. Further, after losing its first Investment Treaty Arbitration (ITA) claim in 2012 against White Industries, an Australian company and pending 17 cases, India has recently adopted new BIT in 2015 . It also has reflections of pending claims of Vodafone and other cases involving Intellectual Property Rights( Hereinafter refereed as IPR) and the cases of compulsory licences.   </em></p><div><br clear="all" /><hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div><p><em><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/SPub/Desktop/July%202016%20IRA%20Issues/IRAJEMS/IRAJEMS1.docx#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Details Avaialble at <a href="http://www.finmin.nic.in/bipa/bipa_index.asp">http://www.finmin.nic.in/bipa/bipa_index.asp</a>.</em></p></div><div><p><em><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/SPub/Desktop/July%202016%20IRA%20Issues/IRAJEMS/IRAJEMS1.docx#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Details Avialable at <a href="http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm">http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm</a>.</em></p></div></div>

Exploring the prospects of host-state counterclaims in corruption disputes

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-600
Author(s):  
Chitransh Vijayvergia ◽  
Pavan Belmannu
Keyword(s):  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
International Arbitration ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
The Public ◽  
Host State ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Investment Treaties ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

Abstract While the regime of investment treaty arbitration has evolved manifold over the decades, has the position of the host-states as a Respondent improved? The authors argue that it has not. Bilateral Investment Treaties (hereinafter BIT(s)) are still asymmetrical in nature where the states are obliged to protect the rights of the foreign investors but are not provided with any remedy against the corrupt activities of the investors. While tribunals have denied jurisdiction over the investors’ claims tainted with corruption, they have provided states with no consequent remedy against such investors. Consequently, the states have to first bear the loss of a failed investment in its territory and then pay for the exorbitant costs of international arbitration as well. Where scholars are arguing for attribution of liability of corrupt activities of the public officials to the states, the authors here raise an important question of what if the liability cannot be attributed to the states due to lack of apparent authority? Should the states be then allowed to move forward from the jurisdictional stage to raise counterclaims to seek damages for the loss caused by the investors? In this article, the authors explore these questions and present arguments in favour of the inclusion of corruption-based counterclaims.

The Politics of Investment Treaty Arbitration

2020 ◽  
pp. 739-766
Author(s):  
Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen
Keyword(s):  
State Politics ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Host State ◽  
Home State ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

This chapter describes the politics of investment treaty arbitration. It first looks at two core political justifications for investment treaty arbitration. The first relates to home state politics and diplomacy: the ability of investment treaty arbitration to depoliticize investor–state disputes. The second justification relates to host state politics and institutions: the ability of investment treaty arbitration to convince certain types of foreign investors to commit capital into certain types of jurisdictions due to its effects on host state governments. On this basis, the chapter then discusses the politics of investment treaty arbitration in recent years, particularly surrounding the unintended consequences of the investment treaty regime as well as the controversy about investment arbitrators themselves.

scholarly journals Let Us Not Forget about the Role of Domestic Courts in Settling Investor-State Disputes

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-415
Author(s):  
Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Working Group ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Host State ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

Abstract This overview illustrates that there is a gap in our knowledge of how domestic courts handle investor-State disputes. As it turns out, some foreign investors use the domestic courts of the host State prior to initiating investment treaty arbitration. Subject matter-wise, these cases are very diverse and not all of them are initiated by investors against the host State. Moreover, in the four countries analysed, investors often appealed to the highest courts of the land, but they lost more cases than they won. These findings should help UNCITRAL Working Group III conceptualize the meaning of “investor-State dispute” and the relationship between domestic and international methods of ISDS. This overview concludes by inviting further empirical research to understand how domestic courts handle investor-State disputes. This in turn can help us develop normative arguments as to why domestic courts should be included in the reform process.

scholarly journals Trumping the Environment? An Empirical Perspective on the Legitimacy of Investment Treaty Arbitration

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Behn ◽  
Malcolm Langford
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Mixed Method ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Anecdotal Evidence ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
The Public ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Environmental Component ◽  
Empirical Perspective ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

Disputes involving an environmental component continue to be at the forefront of ongoing legitimacy debates in investment treaty arbitration. Critics of the international investment regime contend that arbitration favors the property rights of foreign investors over the need of host states to environmentally regulate and legislate in the public interest. While there is some doctrinal and anecdotal evidence to this effect, we ask whether investment treaty arbitration as a whole is as problematic for domestic environmental protection as has been perceived. With mixed method techniques, we analyze environmental cases in the context of five specific legitimacy concerns. Overall, we find that critiques of the system require nuance and clarification of the normative benchmarks for legitimacy assessments. In a number of important areas, the critiques do have purchase but in the aggregate, the most problematic cases are often successfully defended by respondent states.

Investment Treaty Arbitration

2020 ◽  
pp. 616-640
Author(s):  
Anil Yilmaz Vastardis
Keyword(s):  
International Investment ◽  
Special Treatment ◽  
Access To Justice ◽  
Reform Initiatives ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
International Investment Law ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Local Access ◽  
Investment Law ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

This chapter challenges investment treaty arbitration at its core by questioning the validity of insistence on special routes for access to justice reserved to remediate the grievances of a class of privileged investors, which can be referred to as ‘justice bubbles’. Despite the potential of the ongoing reform initiatives to genuinely improve the existing investment treaty arbitration model, salvaging and strengthening these justice bubbles that serve the needs of the privileged few sustains and even makes permanent the prioritization of institutions of justice for foreign investors over the improvement of local institutions that could provide justice for members across society, including foreign investors. However, no institutional process used or proposed for settling international investment law disputes is perfect, and each process is ‘imperfect in different ways given the dynamics of participation within them’. Thus, the challenge in this chapter is directed towards the singling out of high-value investment disputes as deserving special treatment above and beyond any institutional options available to any other private party aggrieved by governmental abuse. The chapter then argues that the establishment of a permanent investment court is a short-sighted solution to deficiencies in local access to justice, which is likely to undermine domestic legal developments.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document