Von der „Wirtschaftsverfassung I, II“ zum „Selbstbegründungsgesetz des Verfassungsrechts“: Zur Kritikalität der Theorie kritischer Systeme von Rudolf Wiethölter (From 'Economic Constitution I, II' to the 'Self-justifying Law of Constitutional Law': On the criticality of Rudolf Wiethölter’s Critical Systems Theory)

Self-organized Monte Carlo simulations of 2D Ising ferromagnet on the square lattice are performed. The essence of the suggested simulation method is an artificial dynamics consisting of the well-known single-spin-flip Metropolis algorithm supplemented by a random walk on the temperature axis. The walk is biased towards the critical region through a feedback based on instantaneous energy and magnetization cumulants, which are updated at every Monte Carlo step and filtered through a special recursion algorithm. The simulations revealed the invariance of the temperature probability distribution function, once some self-organized critical steady regime is reached, which is called here noncanonical equilibrium. The mean value of this distribution approximates the pseudocritical temperature of canonical equilibrium. In order to suppress finite-size effects, the self-organized approach is extended to multi-lattice systems, where the feedback basis on pairs of instantaneous estimates of the fourth-order magnetization cumulant on two systems of different size. These replica-based simulations resemble, in Monte Carlo lattice systems, some of the invariant statistical distributions of standard self-organized critical systems.

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Bentham on the Identification of Interests

Utilitas ◽

10.1017/s095382080000488x ◽

1996 ◽

Vol 8 (2) ◽

pp. 223-234 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Philip Schofield

Keyword(s):

Constitutional Law ◽

The Self ◽

General Interest ◽

Self Interest

It has been commonly accepted that Bentham, in his theory of constitutional law, aimed to replace the natural opposition of interests which existed between rulers and subjects with an artificial identification or junction of interests. This was brought about by making it the self-interest of rulers to act in such a way as to promote the general interest. In other words, any sinister interest to which the ruler was exposed, that is any desire he might feel to sacrifice the general interest to his own particular interest, had to be nullified: this would leave that part of his interest which coincided with the general interest as the only interest by which his conduct could be determined.

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