The Supreme Court and EU Law

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Imelda Maher ◽  
Ronan Riordan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The Supreme Court

The UK courts and EU law post-Brexit

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. Christopher-Vajda
Author(s):  
Christopher Vajda
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Following the expiry on 31 December 2020 of the ‘transition period’ under the UK/EU Withdrawal Agreement, the relationship between UK and EU law had changed. Whilst much EU legislation at that date will continue to apply in UK law as ‘retained EU law’ and judgments of the EU courts handed down before that date will remain binding on UK courts as ‘retained EU case law’, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court can depart from that case law. Whilst EU court judgments handed down after that date are not binding on UK courts, they may be taken into account. This article considers both the status of EU retained case law and when the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal may depart from it, and the future of EU law that is not ‘retained EU case law’ and how judgments of the European Courts and national courts of its Member States may influence UK judges in the future.

scholarly journals (Just) Give Me A Reason …

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 12-35
Author(s):  
Julia Laffranque
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Summary Judgment

Judicial systems often wrestle with whether to sacrifice always presenting thorough judicial reasoning for the sake of an effective leave-to-appeal system. The paper outlines issues of reference to the Luxembourg Court, particularly with regard to Estonian circumstances in light of the ECtHR judgment in Baydar v. the Netherlands. The interplay between EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights in this regard is considered first, along with the importance of giving reasons, courts’ authority, the different roles of domestic and European courts, the duty of referring questions to the CJEU and exemption, consequences of non-referral in EU law, the Strasbourg Court’s role in dialogue between national courts and the CJEU, etc. Examined next are such matters as influences on preliminary references in European Union law, summary reasoning and limits to the reasoning duty (especially with regard to the Ullens de Schooten case of the ECtHR), associated division of competencies between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts, and finally the reasoning of the ECtHR itself as good or bad example. The author then considers the Supreme Court of Estonia’s leave-to-appeal system and the national courts’ practice in relation to Baydar, concluding that, while reasoned judgments are important and a right, no right exists for the applicant’s case to be referred by a domestic judge to the Luxembourg Court, though it is vital that summary judgment not be arbitrary / manifestly unreasonable; that Estonian courts have made reasonable use of the preliminary reference procedure before the Luxembourg Court thus far; and that they should articulate well the reasoning for referral/non-referral for litigants. The author proposes that the Estonian Supreme Court explain, exceptionally in one refusal of leave to appeal (cf. the Netherlands), that the general requirements for granting leave to appeal cover also the situation of preliminary questions to the CJEU and C.I.L.F.I.T. arguments of the CJEU. Above all, neither the interplay between EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights nor the role of national courts finding their way in complex legal surroundings should be neglected. 

scholarly journals Brexit: la secesión de la Unión Europea entre teoría y realidad

2018 ◽  
pp. 111
Author(s):  
Alberto López Basaguren
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Economic Wealth ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Article 50 ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Practical Feasibility ◽  
The Eu

El proceso de retirada de la UE (Brexit) plantea cuestiones de gran trascendencia en el Derecho Constitucional británico y en el de la UE, a la luz del artículo 50 TUE. Algunos de los problemas planteados en el Derecho británico se han resuelto por la Supreme Court en el asunto Miller; pero otros siguen abiertos: el papel del Parlamento en la adaptación del derecho de la UE, que el Gobierno pretende desplazar a través de la asunción de una ilimitada delegación de poderes (la cláusula Enrique VIII); o el de los territorios autónomos, que pretenden ser marginados de la recuperación de competencias de la UE. El resultado de las negociaciones puede poner en riesgo la cohesión interna británica, tanto con Escocia como con Irlanda del Norte. Y las condiciones de la retirada y de las relaciones futuras entre ambos —especialmente en caso de falta de acuerdo— pueden afectar gravemente a la estabilidad económica del RU. El derecho formal a la retirada queda, así, profundamente condicionado por su viabilidad práctica.The withdrawal process from the EU (Brexit) raises issues of great significance both in British constitutional law and in EU law, according to Article 50 TEU. Some of the issues raised in the British legal system have been settled by the Supreme Court in the Miller case; but there are others still to be clarified: the role of Parliament in the task of adapting EU law, which the Government is attempting to replace via an unlimited delegation of powers (the Henry VIII clauses); or that of the devolved bodies, which the Government is seeking to exclude from the recovery of powers from the EU. The outcome of the negotiations may jeopardize British internal cohesion, in relation to both Scotland and Northern Ireland. And the circumstances of withdrawal and future relations between the UK and the EU —especially in the case of no deal— could seriously affect the UK’s economic wealth and stability. The formal right to withdrawal is thus deeply conditioned by its practical feasibility.

Compliance with European Environmental Law—Deficiencies and Approaches: The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Sobotta
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Environmental Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Environmental Considerations

The article discusses the contribution of the ECJ to the reduction of compliance deficiencies with regard to European environmental law. The Court is not a specialised environmental court but the supreme court of the European multilevel legal system. Therefore its contribution is primarily characterised by a concern for effective and uniform application of EU law in general while specific environmental considerations do not figure as prominently.

scholarly journals The Role of EU Principles in Criminal Law: is the Principle of Direct Effect Applicable?

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-75
Author(s):  
Edita Gruodytė ◽  
Saulė Milčiuvienė ◽  
Neringa Palionienė
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right

Abstract With the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, EU law gained supremacy over national law in ten areas of criminal law (with the possibility of extension in the future) treated as particularly serious crimes with a cross-border dimension and the right to enact directives. The question arises if and when direct effect is possible in criminal law, taking account of developments and applications of this principle in other areas of EU law. To answer this question, the following tasks are necessary: (1) to discuss the role of principles in criminal law, (2) to define the principle of direct effect through the academic literature and the jurisprudence of the CJEU, (3) to discuss whether directives could have direct effect in criminal law, and (4) to analyze the EU’s impact on Lithuanian national criminal law through an analysis of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Lithuania.

scholarly journals El Supremo “alivia” la carga procesal del lesionado y determina el momento de la aparición del daño en la acción de responsabilidad patrimonial contra el legislador

2021 ◽  
pp. 179-208
Author(s):  
Mª Consuelo ALONSO GARCÍA
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Legal Regime ◽  
The Public ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Moment

LABURPENA: Lan honek Auzitegi Gorenaren kasazio-doktrina berria aztertzen du, zeinak Sektore Publikoko Araubide Juridikoaren 40/2015 Legeak ezarritako eskakizun batzuk interpretatu eta egokitzen baititu; hala bada, Estatu Legegilearen ondarezko erantzukizuna ikusten du konstituzio-kontrako legeek (eta Europar Batasuneko Zuzenbidea urratzen duten legeek) eragindako kalteak direla eta. Zehazki, Auzitegiak ofizioz berrikustea onartzen du ustez konstituzioaren aurkakoa den lege-xedapena betearazten duen administrazio-jarduna aurkaratzeko errekurtso egoki gisa, hau da, lege-testu horren 32.4 artikuluan aurreikusitako baldintza betetzat jotzeko; eta ordaina jaso dezaketen kalteak egintzat hartzen diren momentua zehazten du, halaber, araua konstituzioaren aurkakoa dela adierazten duen epaia argitaratu baino lehenagoko bost urteko hasierako epea zenbatzeko. Arau beraren 34.1 artikuluaren bigarren paragrafoak aipatzen du muga hori. ABSTRACT: This work examines the innovative doctrine related to appeals delivered by the Supreme Court that interprets by tempering them some of the requirements established by the Act 40/2015 on the Legal Regime of the Public Sector, in order to determine the patrimonial liability of the legislator State for the damages resulting of unconstitutional legislative acts (and acts that infringe EU Law). Specifically, the Court admits the ex officio review as an adequate action to challenge the administrative action that executes an alledgelly unconstitutional legislative provision to the effects of meeting the conditions of art. 32.4 of the aforementioned legal act, and it defines the moment where damages are to be considered inflicted for the purpose of indemnization so as to estimate the onset moment of the five years limit term previous to the publication of the judgment that concludes its unconstitutionality, a time limitation to which art. 34.1, second paragraph, of the same provision refers. RESUMEN: El presente trabajo examina la novedosa doctrina casacional del Tribunal Supremo que interpreta, atemperándolas, algunas de las exigencias que impone la Ley 40/2015, de Régimen Jurídico del Sector Público, para apreciar la responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado Legislador por los perjuicios derivados de leyes inconstitucionales (y de leyes que vulneran el Derecho de la Unión Europea). Concretamente, el Tribunal admite la revisión de oficio como recurso oportuno para impugnar la actuación administrativa que ejecuta la disposición legislativa pretendidamente inconstitucionalidad a los efectos de entender cumplida la condición prevista en el artículo 32.4 de dicho texto legal, y define el momento en el que se entienden producidos los daños indemnizables a fin de contabilizar el plazo inicial de los cinco años anteriores a la fecha de la publicación de la sentencia que declare su inconstitucionalidad, limitación a la que se refiere el artículo 34.1, párrafo segundo, de la misma norma.

11 The Supreme Court and the European Union

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dickson Brice
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
European Community ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Way

This chapter charts the way in which the Irish Supreme Court has applied the law of the European Community/Union. It takes the reader through several seminal cases which illustrate the Court’s readiness to accommodate EC/EU standards within domestic Irish law. These include the Campus Oil case, the Crotty case, the Meagher case, the Maher case, and the Pringle case. This entails explaining and critiquing the Supreme Court’s approach to the doctrine of separation of powers and the status of EC/EU law within the Irish Constitution. The case-law in this field illustrates how activist the Supreme Court can sometimes be. The chapter ends by looking at other respects in which the Supreme Court has interacted with EU law

Prisoner Disenfranchisement in the United Kingdom and the Scope of EU Law: United Kingdom Supreme Court

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-142
Author(s):  
Anja Lansbergen
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Alternative Mechanism ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Right To Vote

On 16 October 2013 the United Kingdom Supreme Court delivered judgment in two conjoined cases that considered the legality of prisoner disenfranchisement. The Court considered both the compatibility of the disenfranchising provisions with the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’), and whether those provisions breached a right to vote acquired by the appellants under European Union law. In a unanimous judgment the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, acknowledging the incompatibility of the relevant legislation with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention but declining to issue a declaration of incompatibility. The Supreme Court further held that EU law does not confer upon EU Citizens a substantive right to vote in European Parliamentary elections.The cases are significant on a number of levels. First, the nuanced arguments advanced before the Court tested the jurisdictional scope of EU law and its capacity to confer rights upon EU Citizens in the absence of cross-border movement. The claims thus held the potential to widen the jurisdiction of EU law along the trajectory outlined by such ECJ case-law as Ruiz Zambrano and Fransson. Secondly, those arguments probed the extent to which the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘the Charter’) imports Strasbourg jurisprudence into EU law and thus creates an alternative mechanism through which to enforce Convention rights. Finally, the decision evidences the constitutional tensions that emanate from discordant interpretations of fundamental rights by national and supranational courts from discordant interpretations of fundamental rights by national and supranational courts.

Malpractice & Negligence: Cal. Supreme Court Clarifies Negligence Provisions under State’s Elder Abuse Act

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-203
Author(s):  
Kendra Carlson
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Health Care Providers ◽  
Elder Abuse ◽  
Skilled Nursing Facility ◽  
Pressure Sores ◽  
Care Providers ◽  
Nursing Facility ◽  
Skilled Nursing ◽  
The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of California held, in Delaney v. Baker, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610 (1999), that the heightened remedies available under the Elder Abuse Act (Act), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15657,15657.2 (West 1998), apply to health care providers who engage in reckless neglect of an elder adult. The court interpreted two sections of the Act: (1) section 15657, which provides for enhanced remedies for reckless neglect; and (2) section 15657.2, which limits recovery for actions based on “professional negligence.” The court held that reckless neglect is distinct from professional negligence and therefore the restrictions on remedies against health care providers for professional negligence are inapplicable.Kay Delaney sued Meadowood, a skilled nursing facility (SNF), after a resident, her mother, died. Evidence at trial indicated that Rose Wallien, the decedent, was left lying in her own urine and feces for extended periods of time and had stage I11 and IV pressure sores on her ankles, feet, and buttocks at the time of her death.

Medical and Legal Issues Raised by the Protz Decision Issued by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 12-13
Author(s):  
LuAnn Haley ◽  
Marjorie Eskay-Auerbach
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Workers Compensation ◽  
Sixth Edition ◽  
Complex Concept ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Compensation Claims ◽  
Recent Edition ◽  
Impairment Ratings ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract Pennsylvania adopted the impairment rating provisions described in the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) in 1996 as an exposure cap for employers seeking predictability and cost control in workers’ compensation claims. In 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down the Protz decision, which held that requiring physicians to apply the methodology set forth in the most recent edition of the AMA Guides reflected an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the American Medical Association. The decision eliminates the impairment-rating evaluation (IRE) mechanism under which claimants were assigned an impairment rating under the most recent edition of the AMA Guides. The AMA Guides periodically are revised to include the most recent scientific evidence regarding impairment ratings, and the AMA Guides, Sixth Edition, acknowledges that impairment is a complex concept that is not yet defined in a way that readily permits an evidence-based definition of assessment. The AMA Guides should not be considered standards frozen in time simply to withstand future scrutiny by the courts; instead, workers’ compensation acts could state that when a new edition of the AMA Guides is published, the legislature shall review and consider adopting the new edition. It appears unlikely that the Protz decision will be followed in other jurisdictions: Challenges to using the AMA Guides in assessing workers’ compensation claims have been attempted in three states, and all attempts failed.

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