The Information Provision in the Corporate Acquisition Process: Why Target Firms Obtain Multiple Fairness Opinions

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tingting Liu
Keyword(s):  
Information Provision ◽  
Acquisition Process ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Fairness Opinions

scholarly journals Strategic Activism in an Uncertain World

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Allard van der Made
Keyword(s):  
Large Fraction ◽  
Information Provision ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Clean Technology ◽  
Property A ◽  
Know How ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Private Politics ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Total Welfare

AbstractWe model private politics in the presence of two-sided incomplete information. An interest group (IG) threatens to inform consumers about a firm’s damaging technology should the firm not adopt a clean technology. The IG does not know how costly adopting the clean technology is and the firm does not know how much the IG cares about the damages. In equilibrium an IG who cares a lot signals its type to the firm and the firm is more inclined to adopt the clean technology if it receives such a signal. However, impasses can occur: the firm does not adopt the clean technology despite the fact that the IG has signaled that it cares a lot and threatens to inform a large fraction of the consumer population. The IG never informs all consumers: as soon as a certain fraction of the consumers is informed by the IG the firm reduces its price and thereby reveals to the remaining consumers that it is employing a damaging technology. The IG’s actions increase consumer well-being, but decrease total welfare unless the cost of adopting the clean technology is likely to be low. Yet, since the IG is inclined to target firms with this property, a regulator might want to delegate information provision to the IG.

The Information Provision in the Corporate Acquisition Process: Why Target Firms Obtain Multiple Fairness Opinions

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 287-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tingting Liu
Keyword(s):  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Information Provision ◽  
Second Opinion ◽  
Wealth Effects ◽  
Investment Bank ◽  
Accounting Data ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT Using a hand-collected dataset for takeovers from 1996 to 2013, I examine why some target firms obtain a second fairness opinion and the associated wealth effects of doing so. I find that multiple opinions are more likely to be used in deals in which management/investment bank conflicts of interest are high—e.g., buyouts and stapled financing deals. In addition, the use of a second opinion has a significantly positive impact on target shareholders' wealth in these two types of deals. Fairness opinion valuation predominantly relies on accounting data, and the benefit of seeking a second opinion increases with a firm's earnings quality. Collectively, the results suggest that a second opinion is used to facilitate transactions. JEL Classifications: G34; G24; J33.

Sequentiality of Product Review Information Provision: An Information Foraging Perspective

MIS Quarterly ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 867-892 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mengxiang Li ◽  
◽  
Chuan-Hoo Tan ◽  
Kwok-Kee Wei ◽  
Kanliang Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Information Provision ◽  
Information Foraging ◽  
Product Review

A Different Approach to Information Provision and Retrieval

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Marsh
Keyword(s):  
Information Retrieval ◽  
Information Provision ◽  
Web Based ◽  
Amount Of Information

Information retrieval finds itself at an interesting juncture, where the amount of information that is available to people increases every day from its already bewildering limit. The problem is how to get the information we need in a timely and efficient fashion, without delivering useless or unwanted information. Current Web-Based IR systems do their best, but they will find it increasingly. . .

Multinationals from the BRIC-countries investing in German firms: Impacts on industrial relations

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1-2020) ◽  
pp. 3-18
Author(s):  
Martin Franz ◽  
Sebastian Henn
Keyword(s):  
Current System ◽  
Industrial Relations ◽  
Industrialized Countries ◽  
Bric Countries ◽  
Social Standards ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Patterns Of Communication ◽  
Run Up ◽  
Works Council ◽  
India And China

Often, investments from emerging economies in firms in industrialized countries evoke concerns among the employees in the targeted firms. Many of them are afraid of losing their jobs, or fear that the new owners could undermine existing social standards. Up to now, little is known about how such investments affect industrial relations in targeted countries. Using the example of investments from the BRIC-countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in German firms, this paper analyses whether employees’ fears are well founded. To this end, four different factors are considered. These include: (1) the situation of the target firms in the run-up to an acquisition and the employees’ reactions to the takeover, (2) the investors’ knowledge of the current system of industrial relations, (3) the day-to day interactions with the new owners, and (4) the patterns of communication between works council representatives and the new owners. The empirical part of the article is based on an analysis of quantitative data as well as the application of problem-centered interviews with members of work councils, trade union representatives as well as managers.

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