scholarly journals Competitive Imperfect Price Discrimination and Market Power

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Belleflamme ◽  
Wing Man Wynne Lam ◽  
Wouter Vergote
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Price Discrimination

scholarly journals Las patentes como límite a la innovación tecnológica

2021 ◽  
pp. 99-130
Author(s):  
Alejandro Pérez ◽  
Soto Domínguez ◽  
Katherine Flórez Pinilla
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Key Words ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Technological Innovation ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Technological Development ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Patent Law ◽  
Palabras Clave

This paper analyzes from the Austrian School of Economics inte-llectual property patents, understood as a legislative mechanism to encourage entrepreneurial behavior that will lead to innovation and technological de-velopment. We take the case for patents in the pharmaceutical sector, in which we find empirical evidence corroborating the hypothesis of the school, through a theoretical analysis based on issues identified around the patent, such as price discrimination, research limited to certain pathologies, unlimited market power, barriers to national technological development, high costs of protection by the state. Key words: Action Incentives, Entrepreneurship, Patent Law, Economic Theory and Technological Innovation. JEL Classification: B53, L43, K11, K23. Resumen: El presente artículo tiene por objeto analizar desde el marco de la Escuela Austriaca la propiedad intelectual reflejada en las patentes, entendidas como un mecanismo del legislador para incentivar una conducta empresarial que impulse la innovación y el desarrollo tecnológico. Se tomó como caso las patentes en el sector farmacéutico, obteniendo a partir de éste evidencia empírica y la corroboración de las hipótesis de la escuela, por medio de un análisis teórico a la luz de los problemas identificados al-rededor de la patente, tales como: discriminación de precios, investigación parcializada en ciertas enfermedades, poder de mercado ilimitado, barreras al desarrollo tecnológico nacional, altos costos de protección por parte del Estado. Palabras clave: Incentivos de la Acción, Empresarialidad, Derecho de Paten-tes, Teoría Económica e Innovación Tecnológica. Clasificación JEL: B53, L43, K11, K23.

Prohibition of Price Discrimination Practice Under Law No. 5 Of 1999 On Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unhealthy Business Competition

Authentica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hangga Prajatama
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Legal Research ◽  
Business World ◽  
Business People ◽  
Legal Documents ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Barrier To Entry

In the business world, business competition or competence among business people in seizing the market is very reasonable. However, this becomes unnatural when the competition is carried out in an unfair manner, with the aim of preventing other business actors from competing (barrier to entry) or shutting down competitors' businesses. One form of anti unfair competition carried out by business actors in creating market power has been anticipated in Law Number 5 of 1999, namely the existence of price discrimination. The research method used is normative juridical, namely legal research that emphasizes the review of legal documents and library materials related to the subject matter. Based on the research that has been done, there is an Article that Regulates Regarding Price Discrimination in Law Number 5 of 1999 concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition, which is located in Article 6 which states that business actors are prohibited from making agreements that cause one buyer to pay a price that is different from the price that must be paid by other buyers for the same goods and / or services. and the Guidelines for the Business Competition Supervisory Commission on Implementation Provisions in Article 6 of Act Number 5 of 1999 concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition.Keywords: Prohibition, Price Discrimination, Law No. 5 of 1999.

scholarly journals Noncompetitive Pricing and Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Selected U.S. and Thai Rice Markets

1994 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 406-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. K. Yumkella ◽  
L. J. Unnevehr ◽  
P. Garcia
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Middle Income ◽  
Pricing To Market ◽  
Middle Income Countries ◽  
Trade Model ◽  
Inelastic Demand ◽  
Pass Through ◽  
Exchange Rate Pass Through

AbstractA “pricing to market” international trade model is applied to U.S. and Thai rice exports to high and middle income countries that are continuous rice importers. These markets are characterized by strong quality preferences and highly inelastic demand, and thus exporters may exercise market power. Evidence of noncompetitive pricing either through price discrimination across destinations or through imperfect exchange rate pass-through is found in this small but growing segment of the international rice trade.

scholarly journals Market power and price discrimination in the US market for higher education

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-225
Author(s):  
Dennis Epple ◽  
Richard Romano ◽  
Sinan Sarpça ◽  
Holger Sieg ◽  
Melanie Zaber
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
The Us

Introduction to a Special Issue on Network Neutrality

2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marius Schwartz ◽  
Philip J. Weiser
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Traffic Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Transportation Networks ◽  
Internet Traffic ◽  
End Users ◽  
Network Neutrality ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Power Threshold

"Network neutrality" encompasses a wide-ranging debate over what limits, if any, should be placed on network providers in pricing or managing Internet traffic. The articles in this volume tackle various aspects of this debate: Have other transportation networks been truly "neutral"? Should broadband providers be allowed to charge content providers for connecting with end users? How much price discrimination is appropriate and is it confined to network operators? How large are the potential costs of constraining traffic management practices? What are the tradeoffs from mandated loop unbundling to deter discrimination and what market power threshold justifies interventions?

7. Article 102 TFEU: Conduct Which Can Be an Abuse

2019 ◽  
pp. 359-581
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Legal Proceedings ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter discusses the difficult concept of what constitutes an ‘abuse’ of a dominant position for the purposes of Article 102 and whether conduct should be condemned on account of the form it takes or only for its effects. It considers the case law of the EU Courts, the decisional practice of the Commission, and the Commission’s Guidance Paper on enforcement priorities, and the problem of distinguishing competition on the merits from illegimate conduct. The chapter looks at the different classifications of abuse, particularly exclusionary and exploitative abuses; the distinction between form- and effects-based approaches to types of abuse; the leveraging of market power between distinct markets as a theory of harm; the objective justification defence; and general issues in respect of abuses concerning prices, including the ‘as efficient competitor’ test. The chapter then examines the application of Article 102 to various forms of conduct, including: price discrimination; predatory pricing; selective low pricing; margin squeeze; exclusive dealing;; tying and bundling; refusal to supply; self-preferencing; malicious pursuit of legal proceedings; ‘regulatory gaming’; discrimination abuses; unfairly high and low pricing; hindering inter-Member State trade; and more novel claimed abuses within the digital economy.

Price Discrimination and Market Power

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane Carbonneau ◽  
R. Preston McAfee ◽  
Hugo M. Mialon ◽  
Sue H. Mialon
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Price Discrimination

scholarly journals Zone Pricing in Retail Oligopoly

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Adams ◽  
Kevin R. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Rural Markets ◽  
Home Improvement ◽  
Home Depot ◽  
Zone Pricing

We quantify the welfare effects of zone pricing, or setting common prices across distinct markets, in retail oligopoly. Although monopolists can only increase profits by price discriminating, this need not be true when firms face competition. With novel data covering the retail home-improvement industry, we find that Home Depot would benefit from finer pricing but that Lowe’s would prefer coarser pricing. Zone pricing softens competition in markets where firms compete, but it shields consumers from higher prices in rural markets, where firms might otherwise exercise market power. Overall, zone pricing produces higher consumer surplus than finer price discrimination does. (JEL D43, L13, L81, M31, R32)

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document