금융위기 시 예금보험제도의 역할에 관한 연구: 2008년 아이슬란드 사례를 중심으로(A Study on the Role of Deposit Insurance System During the Financial Crisis: Focusing on the Iceland Case in 2008)

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinho Lee ◽  
Hyunjae Jung ◽  
Eunji Gwon
Author(s):  
Gokhan Karabulut ◽  
Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-small;">The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the unlimited deposit insurance on non-performing loans and market discipline. Deposit insurance program play a crucial role in achieving financial stability. Governments in many advanced and developing economies established deposit insurance schemes for reducing the risk of systemic failure of banks. Deposit insurance has a beneficial effect of reducing the probability of a bank run.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>However deposit insurance systems have its own set of problems. Deposit insurance systems create moral hazard incentives that encourage banks to take excessive risk. Turkey established an explicit deposit insurance system in 1960. Until 1994, the coverage determined by a flat rate but in that date, Turkey experienced a major economic crisis. In April 1994, Turkish government started to apply an unlimited deposit insurance scheme to restore banking system stability. Unlimited deposit insurance caused a remarkable increase at non-performing loans. This paper empirically estimates the impact of unlimited deposit insurance system on non-performing bank loans (NPLs) and analyses the other potential sources of NPLs. </span></p>


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (5) ◽  
pp. 1404-1425
Author(s):  
Yiming Chang ◽  
Shangmei Zhao ◽  
Fei Hu

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