Paying for Beta: Embedded Leverage and Asset Management Fees

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Hitzemann ◽  
Stanislav Sokolinski ◽  
Mingzhu Tai
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Management Fees

scholarly journals Asset Management Fees and the Growth of Finance

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Burton G Malkiel
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Active Management ◽  
Index Funds ◽  
Management Fees ◽  
Us Economy ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Investment Advice ◽  
Managed Funds

From 1980 to 2006, the financial services sector of the US economy grew from 4.9 percent to 8.3 percent of GDP. A substantial share of that increase was comprised of increases in the fees paid for asset management. This paper examines the significant increase in asset management fees charged to both individual and institutional investors. One could argue that the increase in fees charged by actively managed funds could prove to be socially useful if it reflected increasing returns for investors from active management or if it was necessary to improve the efficiency of the market for investors who availed themselves of low-cost passive (index) funds. But neither of these arguments can be supported by the data. Actively managed funds of publicly traded securities have consistently underperformed index funds, and the amount of the underperformance is well approximated by the difference in the fees charged by the two types of funds. Moreover, it appears that there was no change in the efficiency of the market from 1980 to 2011. Thus, the increase in fees is likely to represent a deadweight loss for investors. Indeed, perhaps the greatest inefficiency in the stock market is in “the market” for investment advice.

scholarly journals Asset management in public DB and non-DB Pension Plans

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES FARRELL ◽  
DANIEL SHOAG
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Nationwide Survey ◽  
Pension Plans ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Defined Benefit ◽  
Defined Contribution ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Management Fees ◽  
Asset Class ◽  
State And Local

AbstractState and local pension plans are increasingly moving from the traditional defined benefit (DB) model to non-DB models that generally allow for participant-directed investment. This shift has important implications for the management of the more than US$3 trillion in assets held to finance public employee retirement benefits. To investigate these implications, we introduce new data from a nationwide survey of public DB and non-DB plans and a unique data set on thousands of individual investors in the state of Florida's defined contribution (DC) plan. Using these sources, we explore how participant involvement in the public sector affects the distribution of asset class allocations, management fees, investment outcomes, and portfolio rebalancing at both the individual and aggregate levels. We found that there is little difference between the DB and non-DB plans in terms of asset mix, returns, and fees, except that DB plan have greater access and allocations to alternative investments. We also found that while the average individual DC plan participant allocated their asset similarly to the DB plan, black females and older white males, on average, invested on opposite tails of the risk spectrum.

scholarly journals The Growth of Finance

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Greenwood ◽  
David Scharfstein
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Financial Sector ◽  
Financial Services Industry ◽  
Shadow Banking ◽  
Preliminary Assessment ◽  
Management Fees ◽  
Active Asset Management ◽  
The Us ◽  
Household Credit

The US financial services industry grew from 4.9 percent of GDP in 1980 to 7.9 percent of GDP in 2007. A sizeable portion of the growth can be explained by rising asset management fees, which in turn were driven by increases in the valuation of tradable assets, particularly equity. Another important factor was growth in fees associated with an expansion in household credit, particularly fees associated with residential mortgages. This expansion was fueled by the development of nonbank credit intermediation (or “shadow banking”). We offer a preliminary assessment of whether the growth of active asset management, household credit, and shadow banking—the main areas of growth in the financial sector—has been socially beneficial.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Aycan Corum ◽  
Andrey Malenko ◽  
Nadya Malenko
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Asset Management ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Management Fees ◽  
Portfolio Managers ◽  
Private Savings ◽  
Total Welfare

We examine the governance role of delegated portfolio managers. In our model, investors decide how to allocate their wealth between passive funds, active funds, and private savings, and asset management fees are endogenously determined. Funds' ownership stakes and asset management fees determine their incentives to engage in governance. Whether passive fund growth improves aggregate governance depends on whether it crowds out private savings or active funds. In the former case, it improves governance even if accompanied by lower passive fund fees, whereas in the latter case, it improves governance only if it does not increase fund investors' returns too much. Regulations that decrease funds' costs of engaging in governance may decrease total welfare. Moreover, even when such regulations are welfare improving and increase firm valuations, they can be opposed by both fund investors and fund managers.

scholarly journals A Continuous-Time Version of a Delegated Asset Management Problem

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Yanan Li ◽  
Zengti Li ◽  
Chuanzheng Li
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Dynamic Programming Principle ◽  
Management Problem ◽  
Continuous Time Model ◽  
Time Model ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Management Fees ◽  
Fund Families

This paper develops a continuous-time model to study the widely used investment mandates in the institutional asset management industry. In this paper, just like He and Xiong (2013), we suppose that the asset management industry has a two-layered incentive structure, and fund families charging investors fixed management fees while compensating individual fund managers based on fund performance. Different from He and Xiong (2013), we suppose that the fund family aims to select an optimal incentive strategy to maximize its terminal benefits, while the fund manager needs to select the optimal effort level and the optimal investment portfolio to maximize his terminal net discounted compensation in a continuous-time model. By using dynamic programming principle and stochastic differential game theory, the optimal strategies and value functions of both sides are derived. At last, numerical studies are provided to illustrate the effects of all the parameters on the optimal strategies. The result reveals that the optimal incentive mechanism will redistribute both the benefit of the fund families and the cost of the fund managers’ effort.

scholarly journals Finance and the Preservation of Wealth *

2014 ◽  
Vol 129 (3) ◽  
pp. 1221-1254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Gennaioli ◽  
Andrei Shleifer ◽  
Robert Vishny
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Asset Management ◽  
Capital Stock ◽  
Neoclassical Growth Model ◽  
Management Fees ◽  
Unit Costs ◽  
Aggregate Wealth ◽  
State Growth ◽  
Financial Income ◽  
Neoclassical Growth

Abstract We introduce the model of asset management developed in Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (“Money Doctors,” Journal of Finance , forthcoming 2015) into a Solow-style neoclassical growth model with diminishing returns to capital. Savers rely on trusted intermediaries to manage their wealth (claims on capital stock), who can charge fees above costs to trusting investors. In this model, the ratio of financial income to GDP increases with the ratio of aggregate wealth to GDP. Both rise along the convergence path to steady state growth. We examine several further implications of the model for management fees, unit costs of finance, and the consequences of shocks to trust and to the capital stock.

Asset Inspection Management System as a Reliable Inspection/ Monitoring Tool

2020 ◽  
Vol 78 (12) ◽  
pp. 1276-1285
Author(s):  
Shibu John A
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Management System ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Integrity Assessment ◽  
Material Evaluation ◽  
The People ◽  
Physical Assets ◽  
Asset Management System ◽  
On Time Delivery ◽  
Capital Intensive

Enterprise asset management (EAM) systems are used by asset owners and/or operators to manage the maintenance of their physical assets. These assets, including equipment, facilities, vehicles, and infrastructure, need maintenance to sustain their operations. An EAM system provides the means to have less unplanned downtime and extended asset longevity, which offers clear business benefits that improve the profit and loss statement and balance sheet. Particularly for capital-intensive industries, like drilling and exploration, the failure of on-time delivery of critical equipment or processes is disruptive and costs nonproductive time and customer satisfaction. Organizations understand these issues and employ an appropriate asset management system to engineer their asset maintenance and management. An EAM system is needed to manage the people, assets/equipment, and processes. EAMs are used to plan, optimize, execute, and track the needed maintenance activities with associated priorities, skills, materials, tools, and information. Similarly, nondestructive testing (NDT) is used as a tool for integrity assessment of assets in drilling and exploration. The main advantage of using NDT is that the item’s intended use or serviceability is not affected. The selection of a specific technique should be based on knowledge and skills that include design, material processing, and material evaluation. Validating the purpose of this paper, we emphasize the importance of optimizing the asset utilization and serviceability to enhance overall efficiency by integrating EAM software that manages assets, the operation management system (OMS) controlling the processes, and asset inspection management systems (AIMSs).

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