Congress’s Power to Compel Executive Branch Information Sharing: The Lost Precedent of 1789 and Its Implications for Contemporary Separation of Powers Doctrine

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauren Libby
Author(s):  
Vladislav Topilin ◽  
Roman Fedorov

The article is devoted to the problems of the legal status of the prosecutor’s office in the system of separation of powers. In the study, the author uses grammatical (philological, linguistic) logical, systematic and other methods of scientific knowledge. The author proposes to separate the prosecutor’s office into a separate (supervisory) branch of government, which will not belong to either the executive branch or the judicial branch, as a result of which the state will receive an independent state structure that will be able to exercise its supervisory functions independently of anyone, which will allow for better and faster suppression of possible violations by any branch of government, as well as improve the work of the state apparatus as a whole.


Author(s):  
Margit Cohn

This chapter provides the basis of the model advanced in the book. Based on the internal tension model, governing constitutionalism-at-large, the chapter submits that the executive is best viewed as straddling the line between subjection to law and dominance beyond law. This is no ‘paradox:’ embodying one of the tensions ingrained in constitutional law, the executive draws on an irresolvable tension between its role as executor of law, under the separation of powers ideal, and its function as manager, or dominant decision-maker in the political sphere, in which it acts above and beyond the law. Under the internal tension model, normative theory can be better expounded, and the extent of required constraints over excessive power can be better addressed. The chapter discusses, and rejects, three models of the executive branch, all of which are based on hierarchical and dichotomous thinking. The subservient executive model connotes full supremacy of the constitution and legislation over the executive; the imperial executive model draws on a vision of executive supremacy; and the third, bipolar model offers a vision of alternating modes of operation. All are set aside in favour of a model that recognizes the internal tension which underlies executive action.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Sutton

This section introduces the topic by explaining the role that structure plays in protecting liberty and property rights. As illustrations, it explains how federalism offers a role for states and the national government to play in addressing pandemics, race discrimination, and criminal law. It explains how the states and federal government have adopted increasingly different forms of government over time. It then introduces the parts. Part I deals with the judicial branch. The second part of the book looks at current issues facing the executive branch in the state and federal systems. The third part of the book deals with the legislative branch. The fourth part of the book, all in Chapter 9, takes vertical separation of powers one step further: federalism within federalism. The fifth part of the book, all in Chapter 10, addresses the ultimate recourse of liberty: the freedom to change our fifty-one constitutions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-271
Author(s):  
Cedric Jenart ◽  
Mathieu Leloup

Alternative dispute resolution procedures before the European Court of Human Rights – The state agent, a member of the executive branch, tasked with representing the respondent state – Judicial and legislative branches of the respondent state limited or bound by concessions by the state agent – Convention framework effectively increases the power of the executive branch to the detriment of the other branches of government in the respondent state – Tension with national separation of powers – Possible solutions on a national and international level


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
William G. Resh ◽  
Gary E. Hollibaugh ◽  
Patrick S. Roberts ◽  
Matthew M. Dull

Abstract We analyse United States presidential appointee positions subject to Senate confirmation without a confirmed appointee in office. These “vacant” positions are byproducts of American constitutional design, shaped by the interplay of institutional politics. Using a novel dataset, we analyse appointee vacancies across executive branch departments and single-headed agencies from 1989 to 2013. We develop a theoretical model that uncovers the dynamics of vacancy onset and length. We then specify an empirical model and report results highlighting both position and principal–agent relations as critical to the politics of appointee vacancies. Conditional on high status positions reducing the frequency and duration of vacancies, we find important principal–agent considerations from a separation of powers perspective. Appointee positions in agencies ideologically divergent from the relevant Senate committee chair are vacant for less time than in ideologically proximal agencies. Importantly, this relationship strengthens as agency ideology diverges away from the chair and towards the chair’s party extreme.


Author(s):  
Somanathan TV

This chapter explores how India’s constitutional law has addressed the administrative and regulatory State as it has evolved outside the traditional branches of government, and how judicial review is exercised over it. It begins by providing a background on constitutional issues relating to the administrative State as it functions within the executive branch, before turning to a discussion of the major regulatory bodies that either are explicitly called ‘regulatory’ or exercise regulatory functions. It then considers the constitutional position of the administrative and regulatory State based on judicial decisions and on the Indian Constitution. It also examines the conceptual underpinnings of, and justification for, the regulatory State, along with some specific concerns arising from the regulatory State such as legal uncertainty and excessive delegation. The chapter concludes by analysing some of the issues associated with the emerging constitutional jurisprudence on the regulatory State.


Author(s):  
Alfonso Iglesias

According to the act of state doctrine, national courts must refrain from prosecuting the validity of official acts carried out by a foreign state within its own territory, except if it commits violations of international norms with broad consensus of international society, such as, for example, a case of genocide. Both its judicial self-restraint character and its reflection in the judicial deference to the executive branch would justify the ex officio application of the act of state doctrine by the courts. This doctrine is neither a rule nor a legal obligation required by international law, although it arises from the relevance of the international rule of territorial sovereignty of the state. It was not introduced by a constitutional or legislative provision, but is a common law principle developed mainly by Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions on the basis of considerations of international comity, respect for the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, separation of powers, and the choice of law freedom. To some extent, the legal basis of the doctrine of immunity for acts of state was analogous to the basis of immunity granted to the foreign sovereign state and its agents. The underlying rationale of this doctrine consists in preventing domestic courts from issuing adverse judgments against foreign governments that could embarrass international relations and interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs by the executive branch power. The doctrine of the act of state (and that of the political question) has important differences with the immunity of the foreign state: (1) This immunity is per se a general rule of public international law of a customary nature accepted and applied universally—in addition to being regulated in various international conventions, one of them of universal vocation—unlike the doctrines cited, which are not regulated by national legislations or by international codification efforts. (2) The moment of operation is also different, since the immunity of the foreign state functions ex ante as a procedural exception to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court of the territorial state (or court of the forum), which for that reason is obliged to recognize its lack of competence to try the case before it, while the doctrines of the state act and the political question act later—only if the defendant does not enjoy immunity—when the court is already exercising its competence and knowing the merits of the case. (3) The application of the immunity of the foreign state requires that the foreign state be sued before the courts of the forum, whereas the act of state doctrine does not require that the foreign state itself be a party to the proceedings, but it is sufficient to question the validity of an internal act of the foreign state during the judicial proceedings.


Author(s):  
Clay Silver Katsky

While presidents have historically been the driving force behind foreign policy decision-making, Congress has used its constitutional authority to influence the process. The nation’s founders designed a system of checks and balances aimed at establishing a degree of equilibrium in foreign affairs powers. Though the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the country’s chief diplomat, Congress holds responsibility for declaring war and can also exert influence over foreign relations through its powers over taxation and appropriation, while the Senate possesses authority to approve or reject international agreements. This separation of powers compels the executive branch to work with Congress to achieve foreign policy goals, but it also sets up conflict over what policies best serve national interests and the appropriate balance between executive and legislative authority. Since the founding of the Republic, presidential power over foreign relations has accreted in fits and starts at the legislature’s expense. When core American interests have come under threat, legislators have undermined or surrendered their power by accepting presidents’ claims that defense of national interests required strong executive action. This trend peaked during the Cold War, when invocations of national security enabled the executive to amass unprecedented control over America’s foreign affairs.


Daedalus ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 145 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-43
Author(s):  
Eric A. Posner

The presidents who routinely are judged the greatest leaders are also the most heavily criticized by legal scholars. The reason is that the greatest presidents succeeded by overcoming the barriers erected by Madison's system of separation of powers, but the legal mind sees such actions as breaches of constitutional norms that presidents are supposed to uphold. With the erosion of Madisonian checks and balances, what stops presidents from abusing their powers? The answer lies in the complex nature of presidential leadership. The president is simultaneously leader of the country, a party, and the executive branch. The conflicts between these leadership roles put heavy constraints on his power.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-91
Author(s):  
George Goradze

The article looks at the last amendments to the Constitution of Georgia. By this amendments Georgia moves into parliamentary system. However, there are some questions: Does this system comply with European standards of parliamentary system? How will this system work in Georgia? Is a parliamentary system ideal model for Post-Soviet countries and particularly for Georgia? The article is divided into two parts: The first part looks at the new redaction of the Constitution of Georgia and the new system of governance which will be established by this constitutional changes. By analysis the author comes to the conclusion that new amendments to the constitution will serve as a guarantee of a long-standing stay in the government for the ruling political party; In the second part of the article the author discusses the negative aspects of a parliamentary system in general. Here main question is “how will the Parliament control the executive branch and its leader who is the head of the ruling party and the parliamentary majority, as well? It may be vice versa.” In the author’ opinion one of the ways for a parliamentary system is to elect a non-party president through a universal suffrage.


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