A Two-Sided Budget-Neutral Incentive Program for Coordinating an Influenza Vaccine Supply Chain With Endogenous Supply and Demand Under Uncertainty

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenan Arifoglu ◽  
Christopher S. Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Influenza Vaccine ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Incentive Program ◽  
Endogenous Supply

scholarly journals A Two-Sided Incentive Program for Coordinating the Influenza Vaccine Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenan Arifoğlu ◽  
Christopher S. Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Supply Side ◽  
Negative Externalities ◽  
Transfer Payments ◽  
Incentive Program ◽  
The Social ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Flu Vaccine ◽  
Balanced Budget

Problem definition: The U.S. influenza (flu) vaccine supply chain is decentralized and experiences frequent supply and demand mismatches caused by two key factors: (1) the vaccine production process (yield) is highly uncertain; and (2) individuals are self-interested and do not completely take into account positive and negative externalities that they impose on others. To improve matching of supply and demand, we counteract these factors by developing an ex ante budget-neutral incentive program. Academic/practical relevance: We establish the sources of inefficiency in the flu vaccine supply chain. To eliminate the inefficiency, we develop a two-sided incentive program that policymakers can implement to finance vaccines under an ex ante balanced budget. Methodology: We model the flu vaccine supply chain as a decentralized system consisting of self-interested individuals on the demand side, and a profit-maximizing manufacturer with uncertain yield on the supply side. We use backward induction to characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the sequential game that models the interactions between individuals and the manufacturer. Results: We develop a two-sided incentive program that proposes “vaccination incentives” to be given to individuals on the demand side, and “a menu of transfer payments” between the social planner and manufacturer on the supply side. When the realized vaccine supply is high (or low), our incentive program provides positive (negative) vaccination incentives for individuals to stimulate (or curb) the demand and eliminate positive (or negative) externalities by making vaccination more affordable (or costly). When social benefits from vaccination are significantly high, our incentive program uses a menu of transfer payments to penalize (or subsidize) the manufacturer for low (or high) yield realizations so that it produces the socially optimal quantity. We show that our incentive program can attain the social optimum, maintain an ex ante balanced budget (i.e., budget-neutral in expectation), and distribute the maximum social welfare between individuals and the manufacturer arbitrarily. Managerial implications: Vaccination incentives to individuals can ensure their access to the vaccine, but they are not enough to entice the manufacturer to ensure vaccine availability. A menu of contracts contingent on realized yield provides necessary incentives to the manufacturer and assures the availability.

High world sugar prices: is Asia’s production cycle to blame?

2010 ◽  
pp. 169-173
Author(s):  
Martin Todd
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Production Cycle ◽  
Low Levels ◽  
High Level ◽  
High World

The current high world sugar prices reflect a major imbalance between global supply and demand, which has reduced stocks to very low levels. Although it remains to be seen whether prices will rise much above current values, it is clear that the supply chain will remain stretched throughout 2010 and this will help to maintain prices at a high level.

scholarly journals The Implementation of CSA Model in Aquaculture Management in Poland

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1242
Author(s):  
Magdalena Raftowicz ◽  
Magdalena Kalisiak-Mędelska ◽  
Mirosław Struś
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Source Material ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Alternative Form ◽  
Community Supported Agriculture ◽  
Direct Sales ◽  
Key Stakeholders ◽  
Aquaculture Management

Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) is an alternative form of distributing agricultural products, including fish, consistent with the model of food supply chain shortening. It extends beyond the traditional model of profit maximization and aims at strengthening local interactions with food consumers. The purpose of this article is to assess the feasibility of implementing the CSA model in the Polish carp market, representing the dominant aquaculture product. The research focused on the potential identified on the supply and demand sides of the carp market. The source material was collected through a pilot two-track empirical study conducted in 2019 in the Barycz Valley, where the largest complex of carp breeding ponds is located in Poland, and in Europe. We propose that the following CSA model of direct sales can become a source of specific benefits in the economic, social, and environmental dimensions for the key stakeholders of the supply chain, (i.e., carp producers and consumers). The research results show that in the case of carp production in Poland, CSA may turn out a desirable support for the sale of fish in the future; however, the existing conditions are not yet fully favourable for its development.

Network effect in shared supply chain platform value co-creation behavior in evolutionary game1

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Zou Xiaohong ◽  
Chen Jinlong ◽  
Gao Shuanping
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Condition ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Network Effect ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
The Cost

The shared supply chain model has provided new ideas for solving contradictions between supply and demand for large-scale standardized production by manufacturers and personalized demands of consumers. On the basis of a platform network effect perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of value co-creation behavior for a shared supply chain platform and manufacturers, analyzes their evolutionary stable strategies, and uses numerical simulation analysis to further verify the model. The results revealed that the boundary condition for manufacturers to participate in value co-creation on a shared supply chain platform is that the net production cost of the manufacturers’ participation in the platform value co-creation must be less than that of nonparticipation. In addition, the boundary condition for the shared supply chain platform to actively participate in value co-creation is that the cost of the shared supply chain platform for active participation in value co-creation must be less than that of passive participation. Moreover, value co-creation behavior on the shared supply chain platform is a dynamic game interaction process between players with different benefit perceptions. Finally, the costs and benefits generated by the network effect can affect value co-creation on shared supply chain platforms.

scholarly journals Auction models with resource pooling in modern supply chain management

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-134
Author(s):  
Lihua Chen ◽  
Liying Wang ◽  
Yingjie Lan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Resource Pooling ◽  
Auction Models ◽  
Auction Model

Purpose In this paper, the main focus is on supply and demand auction systems with resource pooling in modern supply chain from a theoretical modeling perspective. The supply and demand auction systems in modern supply chains among manufacturers and suppliers serve as information sharing mechanisms. The purpose of this paper is to match the supply and demand such that a modern supply chain can achieve incentive compatibility and economic efficiency. The authors design such a supply and demand auction system that can integrate resources to efficiently match the supply and demand. Design/methodology/approach The authors propose three theoretic models of modern supply chain auctions with resource pooling according to the Vickrey auction principle. They are supply auction model with demand resource pooling, demand auction model with supply resource pooling, and double auction model with demand and supply resource pooling. For the proposed auction models, the authors present three corresponding algorithms to allocate resources in the auction process by linear programming, and study the incentive compatibility and define the Walrasian equilibriums for the proposed auction models. The authors show that the solutions of the proposed algorithms are Walrasian equilibriums. Findings By introducing the auction mechanism, the authors aim to realize the following three functions. First is price mining: auction is an open mechanism with multiple participants. Everyone has his own utility and purchasing ability. So, the final price reflects the market value of the auction. Second is dynamic modern supply chain construction: through auction, firm can find appropriate partner efficiently. Third is resources integration: in business practices, especially in modern supply chain auctions, auctioneers can integrate resources and ally buyers or sellers to gain more efficiency in auctions. Originality/value In the paper, the authors propose three theoretic models and corresponding algorithms of modern supply chain auctions with resource pooling according using the Vickrey auction principle, which achieves three functions: price mining, dynamic modern supply chain construction and resources integrating. Besides, these proposed models are much closer to practical settings and may have potential applications in modern supply chain management.

scholarly journals A Study of the Closed-Loop Supply Chain Coordination on Waste Glass Bottles Recycling

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenxue Ran ◽  
Fan Chen ◽  
Qianni Wu ◽  
Sen Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Waste Glass ◽  
Manufacturing Cost ◽  
Single Node ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
Glass Bottles

The recycling of waste products can sharply save manufacturing cost and improve the economic efficiency and corporate-reputation. It also has a great effect on the environment and resources protection. In the management of the closed-loop supply chain, the recycling of waste products and decision-making on pricing often directly affect the supply and demand of products and the operation efficiency of supply chain. Therefore, first we take waste glass bottles as an example and establish a mathematical model to solve the profit of manufacturers and retailers solely. Then, we analyzed whole supply chain profit under a dual-channel recycling condition which is directly recycled by consumers or by retailers. Finally, we concluded that no matter what product’s price, quality, profit, or operational efficiency of supply chain is, the overall recycling is better than the single node recycling model. Based on the analysis, we developed a new model to coordinate the profit of manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain with revenue-sharing contract. A numerical study shows that this approach is applicable and effective.

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