Can Independent Directors Effectively Monitor Controlling Shareholders? Evidence from Hong Kong

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Huang ◽  
Charles Zhen Qu ◽  
Haitian Lu
2013 ◽  
Vol 08 (02) ◽  
pp. 1350011 ◽  
Author(s):  
TINA T. HE ◽  
WILSON X. B. LI ◽  
GORDON Y. N. TANG

This study examines whether dividends payout has a positive contribution to firm performance while taking into account the important firm level characteristics such as the divergence between the control rights and the ownership rights of controlling shareholders and firm leverage. Investigating the large firms listed on the Main Board of Hong Kong Stock Exchange over the 1998–2007 period, we find that dividends payout has statistically significantly positive impacts on both return on assets (ROA) and Tobin's Q, particularly after controlling for the nonlinear relation between dividends and firm performance and between control rights of the controlling shareholder and firm performance. The regression results do not show significant interaction effect between dividends payout and control divergence on firm performance. But the impact of dividends payout on firm performance is different in family controlled firms versus state controlled firms and varies with institutional factors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-96
Author(s):  
Thi Tuyet Mai Nguyen ◽  
Elaine Evans ◽  
Meiting Lu

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the perceptions of independent directors in Vietnam about their roles and challenges when sitting on the boards of listed companies.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses mailed questionnaires to collect data. The authors sent surveys to 810 independent directors from 354 listed companies and received feedback from 170 respondents.FindingsThe authors examine several aspects of independent directors’ work on the board (such as the roles of and challenges for independent directors) as well as board environment (such as information provision or board interaction). Findings suggest that independent directors in Vietnam place more emphasis on their advisory role than their monitoring role. In addition, they also point out their challenges including information asymmetries and the influence of controlling shareholders. These challenges are significant and they prevent independent directors to properly execute their independent role on the board. These findings reflect the unique features of corporate governance in transition economies.Originality/valueThe authors contribute to the literature through providing an insightful view about the nature of the work performed by this type of director in a transition economy. The study is also one of the first studies to use a qualitative instrument to provide an explanation of how controlling shareholders influence independent directors on boards of directors.


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