The Decision Architecture of Proportionality Analysis: Cognitive Biases and Heuristics

Author(s):  
Anne van Aaken
Urban Studies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 452-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Cardoso ◽  
Evert Meijers ◽  
Maarten van Ham ◽  
Martijn Burger ◽  
Duco de Vos

Despite the many uncertainties of life in cities, promises of economic prosperity, social mobility and happiness have fuelled the imagination of generations of urban migrants in search of a better life. Access to jobs, housing and amenities, and fewer restrictions of personal choices are some of the perceived advantages of cities, characterised here as ‘urban promises’. But while discourses celebrating the triumph of cities became increasingly common, urban rewards are not available everywhere and for everyone. Alongside opportunity, cities offer inequality, conflict and poor living conditions. Their narrative of promise has been persistent across different times and places, but the outcomes and experiences of urban life compare poorly with the overoptimistic expectations of many newcomers. And yet, millions still come and stay regardless of odds, raising the question why we have such positive and persistent expectations about cities. To examine this question, this paper considers the process of urban migration from the perspective of decision-making under uncertainty. It discusses how decisions and evaluations are based on imperfect information and offers a novel contribution by examining how the cognitive biases and heuristics which restrict human rationality shape our responses to urban promises. This approach may allow a better understanding of how people make decisions regarding urban migration, how they perceive their urban experiences and evaluate their life stories. We consider the prospects and limitations of the behavioural approach and discuss how biases favouring narratives of bright urban futures can be exploited by ‘triumphalist’ accounts of cities which neglect their embedded injustices.


2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Anglada-Tort ◽  
Daniel Müllensiefen

The repeated recording illusion refers to the phenomenon in which listeners believe to hear different musical stimuli while they are in fact identical. The present paper aims to construct an experimental paradigm to enable the systematic measurement of this phenomenon, investigating potentially related extrinsic and individual difference factors. Participants were told to listen to “different” musical performances of an original piece when in fact they were exposed to the same repeated recording. Each time, the recording was accompanied by a text suggesting a low, medium, or high prestige of the performer. Most participants (75%) believed that they had heard different musical performances. Participants with high levels of neuroticism and openness were significantly more likely to fall for the illusion. While the explicit information presented with the music influenced participants’ ratings significantly, the effect of repeated exposure was only significant in the more familiar music condition. These results suggest that like many other human judgments, evaluations of music also rely on cognitive biases and heuristics that do not depend on the stimuli themselves. The repeated recording illusion can constitute a useful paradigm for investigating nonmusical factors because it allows for the study of their effects while the music remains the same.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-38

We know that our thinking is affected by conflict; this applies to groups and nations as much as to individuals. Mediators are at the sharp end of this phenomenon, and those we work with often find each other’s behaviour at best inexplicable and at worst malicious. This article considers how biases and heuristics (mental shortcuts) can exacerbate disputes. Two cognitive biases in particular can contribute to the growth of conflict: the fundamental attribution error and the self-serving bias. Using a workplace mediation case study the article traces the step-by-step mechanics of conflict in people’s thinking and its tendency to set in motion vicious circles of suspicion and defence. It goes on to provide a critique of bullying and harassment policies before proposing that they begin with a mediation stage in order to combat attribution errors by bringing more data into play.


2022 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Sakhhi Chhabra

In this exploratory study, the main aim was to find, ‘why do people disclose information when they are concerned about their privacy?’. The reasons that provide a plausible explanation to the privacy paradox have been conjectural. From the analysis of the eighteen in-depth interviews using grounded theory, themes were then conceptualized. We found rational and irrational explanations in terms of cognitive biases and heuristics that explain the privacy paradox among mobile users. We figured out some reasons in this context of mobile computing which were not emphasized earlier in the privacy paradox literature such as Peanut Effect, Fear of Missing Out- FoMo, Learned Helplessness, and Neophiliac Personality. These results add to the privacy paradox discourse and provide implications for smartphone users for making privacy-related decisions more consciously rather than inconsiderately disclosing information. Also, the results would help marketers and policymakers design nudges and choice architectures that consider privacy decision-making hurdles.


Urban Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (9) ◽  
pp. 1994-2007
Author(s):  
Jeroen van der Heijden

Policy and governance interventions often build on a rational choice perspective of human behaviour. Over the years, the behavioural sciences have highlighted how people sometimes deviate in predictable ways from this perspective. Building on a systematic analysis of 200 peer-reviewed publications published between 2009 and 2018, this article discusses the core cognitive biases and heuristics uncovered by the behavioural sciences, and gives insights into how these can be exploited to develop urban climate governance interventions to promote behaviours that help mitigate climate change at city level. The article concludes with a research agenda for this promising area of research for scholars of urban climate governance.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler J. Adkins ◽  
Richard L. Lewis ◽  
Taraz G. Lee

AbstractThe rationality of human behavior has been a major problem in philosophy for centuries. The pioneering work of Kahneman and Tversky provides strong evidence that people are not rational. Recent work in psychophysics argues that incentivized sensorimotor decisions (such as deciding where to reach to get a reward) maximizes expected gain, suggesting that it may be impervious to cognitive biases and heuristics. We rigorously tested this hypothesis using multiple experiments and multiple computational models. We obtained strong evidence that people deviated from the objectively rational strategy when potential losses were large. They instead appeared to follow a strategy in which they simplify the decision problem and satisfice rather than optimize. This work is consistent with the framework known as bounded rationality, according to which people behave rationally given their computational limitations.


Author(s):  
Mehmet SEVGIN

Over the last decades, standard economic assumptions are questioned due to some empirical violation examples of the rationality principle in economic theory. Behavioral economists suggest that it is more realistic to call individuals and firms "bounded rational" than rational to solve this inconsistency. Hence, one of the primary sources of these rationalities comes from cognitive biases and heuristics, according to many psychologies and behavioral economics studies. It is assumed that anchoring effect is one of the most robust cognitive biases since it might occur without the individual's awareness. In this study, anchoring effect as a cognitive bias is analyzed with its theoretical and psychological background. In the last section of the study, the findings of a class experiment are presented and discussed. According to the results, when the anchoring effect increases, the anchors' impact on the mean estimations of the subjects also increases. Moreover, when the subjects are explicitly directed to the anchor value, anchoring effect is more influential than a regular incidental anchoring effect. Hence, increases in anchoring effect result in a larger influence on the estimations of the subjects.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Scharowski ◽  
Florian Brühlmann

In explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) research, explainability is widely regarded as crucial for user trust in artificial intelligence (AI). However, empirical investigations of this assumption are still lacking. There are several proposals as to how explainability might be achieved and it is an ongoing debate what ramifications explanations actually have on humans. In our work-in-progress we explored two posthoc explanation approaches presented in natural language as a means for explainable AI. We examined the effects of human-centered explanations on trust behavior in a financial decision-making experiment (N = 387), captured by weight of advice (WOA). Results showed that AI explanations lead to higher trust behavior if participants were advised to decrease an initial price estimate. However, explanations had no effect if the AI recommended to increase the initial price estimate. We argue that these differences in trust behavior may be caused by cognitive biases and heuristics that people retain in their decision-making processes involving AI. So far, XAI has primarily focused on biased data and prejudice due to incorrect assumptions in the machine learning process. The implications of potential biases and heuristics that humans exhibit when being presented an explanation by AI have received little attention in the current XAI debate. Both researchers and practitioners need to be aware of such human biases and heuristics in order to develop truly human-centered AI.


2008 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory C. R. Yates

Principles of scientific data accumulation and evidence‐based practices are vehicles of professional enhancement. In this article, the author argues that a scientific knowledge base exists descriptive of the relationship between teachers’ activities and student learning. This database appears barely recognised however, for reasons including (a) the scientific tradition may not be seen as an appropriate basis for humanistic decision making; (b) personal observations can override impersonal statistics; (c) alternative frames, such as postmodernism, may contribute towards an anti‐science stance; (d) qualitative research may be viewed as representing a sampled universe; (e) educational theorising thrives upon dichotomisations which cannot be mapped against objectively‐secured data; and (f) individuals are relatively unable to undertake the mental processes demanded of theory change. The author also discusses the distinction between scientific reasoning and everyday cognition, as illustrated by research findings into cognitive biases and heuristics.


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