Cursedness in Markets with Asymmetric Information: Theory and Experimental Evidence

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lukas Wenner
2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bauchet ◽  
Amy Damon ◽  
Brian Hunter

1997 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 686-687
Author(s):  
Reinhard Eckhorn

Our work supports synchronization for binding within Phillips & Singer's “contextual field” (CF) as well as the type of its lateral interaction they propose. Both firmly agree with our “association field” (AF) and its modulatory influences (Eckhorn et al. 1990). However, the CF connections seem to produce anticorrelation among assemblies representing unrelated structures, whereas experimental evidence indicates decoupling. Finally, it is unclear how the cortex can have access to the logistic function used in the “coherent infomax” approach.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-140
Author(s):  
Olivier Bochet ◽  
Simon Siegenthaler

In markets with asymmetric information, where equilibria are often inefficient, bargaining can help promote welfare. We design an experiment to examine the impact of competition and price transparency in such settings. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that competition promotes efficiency if bargainers cannot observe each other’s price offers. Contrary to the predictions, however, the efficiency-enhancing effect of competition persists even when offers are observable. We explore different behavioral explanations for the absence of a detrimental effect of price transparency. Remarkably, implementing the strategy method improves subjects’ conditional reasoning, delivering the predicted loss in efficiency when offers are observable. (JEL C78, D82, L15)


Author(s):  
Claudio Porzio ◽  
Francesca Battaglia ◽  
Antonio Meles ◽  
Maria Grazia Starita

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