Essays on Duopoly Competition with Asymmetric Firms: Is Profit Maximization Always an Evolutionary Stable Strategy?

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Silveira ◽  
Silvinha Vasconcelos
Keyword(s):  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Stable Strategy

scholarly journals Males as somatic investment in a parthenogenetic nematode

Science ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 363 (6432) ◽  
pp. 1210-1213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manon Grosmaire ◽  
Caroline Launay ◽  
Marion Siegwald ◽  
Thibault Brugière ◽  
Lilia Estrada-Virrueta ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Reproductive Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Sperm Dna

We report the reproductive strategy of the nematode Mesorhabditis belari. This species produces only 9% males, whose sperm is necessary to fertilize and activate the eggs. However, most of the fertilized eggs develop without using the sperm DNA and produce female individuals. Only in 9% of eggs is the male DNA utilized, producing sons. We found that mixing of parental genomes only gives rise to males because the Y-bearing sperm of males are much more competent than the X-bearing sperm for penetrating the eggs. In this previously unrecognized strategy, asexual females produce few sexual males whose genes never reenter the female pool. Here, production of males is of interest only if sons are more likely to mate with their sisters. Using game theory, we show that in this context, the production of 9% males by M. belari females is an evolutionary stable strategy.

scholarly journals An Incentive Mechanism for Reporting Phishing E-Mails Based on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Mengli Wang ◽  
Lipeng Song
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Important Link ◽  
E Mail

The human is considered as the important link in the phishing attack, and the e-mail security provider encourages users to report suspicious e-mails. However, evidence suggests that reporting is scarce. Therefore, we study how to motivate users to report phishing e-mails in this paper. To solve the problem, a tripartite evolutionary game model among e-mail security providers, e-mail users, and attackers is constructed. We obtain the desired evolutionary stable strategy through solving the replicator dynamics equations. Moreover, the evolution process to the desired evolutionary stable strategy is derived, which can guide the e-mail security provider to make a reasonable incentive mechanism. Lastly, we experiment with a large real-world e-mail network. The experiment results show that our model is effective and practical.

scholarly journals Green Product Quality Supervision Strategy in Online Shopping With Consumer Evaluation and Complaint

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui He ◽  
Siyi Zhang ◽  
Lilong Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Product Quality ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Green Product ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Strategy Combination

Green consumption is an important foundation for achieving stable and long-term economic development goals. With the rapid development of e-commerce and people’s widespread attention to sustainability, more and more consumers purchase green products online. Therefore, we consider consumer feedback mechanisms including evaluation and complaint and construct an evolutionary game model of green product quality supervision with the participation of governmental supervision department, third-party e-commerce platform, online seller and consumer, which analyzes the four parties’ evolutionary stable strategies. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by Matlab 2020b. Moreover, we study the conditions that make evolutionary stable strategy combination exist based on Lyapunov’s First Method. And we find that when consumer chooses complaint, (0, 0, 1) is likely to become an only evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller chooses to provide high-quality green product, third-party e-commerce platform chooses not to strengthen inspection, and governmental supervision department chooses to strictly supervise. Conversely, when the consumer chooses no complaint, (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) may become an evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller cannot be stable in providing high-quality green product. What’s more, governmental supervision department increases the penalty, which can incentivize a third-party e-commerce platform to strengthen inspection. Third-party e-commerce platform increases the reward and can promote online seller to provide high-quality green product. On the one hand, this paper enriches the theoretical basis of online shopping green product quality supervision. On the other hand, compared with existing literature, it extends the main body of the evolutionary game to four paries and broadens the application scope of the game model. In addition, it has put forward feasible suggestions for the government supervision department to strengthen the quality supervision, and provided decision-making support for the third-party e-commerce platform to assume the responsibility of quality inspection.

Selection for Adult Size in Female Coho Salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch)

1986 ◽  
Vol 43 (10) ◽  
pp. 1946-1959 ◽  
Author(s):  
L B. Holtby ◽  
M. C. Healey
Keyword(s):  
Coho Salmon ◽  
Pacific Salmon ◽  
Oncorhynchus Kisutch ◽  
Selective Advantage ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Relative Fitness ◽  
Female Size ◽  
Adult Size ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Wide Range

Several recent studies have presented evidence that large size confers a selective advantage to female Pacific salmon. Nevertheless, a wide range of female sizes is normally present in any spawning population. Two possible explanations exist for the observed range in female size. First, average female size might be determined by an optimizing process with variation around the optimum size due to individual differences in success at obtaining food. Second, various sizes of females might coexist as a mixed evolutionary stable strategy. Under the first explanation, females of sizes other than the optimum would display lower fitness whereas, under the second explanation, females of all sizes would be equally fit. We investigated factors affecting survival of eggs, fry, and smolts of coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch) in Carnation Creek on Vancouver Island with a view to determining the relative fitness of different sized females. Egg-to-fry mortality was best explained by a model that included only the effects of stream bed scour and gravel quality. Including an effect of female size, expressed through depth of egg burying, worsened the model's predictive capability. We could find no evidence that the eggs of large females consistently survived better during incubation than those of small females. In fact, we observed three instances in which it appeared that the eggs of small females survived better. In Carnation Creek, large 1- and 2-yr-old smolts did not consistently survive better in the marine environment than small smolts. Thus, we were unable to demonstrate that the reproductive success of large females was consistently higher than that of small females, contrary to the hypothesis that female size is the result of an optimizing process. In Carnation Creek the observed range of female sizes probably represents an evolutionary stable strategy in which all sizes have equal fitness. We propose a model that predicts female size and variance in size based on the conflicting selective effects of gravel quality, scour, and competition for nest sites.

Evolutionary stable strategy

Resonance ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (9) ◽  
pp. 803-814 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jayanti Ray-Mukherjee ◽  
Shomen Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Stable Strategy

scholarly journals Cooperation or Competition: An Evolutionary Game Study between Commercial Banks and Big Data-Based E-Commerce Financial Institutions in China

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Zhao ◽  
Dong Li ◽  
Liqiang Pan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Business Case ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Supply Chain Financing

On the premise of participants’ bounded rationality and information asymmetry, this paper focuses on the cooperation or competition relationship between Chinese e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks from the perspective of dynamic game. Theoretical mathematical model is built to analyze an evolutionary stable strategy under different conditions. We adopt real-life data set collected in Alibaba’s network credit loan business case and Jingdong’s supply chain financing business case to verify the evolution process of cooperation and competition relationship. The results show that (cooperation, cooperation) is bound to be the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) and cooperation tends to be increasingly in-depth and expansive for commercial banks as well as e-commerce financial institutions in China. The complementarity of participants’ core competitiveness is explored as the root of cooperation. Finally, strategic suggestions are put forward on cooperation between e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks.

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