scholarly journals Samuelson's Contributions to Population Theory and Overlapping Generations in Economics

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald D. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Population Theory

Methods

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Homburg
Keyword(s):  
Labor Supply ◽  
Money Demand ◽  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
Reasonable Approximation ◽  
Planning Horizons ◽  
Elastic Labor Supply ◽  
Made In

Chapter 8 concludes the text with methodical remarks. It defends key assumptions made in the main text and compares them, to the extent they deviate, with more conventional premises. The chapter starts with a comparison of adaptive versus rational expectations. Thereafter, it contrasts infinite planning horizons, finite planning horizons, and overlapping generations models. The third section, which is devoted to modeling money, discusses money-in-the-utility, the transaction costs approach, and more recent theories that derive money demand from a microeconomic framework. The forth section shows that assuming a highly elastic labor supply is empirically unconvincing, whereas a constant labor supply simplifies the model greatly and appears as a reasonable approximation. The final section contrasts behavioral and choice theoretic approaches to price setting.

scholarly journals INCOME INEQUALITY, MOBILITY, AND THE WELFARE STATE: A POLITICAL ECONOMY MODEL

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 1198-1226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Bossi ◽  
Gulcin Gumus
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Welfare State ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Public Programs ◽  
Transfer Payments ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Welfare State

In this paper, we set up a three-period stochastic overlapping-generations model to analyze the implications of income inequality and mobility for demand for redistribution and social insurance. We model the size of two different public programs under the welfare state. We investigate bidimensional voting on the tax rates that determine the allocation of government revenues among transfer payments and old-age pensions. We show that the coalitions formed, the resulting political equilibria, and the demand for redistribution crucially depend on the level of income inequality and mobility.

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