An Empirical Test of the Agency Theory in Corporate Governance of SACCOs in Uganda

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kibs Boaz Muhanguzi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Empirical Test

Corporate Governance and Performance of Organizations

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 439-446
Author(s):  
Hamid Ait lemqeddem ◽  
◽  
Mounya Tomas ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Quantitative Approach ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Deductive Method ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Is Theory ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Do So

There is renewed interest in the need to focus on corporate governance in an environment where it is a performance imperative for all small and large organizations, private and public, beginner or established.The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the place of corporate governance practices in organizations to ensure that the board, officers, and directors take action to protect shareholder interests and all stakeholders. It is important to focus on the effect of these practices on improving performance and competitiveness. To do so, we opted for the hypothetico-deductive method with a quantitative approach. Our theoretical foundation is theory is agency theory.

scholarly journals Is corporate governance of private equity targets more effective for risk mitigation?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimiro Marini ◽  
Massimo Caratelli ◽  
Gian Paolo Stella ◽  
Ilaria Barbaraci
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Risk Mitigation ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Active Monitoring ◽  
Industry Expert ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

AbstractPrivate equity is a source of finance and a governance device characterised by active monitoring through sponsors that intervene in targets’ corporate governance. As sponsors are skilled and motivated acquirors, we investigated whether corporate governance mechanisms mitigate leveraged targets’ risk of financial distress differently compared to non-acquired companies through the lenses of agency theory and resource-based theories. We found that targets and non-acquired companies are not significantly different in terms of corporate governance features, but sponsors are skilled enough to choose corporate governance members to mitigate risk more, especially when boards are smaller, have busier industry expert directors, and mandate execution to more managers. These results can be useful to targets, targets’ investors and lenders, and policymakers.

scholarly journals Stewardship theory: is board accountability necessary?

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (6) ◽  
pp. 1292-1314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Keay
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Stewardship Theory ◽  
Content Type ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that notwithstanding the fact that stewardship theory embraces things like trust of directors, their professionalism, loyalty and willingness to be concerned for the interests of others, as well as rejecting the foundations of classic agency problems that are asserted by agency theory, board accountability is as relevant to stewardship theory as it is to agency theory. Design/methodology/approach The paper applies the theory underlying board accountability in corporate governance, which is so often applied both in the corporate governance literature and in practice with agency theory in mind, to stewardship theory. Findings While the idea of accountability of boards is generally associated with an explanation and conceptualisation of the role and behaviour of directors as agents within classic agency theory, the paper demonstrates that board accountability is a necessary part of board life even if the role of directors is explained and conceptualised in terms of stewardship theory. Practical implications The paper suggests some accountability mechanisms that might be employed in a stewardship approach. Originality/value While many authors have talked in general terms about board accountability and its importance, this is the first paper that has engaged in a substantial study that links board accountability directly with stewardship theory, and to establish that accountability is necessary.

scholarly journals Impact of Corporate Governance on Investment in SMEs Vietnam

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 59
Author(s):  
Nguyen Thi Kim Chi ◽  
Bui Van Can ◽  
Bui Minh Duc
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Small And Medium Enterprises ◽  
Financial Leverage ◽  
Board Chair ◽  
Revenue Growth ◽  
Medium Enterprises ◽  
The Impact ◽  
State Enterprises

Controlling the investment activities of company representatives helps to avoid inefficient investment activities. Shareholders will face with risks if manager’s decisions which not bring benefits to shareholders (according to agency theory). Studying the influence of corporate governance on investment has an important role in controlling investment activities of enterprises. Therefore, the authors analyze the impact of corporate governance on investment of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam from 2014 to 2018. With data collected from 480 small and medium enterprises in Vietnam. The results show that state-owned enterprises tend to invest less than non-state enterprises. Companies with manager is board chair and manager hold shares will make investing more. Revenue growth and financial leverage have a positive impact on investment. From the results of this study, the authors also make some recommendations to help control investment activities in the enterprise through corporate governance characteristics.

scholarly journals CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORY AND MODEL : A CONCEPTUAL OBSERVATION

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 486-500
Author(s):  
Shailendra Mohan Singh ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Theoretical Frameworks ◽  
Legal Obligations ◽  
Governance Theory ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Theory And Model

This paper outlines the conceptual, contextual and disciplinary scope of the rapidly evolving topic of corporate governance. The aim of this paper is to make a study of different theories and models of corporate governance that have been used globally by analysing strengths and weaknesses for each one. This is to determine which one is the best theory and model and if it can be adopted to different economic systems. Corporate governance theory has tended to look to this theory to guide the decisions of the board of directors in curbing excessive executive power in the hands of management. While useful for this purpose, the Agency Theory provides limited guidance on corporate governance in real life situations which are far more complex. With the blurring of the roles of the principal and the agent, the currently prevalent governance framework, based on the Agency Theory has become self limiting and ineffective. Efforts to supplement the Agency Theory with alternative theoretical frameworks such as the Stakeholder Theory and the Stewardship Theory have, at times, tended to place the board of directors in conflict with their legal obligations to work in the interests of the shareholders. A governance model based on the concept of Trusteeship, while providing fresh insights, suffers from problems in implementation and remains a goal . These alternative frameworks have, therefore, not been of much practical use to the board members in helping them to decide what constitutes the “right” decision. We need new theoretical insights that will take us towards a comprehensive theory of governance. This paper seeks to highlight the various theoretical frameworks for corporate governance.

scholarly journals Investor Protection and Agency Theory in Corporate Governance in Pakistan

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-21
Author(s):  
Imtiaz Ahmed Khan ◽  
Altaf Hussain Abro ◽  
Farooque Ahmed Leghari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Global Trend ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Very High

The paper discusses the minority shareholders’ protection under the quantumof agency cost in corporate governance in Pakistan. The agency theory statesthat in most of the cases, the controlling shareholders and the topmanagement are normally involved in expropriating the funds of the company.This phenomenon increases the agency cost. The agency cost is directlyproportional to the cost of functioning of the company. In other words, theagency cost is inversely proportional to the profit of the company. Accordingto the agency theory, if the agency cost is decreased, the profit for investorincreases. The Pakistani corporate sector is dominated by the businessfamilies, the state and an opportunity to get the private benefits at the cost ofother stakeholders. There are the different mechanisms as discussed andapplied around the world to minimize the agency cost so as to make companyfinancially strong and better profit for the investors. In Pakistan, the agencycost is very high. Hence, there is a need to revamp the corporate governancemechanism to reduce the agency cost in order to provide a better protection tominority shareholders in a particular in the context of the global trend keepingin the view of the nature of corporate structure in Pakistan.

scholarly journals The two-tier board system and underpricing of initial public offerings: Evidence from Austria

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 352-362
Author(s):  
Lalith P. Samarakoon ◽  
Palani-Rajan Kadapakkam
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Management Board ◽  
Board System

We study the relation between initial IPO underpricing and two-tier board structure in the Vienna Stock Exchange of Austria, where a two-tier board is mandatory for listed companies. The board ratio, defined as the size of the supervisory board to the management board, is used to capture the effect of two-tiered board on underpricing. The results show that the board ratio is negatively related with underpricing, consistent with the agency theory which predicts that more effective monitoring implied in a relatively larger supervisory board will lead to lower agency costs, and thus lower underpricing. The results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and suggest that firms seeking to raise external capital will be helped by adopting strong corporate governance standards.

scholarly journals The board of directors and firm performance: empirical evidence from listed companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 508-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Merendino ◽  
Rob Melville
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type

PurposeThis study aims to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board structure–firm performance relationship and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice.Design/methodology/approachThis research applies a dynamic generalised method of moments on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO–chairman leadership.FindingsWhile directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact performance, independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements do not affect firm performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure–performance relationship. Firm performance is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance.Practical implicationsThis paper suggests that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and effectiveness of minority directors by analysing whether they are able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO duality, as the influence of CEO duality on performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company.Originality/valueThe results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research evidence of agency theory studies.

scholarly journals Factors affecting the voluntary use of internal audit: evidence from the UK

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 288-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hazem Ramadan Ismael ◽  
Clare Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
The Uk

Purpose This study aims to identify the factors that lead non-financial companies listed in the UK to use an internal audit function (IAF) as a monitoring mechanism. Although the use of an IAF in the UK is voluntary, no prior research has examined the drivers for using one. Design/methodology/approach Financial and non-financial data were collected from the annual reports of 332 UK non-financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) Main Market. Univariate tests and multivariate logistic regression tests were used to test the research hypotheses. A theoretical framework based on both agency theory and transaction cost economics (TCE) theory was used to explain the economic factors affecting the use of an IAF. Findings The study provides evidence that firm size, level of internal risks, agency problem between owners and managers and existence of an effective audit committee are associated with the existence of an IAF. Thus, the need to have strong internal control and risk management systems and to reduce both internal and external agency costs drives companies to have an IAF. These results suggest the importance of IAF as an internal corporate governance tool and the effectiveness of UK governance regulations in monitoring the effectiveness of internal control systems. Practical implications Given the importance of the IAF’s corporate governance role, the study provides some policy implications. Regulators should pay more attention to the issue of maintaining an IAF, especially by large companies, the relationship between the IAF and other governance parties, especially the audit committee, and the disclosure of more relevant information about the IAF’s characteristics and practices. Originality/value This is the first study to examine the factors affecting the existence of the IAF within the UK’s distinctive regulatory approach of “comply or disclose reasons”. Furthermore, it provides a theoretical framework that explains how both the agency theory and TCE theory can interpret the adoption of internal audit.

scholarly journals Project governance: "Schools of thought"

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michiel Christiaan Bekker
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Value Systems ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
Institutional Level ◽  
Project Governance ◽  
Management Literature ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Definition Of

The terminology, definition and context of project governance have become a focal subject for research and discussions in project management literature. This article reviews literature on the subject of project governance and categorise the arguments into three schools of thought namely the single-firm school, multi-firm school and large capital school. The single-firm school is concerned with governance principles related to internal organisational projects and practice these principles at a technical level. The multi-firm school address the governance principles concerned with two of more organisations participating on a contractual basis on the same project and focus their governance efforts at the technical and strategic level. The large capital school consider projects as temporary organisations, forming their own entity and establishing governance principles at an institutional level. From these schools of thought it can be concluded that the definition of project governance is dependent on the type of project and hierarchical positioning in the organisation. It is also evident that further research is required to incorporate other governance variables and mechanisms such as transaction theory, social networks and agency theory. The development of project governance frameworks should also consider the complexity of projects spanning across international companies, across country borders and incorporating different value systems, legal systems, corporate governance guidelines, religions and business practices.

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