scholarly journals The Quasilinear Quadratic Utility Model: An Overview

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Choné ◽  
Laurent Linnemer
Keyword(s):  
Utility Model ◽  
Quadratic Utility

A New Light on Old Insight: Optimal Risk Taking with Quadratic Utility

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jung Lim Koo ◽  
Se Ryoong Ahn ◽  
Byung Lim Koo ◽  
Hyeng Keun Koo ◽  
Yong Hyun Shin
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Quadratic Utility

Populism and the rational choice model: The case of the French National Front

2021 ◽  
pp. 104346312199596
Author(s):  
François Facchini ◽  
Louis Jaeck
Keyword(s):  
Political Party ◽  
General Model ◽  
Choice Model ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
National Front ◽  
General Process ◽  
Expressive Voting ◽  
Rational Choice Model ◽  
Political Norms

This article proposes a general model of partisan political dealignment based on the theory of expressive voting. It is based on the Riker and Odershook equation. Voters cast a ballot for a political party if the utility associated with expressing their support for it is more than their expressive costs. Expressive utility is modeled here as a certain utility model. Then, the model is applied to the rise of voting support in favor of French right-wing populists, the National Front (FN). We show that the fall of justification costs of FN ideology along with the decline in stigmatization costs of voting in favor of the extreme right has fostered the popularity of this party. Political dealignment here is only a particular case of a general process of political norms transgression inherited by each voter.

scholarly journals Sorting into Contests: Evidence from Production Contracts

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Tomislav Vukina
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Random Utility Model ◽  
Random Utility ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
Fixed Effects Model ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Production Contracts ◽  
Contract Choice ◽  
Lower Ability ◽  
Profit Maximizing

Abstract In this paper, we investigate sorting patterns among chicken producers who are offered a menu of contracts to choose from. We show that the sorting equilibrium reveals a positive sorting where higher ability producers self-select themselves into contracts to grow larger chickens and lower ability types self-select themselves into contracts to grow smaller birds. We also show that eliciting this type of sorting behavior is profit maximizing for the principal. In the empirical part of the paper, we first estimate growers’ abilities using a two-way fixed effects model and subsequently use these estimated abilities to estimate a random utility model of contract choice. Our empirical results are supportive of the developed theory.

Resource allocation on computational grids using a utility model and the knapsack problem

2009 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel C. Vanderster ◽  
Nikitas J. Dimopoulos ◽  
Rafael Parra-Hernandez ◽  
Randall J. Sobie
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Knapsack Problem ◽  
Computational Grids ◽  
Utility Model
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