Designing Demand Information Disclosure in the Presence of Capacity Constraints: A Large-Scale Randomized Field Experiment on a Matching Platform

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ni Huang ◽  
Yumei He ◽  
Xingchen Xu ◽  
Yili Hong
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Capacity Constraints ◽  
Randomized Field Experiment ◽  
Demand Information

scholarly journals You’ve Got Mail: A Randomized Field Experiment on Tax Evasion

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (7) ◽  
pp. 2801-2819 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina M. Bott ◽  
Alexander W. Cappelen ◽  
Erik Ø. Sørensen ◽  
Bertil Tungodden
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Field Experiment ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Detection Probability ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Extensive Margin ◽  
Long Term Effects ◽  
Randomized Field Experiment

We report from a large-scale randomized field experiment conducted on a unique sample of more than 15,000 taxpayers in Norway who were likely to have misreported their foreign income. By randomly manipulating a letter from the tax authorities, we cleanly identify that moral suasion and the perceived detection probability play a crucial role in shaping taxpayer behavior. The moral letter mainly works on the intensive margin, while the detection letter has a strong effect on the extensive margin. We further show that only the detection letter has long-term effects on tax compliance. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics.

scholarly journals Moderating attitudes in times of violence through paradoxical thinking intervention

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (43) ◽  
pp. 12105-12110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boaz Hameiri ◽  
Roni Porat ◽  
Daniel Bar-Tal ◽  
Eran Halperin
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Small City ◽  
Randomized Field Experiment ◽  
City Population ◽  
Scale Field ◽  
Paradoxical Thinking ◽  
Large Scale Field ◽  
The Government ◽  
The City

In the current paper, we report a large-scale randomized field experiment, conducted among Jewish Israelis during widespread violence. The study examines the effectiveness of a “real world,” multichanneled paradoxical thinking intervention, with messages disseminated through various means of communication (i.e., online, billboards, flyers). Over the course of 6 wk, we targeted a small city in the center of Israel whose population is largely rightwing and religious. Based on the paradoxical thinking principles, the intervention involved transmission of messages that are extreme but congruent with the shared Israeli ethos of conflict. To examine the intervention’s effectiveness, we conducted a large-scale field experiment (prepost design) in which we sampled participants from the city population (n = 215) and compared them to a control condition (from different places of residence) with similar demographic and political characteristics (n = 320). Importantly, participants were not aware that the intervention was related to the questionnaires they answered. Results showed that even in the midst of a cycle of ongoing violence within the context of one of the most intractable conflicts in the world, the intervention led hawkish participants to decrease their adherence to conflict-supporting attitudes across time. Furthermore, compared with the control condition, hawkish participants that were exposed to the paradoxical thinking intervention expressed less support for aggressive policies that the government should consider as a result of the escalation in violence and more support for conciliatory policies to end the violence and promote a long-lasting agreement.

Motivating Effective Mobile App Adoptions: Evidence from a Large-Scale Randomized Field Experiment

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 523-539 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tianshu Sun ◽  
Lanfei Shi ◽  
Siva Viswanathan ◽  
Elena Zheleva
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Mobile App ◽  
Randomized Field Experiment

Information Disclosure as a Matching Mechanism: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (2) ◽  
pp. 886-905 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Tadelis ◽  
Florian Zettelmeyer
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Procurement Auctions ◽  
Quality Of Information ◽  
Market Outcomes ◽  
Scale Field ◽  
Large Scale Field ◽  
Matching Mechanism

Market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to its participants. We measure the effect of information disclosure on market outcomes using a large-scale field experiment that randomly discloses quality information in wholesale automobile auctions. We argue that buyers in this market are horizontally differentiated across cars that are vertically ranked by quality. This implies that information disclosure helps match heterogeneous buyers to cars of varying quality, causing both good and bad news to increase competition and revenues. The data confirm these hypotheses. These findings have implications for the design of other markets, including e-commerce, procurement auctions, and labor markets. (JEL C93, D44, D82, L15)

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