Regulation Best Interest and the Standards of Conduct for Securities Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie L. Fein
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 6-12
Author(s):  
Mark M. Attar ◽  
Marguerite Bateman ◽  
Jack P. Drogin ◽  
Domenick Pugliese ◽  
Rachael Leah Schwartz ◽  
...  

Purpose To provide an overview of the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) recently proposed rulemaking package relating to standards of conduct for investment professionals. The three proposals included: interpretation regarding the standard of conduct of investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; Form CRS which both registered investment advisers and registered broker-dealers would have to provide to retail investors; and proposed regulation best interest. Design/methodology/approach Reviews and summarizes the three individual proposals. Findings The SEC has proposed this rulemaking package in order to meet three goals: enhance retail investor protection and decision making, preserve investor choice and cost, and raise retail investor awareness of whether they are doing business with a registered financial professional. The SEC is looking for feedback, particularly from retail investors, on whether these proposals would achieve the SEC’s goals. Originality/value Summarizes the three proposals in a manner that provides insight into how investment advisers and broker-dealers would be required to conduct business with retail investors if the proposals are adopted in the current form.


Author(s):  
Arthur B. Laby

This chapter examines the fiduciary principles governing investment advice. Fiduciary principles in investment advice are both straightforward and complex. They are straightforward because most investment advisers are considered fiduciaries and subject to strict fiduciary duties under federal and state law. Their complex nature arises from the fact that many individuals and firms provide investment advice but are not deemed investment advisers and, therefore, are not subject to a fiduciary obligation. This chapter first explains whether and when an advisory relationship gives rise to fiduciary duties by focusing on both federal and state law, as well as the individuals and firms that typically provide investment advice. In particular, it looks at certain persons and entities excluded from the definition of investment adviser and thus not subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, namely broker-dealers, banks, and family offices as well as accountants, lawyers, teachers, and engineers. The chapter also considers fiduciaries under ERISA, the Investment Company Act, and the Commodity Exchange Act before discussing the fiduciary duty of loyalty and how it is expressed and applied in investment advisory relationships; the fiduciary duty of care and how it differs from other standards of conduct, such as a duty of suitability; and other legal obligations imposed on investment advisers and how those obligations relate to an adviser’s fiduciary duty. Finally, the mandatory or default terms with regard to an investment adviser’s fiduciary duties are explored, along with remedies available for breach of fiduciary duty.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 35-44
Author(s):  
Michael R. Rosella ◽  
Vadim Avdeychik ◽  
Justin R. Capozzi

Purpose This article provides an overview of the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) recent approval of a package of rulemakings and interpretations designed to enhance the quality and transparency of investors’ relationships with investment advisers and broker-dealers. Design/Methodology/Approach The article provides legal analysis for and historical context of the requirements of the SEC’s adopted rules, Regulation Best Interest and Form CRS in addition to the two separate interpretations under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers; and the Broker-Dealer Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Adviser. Findings The SEC’s adopted regulatory package does not adopt a uniform fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and investment advisers but instead promulgates legal requirements and mandated disclosures in order to conform to the SEC’s perceived expectations for reasonable investors. Practical implications Investment advisers and broker-dealers should consult with their legal counsel in assessing how and to what extent the new regulatory package is applicable to them. Originality/Value This article provides practical guidance from lawyers who have extensive experience with the Investment Company Act, Investment Advisers Act, and the Securities Acts.


Author(s):  
Donald C. Langevoort

The first formal legislative package sent to Congress by the Obama Administration dealing specifically with securities law reform was not about the financial crisis issues of derivatives, securitization, or credit ratings—though these came shortly thereafter. Instead, it was about consumer protection. Having proposed a bold new Consumer Financial Product Commission but chosen to leave investment product regulation in the jurisdiction of the SEC rather than shift it to the new agency, the Administration sought to enhance the consumer protection powers of the SEC so that they would be comparable with what the proposed new agency could do with respect to non-securities financial products. Substantively, the headline reform proposal was the authorization for the SEC to promulgate rules to conform the duties owed by broker-dealers to their customers with the duties owed by investment advisers to their clients, holding both to the same fiduciary standards of conduct.


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