RE: Amendments to Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard S. Sharfman
Keyword(s):  
Proxy Voting

Transformations of Self-Regulation and New Public Regulations in the Field of Swiss Corporate Governance (1985-2002)

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andre Mach ◽  
Gerhard Schnyder ◽  
Thomas David ◽  
Martin Lupold
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Private Governance ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
New Public ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Accounting Rules ◽  
Takeover Bids

Switzerland was for a very long time characterised by a strong tradition of self-regulation by private actors in the economic sphere rather than by an extensive and detailed legal framework. This is particularly true in the field of corporate governance and more precisely visible in the Stock Corporation Law, the supervision of the stock exchanges and accounting rules. Due to very lax legal rules, mechanisms of "private governance" complemented the minimal legal framework in these three fields. Over the last twenty or so years, these mechanisms of self-regulation have nonetheless undergone profound change. In fact, private self-regulation has been incrementally formalised and replaced by more specific public regulations in five important fields: the transferability of shares, proxy-voting by banks, takeover bids, supervision of the stock exchanges and accounting rules. Due to changes in the international context, to the shifting preferences of important economic actors, and to the emergence of new actors (institutional investors and accountants), the legal framework of Swiss corporate governance has been reformed in a significant way.

scholarly journals ENHANCING CORPORATE DEMOCRACY BY THE USE OF SHAREHOLDER PROXIES

Obiter ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maleka Femida Cassim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
Shareholder Engagement ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Off Time ◽  
Practical Question

Effective shareholder control over the board of directors is patently in the interests of good corporate governance, accountability and transparency. In recognition of this modern reality, the policy focus in company law has shifted to encouraging shareholder participation and shareholder engagement in corporate affairs. Bearing in mind that very few shareholders of large public companies attend meetings in person, proxy voting is of vital importance to corporate democracy. This article discusses enhanced rights conferred by the Companies Act 71 of 2008 in relation to shareholder proxies who attend, speak and vote at shareholders’ meetings. It also considers the pressing practical question whether companies may impose a cut-off time for the lodgement of shareholder proxies.

O3-07-07: Voting and proxy voting appointment capacities in internal medicine inpatients and two populations of geriatric subjects

2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (4S_Part_5) ◽  
pp. P141-P141
Author(s):  
Antoine Bosquet ◽  
Amar Medjkane ◽  
Louis Affo ◽  
Philippe Charru ◽  
Philippe Vinceneux ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Internal Medicine ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
Two Populations

scholarly journals Coercion-Resistant Proxy Voting

2016 ◽  
pp. 3-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oksana Kulyk ◽  
Stephan Neumann ◽  
Karola Marky ◽  
Jurlind Budurushi ◽  
Melanie Volkamer
Keyword(s):  
Proxy Voting

The Value-Extracting Enablers

2019 ◽  
pp. 90-126
Author(s):  
William Lazonick ◽  
Jang-Sup Shin
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Index Funds ◽  
Business Corporation ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
Compulsory Voting ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
Rule Change ◽  
Institutional Activism ◽  
Shareholder Democracy

This chapter explains historical and systemic sources of institutional activism. Starting from re-examining underlying principles of New Deal financial regulations established in the 1930s that discouraged institutional activism, it argues that they were overturned in the 1980s and 1990s in the name of promoting “shareholder democracy.” It analyzes these misguided regulatory “reforms” including the introduction of compulsory voting by institutional investors, a proxy-voting rule change that greatly facilitated aggregation of proxy votes by predatory value extractors. The chapter argues that those reforms created a large vacuum in corporate voting because, contrary to the ideal of shareholder democracy and particularly with the increasing dominance of index funds, institutional investors had little ability and incentive to vote the shares in their portfolios. The main beneficiaries of these reforms have been the leading proxy advisory firms and a small group of hedge-fund activists intent on looting the business corporation.

Corporate Governance and the Role of Investment Funds

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Seibert
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Driving Forces ◽  
Master Plan ◽  
Investment Funds ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
Striking Increase ◽  
The Law ◽  
To Come ◽  
Transparency And Disclosure

Since the mid-90\'s Germany has seen a whole range of laws on corporate governance: first and foremost the KonTraG, i.e. the law on control and transparency, followed by the NaStraG, i.e. the law on registered shares and the facilitating of proxy voting, then, more recently, the TransPuG, i.e. the law on transparency and disclosure, and - finally - the German Corporate Governance Codex issued by the Cromme Commission – and there is probably more to come during the next legislative period. What are the reasons for this striking increase in activity? What are the driving forces and is there a master plan behind these efforts?

Proxy-voting at the Royal College of Surgeons

BMJ ◽  
1879 ◽  
Vol 1 (963) ◽  
pp. 913-913
Author(s):  
R. Harrison
Keyword(s):  
Royal College ◽  
Proxy Voting
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