Limits and the Uniformity Principle; Yet Another Run at Uniformity, Induction, and Everything

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Andrews
Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matias Slavov

Abstract:Given the sharp distinction that follows from Hume’s Fork, the proper epistemic status of propositions of mixed mathematics seems to be a mystery. On the one hand, mathematical propositions concern the relation of ideas. They are intuitive and demonstratively certain. On the other hand, propositions of mixed mathematics, such as in Hume’s own example, the law of conservation of momentum, are also matter of fact propositions. They concern causal relations between species of objects, and, in this sense, they are not intuitive or demonstratively certain, but probable or provable. In this article, I argue that the epistemic status of propositions of mixed mathematics is that of matters of fact. I wish to show that their epistemic status is not a mystery. The reason for this is that the propositions of mixed mathematics are dependent on the Uniformity Principle, unlike the propositions of pure mathematics.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (06) ◽  
pp. 810-827
Author(s):  
Neil Ghani ◽  
Fredrik Nordvall Forsberg ◽  
Federico Orsanigo

AbstractIn the 1980s, John Reynolds postulated that a parametrically polymorphic function is an ad-hoc polymorphic function satisfying a uniformity principle. This allowed him to prove that his set-theoretic semantics has a relational lifting which satisfies the Identity Extension Lemma and the Abstraction Theorem. However, his definition (and subsequent variants) has only been given for specific models. In contrast, we give a model-independent axiomatic treatment by characterising Reynolds’ definition via a universal property, and show that the above results follow from this universal property in the axiomatic setting.


1999 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 537-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Camardi

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Delmotte

Barbara Fried takes the view that uniform taxation—that is, a single rate applicable to all income levels—cannot be defended on any grounds of justice. She goes further by saying that, of all possible rate structures, it might be “the hardest one”? to ground in “a”? theory of fairness. Using the contractarian-constitutional perspective advanced by John Rawls and James Buchanan, this article argues that tax uniformity can be seen as a requirement of justice. After modelling how the political world realistically decides to distribute tax shares (self-interested parties act under a majority constraint), I show how the uniformity principle could emerge from the constitutional contract. In other words, rational individuals would choose uniformity as a procedural constraint under a “veil of uncertainty”?; that is, with limited knowledge regarding their positions under the future application of the rule. Moreover, I elucidate how the uniformity requirement integrates generalized criteria of fairness and efficiency into fiscal politics as it precludes fiscal exploitation and constrains majorities, and their most influential subgroups, to opt for policies in the direction of the Pareto frontier, and as such promotes outcomes acceptable to all participants.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seungbae Park
Keyword(s):  

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