Counting on My Vote Not Counting: Expressive Voting in Committees

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Ginzburg ◽  
José Alberto Guerra ◽  
Warn N. Lekfuangfu
Keyword(s):  
Expressive Voting

Populism and the rational choice model: The case of the French National Front

2021 ◽  
pp. 104346312199596
Author(s):  
François Facchini ◽  
Louis Jaeck
Keyword(s):  
Political Party ◽  
General Model ◽  
Choice Model ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
National Front ◽  
General Process ◽  
Expressive Voting ◽  
Rational Choice Model ◽  
Political Norms

This article proposes a general model of partisan political dealignment based on the theory of expressive voting. It is based on the Riker and Odershook equation. Voters cast a ballot for a political party if the utility associated with expressing their support for it is more than their expressive costs. Expressive utility is modeled here as a certain utility model. Then, the model is applied to the rise of voting support in favor of French right-wing populists, the National Front (FN). We show that the fall of justification costs of FN ideology along with the decline in stigmatization costs of voting in favor of the extreme right has fostered the popularity of this party. Political dealignment here is only a particular case of a general process of political norms transgression inherited by each voter.

A Group Rule—Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 1476-1504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Coate ◽  
Michael Conlin
Keyword(s):  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Coefficient Estimates ◽  
Expressive Voting ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Utilitarian Approach ◽  
Voting Model

This paper explores a group rule–utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout, inspired by the theoretical work of John C. Harsanyi (1980) and Timothy J. Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni (2002). It develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in Texas liquor referenda. The results are encouraging: the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data, and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well. The structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model.

scholarly journals The Brennan–Lomasky Test of Expressive Voting: When Impressive Probability Differences Are Meaningless

Economies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 51 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Clark ◽  
Dwight Lee
Keyword(s):  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Correct Result ◽  
Expressive Voting ◽  
Voting Turnout ◽  
Consistent Relationship ◽  
Additional Support ◽  
Decisive Vote

We consider a test of expressive voting developed by Brennan and Lomasky (1993). They point out that in presidential elections the probability of a tie, and casting a decisive vote, increases “multi-billionfold” as the election becomes increasingly close. They conjecture that if voters are instrumentally motivated there would be enormous increases in voter turnout for presidential elections as they became close. When they find no consistent relationship between closeness and turnout in presidential elections since 1940, they conclude their test justifies a “decisive rejection of the instrumental voter hypothesis.” As dramatic as such a “multi-billionfold” increase is, we argue it would not motivate voting if an instrumental payoff was the only motivation for doing so. The Brennan–Lomasky test does give the correct result, but not for the reason they emphasize. They do see reasons why voting turnout would be moderated other than the dramatic probability of a decisive vote in close elections. Furthermore, they close their test by indicating that one reason turnout might be higher in close elections is that they are more interesting, which is congenial to an expressive account. We agree. We also argue that the observed tendency for voters to confirm their biases rather than change their minds provides additional support for expressive voting.

An experimental study of expressive voting

Public Choice ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Carter ◽  
Stephen D. Guerette
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Expressive Voting

Partisan bias and expressive voting

2018 ◽  
Vol 157 ◽  
pp. 107-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Robbett ◽  
Peter Hans Matthews
Keyword(s):  
Partisan Bias ◽  
Expressive Voting

A further experimental study of expressive voting

Public Choice ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 88 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 171-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. J. Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Expressive Voting

Voters, dictators, and peons: expressive voting and pivotality

Public Choice ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 159 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 159-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emir Kamenica ◽  
Louisa Egan Brad
Keyword(s):  
Expressive Voting

scholarly journals Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting

2019 ◽  
pp. 927-940
Author(s):  
Jean-Robert Tyran ◽  
Alexander K. Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Experimental Tests ◽  
Expressive Voting ◽  
Economic Reasoning

Standard economic reasoning assumes that people vote instrumentally—i.e., that the sole motivation to vote is to influence the outcome of an election. In contrast, voting is expressive if voters derive utility from the very act of expressing support for one of the options by voting for it, and this utility is independent of whether the vote affects the outcome. This chapter surveys experimental tests of expressive voting with a particular focus on the low-cost theory of expressive voting. The evidence for the low-cost theory of expressive voting is mixed.

Counting on my vote not counting: Expressive voting in committees

2022 ◽  
Vol 205 ◽  
pp. 104555
Author(s):  
Boris Ginzburg ◽  
José-Alberto Guerra ◽  
Warn N. Lekfuangfu
Keyword(s):  
Expressive Voting
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