Assessing Monopoly Power or Dominance in Platform Markets

Insurgent Universality presents an intervention in current discussions on universalism, democracy, and property. It investigates other trajectories besides traditional ones of modernity and traces an alternative legacy for contemporary movements. This legacy exceeds the familiar juridical horizon of citizenship, individual rights, and the state by revisiting questions relating to power, democratic practices, and the modern conception of private property. Insurgent Universality investigates and displays alternative trajectories of modernity that have been repressed, hindered, and forgotten. These trajectories are not only embodiments of a radical hope and a new conception of universality that arose from insurgencies from below; they also alert us to possibilities in our present that have been underestimated or overlooked. Eventually, they show us alternative institutions by which to reshape our present. These experimental democratic practices and institutions are based on the pluralism of authorities instead of the monopoly power of the state. However, such an inquiry resists the utopian urge to clear the tables. Instead, the book examines more closely, and with a fresh perspective, those aspects of our intellectual inheritance that we have allowed to remain in the darkness. By doing this, Insurgent Universality aims to “decolonize” European history, offering an image of Europe that is not monolithic but, rather, composed of many layers and paths that have been repressed or forgotten. The aim of the book is to rebuild those roads not taken and bridge them with non-European trajectories and political experiments.

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Regulation

10.1093/oso/9780198825142.003.0007 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Robert Sugden

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Maximum Yield ◽

Monopoly Power ◽

Choice Overload ◽

Market Failures ◽

Governmental Regulation

Chapter 7 considers a range of conditions that are usually considered as ‘market failures’ to be corrected by governmental regulation. I discuss these conditions, and possible responses to them, from a contractarian viewpoint. I argue that neoclassical arguments for regulations against cartels and against the exploitation of monopoly power can be endorsed on contractarian grounds, as can certain kinds of regulations against spurious complexity in pricing. I raise doubts about the significance of behavioural arguments for regulation that assume choice overload or preferences for self-constraint. I develop a concept of consumers’ surplus that does not depend on assumptions about preferences, and is defined in terms of the maximum yield of discriminatory pricing. I discuss two opportunity-enhancing mechanisms for the supply of public goods.

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Controlling monopoly power in a double‐auction market experiment

Journal of Public Economic Theory ◽

10.1111/jpet.12504 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Giuseppe Attanasi ◽

Kene Boun My ◽

Andrea Guido ◽

Mathieu Lefebvre

Keyword(s):

Monopoly Power ◽

Double Auction ◽

Auction Market ◽

Market Experiment

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The Measurement of Monopoly Power in Dynamic Markets

The Journal of Law and Economics ◽

10.1086/467080 ◽

1985 ◽

Vol 28 (1) ◽

pp. 193-222 ◽

Cited By ~ 27

Author(s):

Robert S. Pindyck

Keyword(s):

Monopoly Power ◽

Dynamic Markets

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Monopoly Power and the Firm's Valuation: A Dynamic Analysis of Short versus Long-Term Policies

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.242364 ◽

2000 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Suleyman Basak ◽

Anna Pavlova

Keyword(s):

Dynamic Analysis ◽

Monopoly Power

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Page Limits on Economics Articles: Evidence from Two Journals

The Journal of Economic Perspectives ◽

10.1257/jep.28.3.149 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 28 (3) ◽

pp. 149-168 ◽

Cited By ~ 15

Author(s):

David Card ◽

Stefano DellaVigna

Keyword(s):

Average Length ◽

American Economic Review ◽

Competitive Market ◽

Monopoly Power ◽

Median Length ◽

European Economic ◽

The Past ◽

Economic Association ◽

Economic Journals ◽

Page Limit

Over the past four decades the median length of the papers published in the “top five” economic journals has grown by nearly 300 percent. We study the effects of a page limit policy introduced by the American Economic Review (AER) in mid-2008 and subsequently adopted by the Journal of the European Economic Association (JEEA) in 2009. We find that the imposition of a 40-page limit on submissions led to no change in the flow of new papers to the AER. Instead, authors responded by shortening and reformatting their papers. For JEEA, in contrast, we conclude that the page-limit policy led authors of longer papers to submit to other journals. These results imply that the AER has substantial monopoly power over submissions, while JEEA faces a very competitive market. Evidence from both journals, and from citations to published papers in the top journals, suggests that longer papers are of higher quality than shorter papers, so the loss of longer submissions at JEEA may have led to a drop in quality. Despite a modest impact of the AER's policy on the average length of submissions, the policy had little or no effect on the length of final accepted manuscripts.

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